EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM: NEO-WITTGENSTEINIAN AND MODERATE NEO-MOOREAN

Episteme ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 438-457
Author(s):  
Joshua Stuchlik
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Radical Skepticism ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Epistemic Modesty ◽  
Rational Evaluation

ABSTRACTDuncan Pritchard proposes a biscopic solution to the problem of radical skepticism, which consists in epistemological disjunctivism and a theory about the limits of rational evaluation inspired by Wittgenstein's On Certainty. According to the latter theory, we cannot have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses, a consequence that Pritchard finds attractive insofar as he thinks that claims to know the falsity of radical skeptical hypotheses are epistemically immodest. I argue that there is room for a neo-Moorean to dispute Pritchard's argument for the Wittgensteinian proposal and I raise some doubts about its underlying motivation. Finally, I put forward an alternative, which I call “moderate neo-Moorean epistemological disjunctivism.” While this theory contends that we possess rationally grounded anti-skeptical knowledge, it also allows for a degree of epistemic modesty, by conceding that perceptual knowledge never amounts to knowledge that is absolutely certain.

Introduction

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan Pritchard
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Radical Skepticism ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
The Face ◽  
Rational Support ◽  
The One ◽  
Rational Evaluation

This introductory chapter argues that integrating epistemological disjunctivism with Wittgenstein's radical account of the structure of rational evaluation can solve the problem of radical skepticism. On the face of it, these proposals look very different; indeed, they look antithetical and competing. Whereas the one proposal emphasizes the locality of rational evaluation, and hence rational support, the other emphasizes the strength of the rational support available to us in paradigm conditions, in that it is factive. But these differences are superficial, the chapter asserts. In fact, these proposals work very well with each other, in that they are not only compatible, but also mutually supporting and philosophically in the same spirit.

scholarly journals AN EXPLANATORY CHALLENGE FOR EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM

Episteme ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cameron Boult
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Adequate Response ◽  
Number Of Authors

ABSTRACTEpistemological Disjunctivism is a view about paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge. Duncan Pritchard claims that it is particularly well suited to accounting for internalist and externalist intuitions. A number of authors have disputed this claim, arguing that there are problems for Pritchard's way with internalist intuitions. I share the worry. However, I don't think it has been expressed as effectively as it can be. My aim in this paper is to present a new way of formulating the worry, in terms of an “explanatory challenge”. The explanatory challenge is a simple, yet powerful and illuminating challenge for Epistemological Disjunctivism. It is illuminating in the sense that it shows us why Epistemological Disjunctivism must take on certain internalistically problematic commitments. A secondary aim of this paper is to examine whether the recently much-discussed distinction between justifications and excuses in epistemology can support an adequate response. I will argue that it cannot.

The Sources of Scepticism

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 203-227
Author(s):  
Duncan Pritchard
Keyword(s):  
Closure Principle ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Radical Scepticism ◽  
Rational Evaluation

It is claimed that the radical sceptical problem that is the focus of much of contemporary epistemological discussion in fact divides into two logically distinct sub-problems—a formulation that turns on the closure principle and a second formulation which turns on the underdetermination principle. The Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation is set out, and it is shown how this proposal—at least when properly formulated—can deal with closure-based radical scepticism. It is also claimed, however, that this account fails to gain any purchase on underdetermination-based radical scepticism. The antidote to this latter form of radical scepticism lies elsewhere—with, it is suggested, epistemological disjunctivism.

scholarly journals ON ENVATTMENT - DISJUNCTIVISM, SKEPTICAL SCENARIOS AND RATIONALITY

2016 ◽  
Vol 57 (134) ◽  
pp. 525-544
Author(s):  
Giovanni Rolla
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Clinical Cases

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is two-fold: first, it is intended to articulate theses that are often assessed independently, thus showing that a strong version of epistemological disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge implies a transformative conception of rationality. This entails that individuals in skeptical scenarios could not entertain rational thoughts about their environment, for they would fail to have perceptual states. The secondary aim is to show that this consequence is not a sufficient reason to abandon the variety of disjunctivism presented. The argument for this claim depends on the assessment of rationality attributions to subjects in plausible cases of illusion and some clinical cases of hallucination.

Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemic Angst

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Greco
Keyword(s):  
Radical Skepticism ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Princeton University

Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of our Believing. By Duncan Pritchard. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016. Pp. xv + 239. isbn 978-0-691-16723-7.

scholarly journals Faith and Reason

2017 ◽  
Vol 81 ◽  
pp. 101-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan Pritchard
Keyword(s):  
Religious Belief ◽  
Rational Belief ◽  
Faith And Reason ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Rational Evaluation

AbstractA novel account of the rationality of religious belief is offered, called quasi-fideism. According to this proposal, we are neither to think of religious belief as completely immune to rational evaluation nor are we to deny that it involves fundamental commitments which are arational. Moreover, a parity argument is presented to the effect that religious belief is no different from ordinary rational belief in presupposing such fundamental arational commitments. This proposal is shown to be rooted in Wittgenstein's remarks on hinge commitments in On Certainty, remarks which it is claimed were in turn influenced by John Henry Newman's treatment of the rationality of religious belief in An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent.

scholarly journals Dobradiças, Vertigem Epistémica e Moralidade

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (53) ◽  
pp. 125-140
Author(s):  
Nuno Venturinha ◽  
Keyword(s):  
On Certainty ◽  
The Third ◽  
Inexact Knowledge ◽  
Hinge Epistemology ◽  
Hinge Propositions ◽  
Rational Evaluation

This paper explores central themes of Duncan Pritchard’s epistemology intimately related to the Wittgensteinian idea of a “hinge epistemology”. The first section calls attention to the eminently empirical character of our “hinges”. The second section focuses on Pritchard’s notion of “arational hinge commitments”, more specifically his distinction between the pair “über hinge commitments”/“über hinge propositions” and the pair “personal hinge commitments”/“personal hinge propositions”. The third section brings to the discussion Timothy Williamson’s view of “inexact knowledge” and examines another pair of notions introduced by Pritchard, namely “antiskeptical hinge commitments”/“antiskeptical hinge propositions”. I conclude with a reevaluation of the diagnosis made by Pritchard that, confronted with a sceptical scenario, our “epistemic angst” can be surpassed if we follow Wittgenstein’s teaching in On Certainty about the “structure of rational evaluation”, but that an “epistemic vertigo” can never be ultimately dispelled. My argument is that in a moral scenario there is no room for vertigo.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document