scholarly journals REFLECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
J.J. Cunningham
Keyword(s):  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Bridge Principle ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism

AbstractIt is now common to distinguishMetaphysicalfromEpistemologicalDisjunctivism. It is equally common to suggest that it is at least not obvious that the latter requires a commitment to the former: at the very least, a suitable bridge principle will need to be identified which takes one from the former to the latter. This paper identifies a plausible-looking bridge principle that takes one from the version of Epistemological Disjunctivism defended by John McDowell and Duncan Pritchard, which I labelReflective Epistemological Disjunctivismor (RED), to Metaphysical Disjunctivism. Moreover, it identifies a modification the proponent of (RED) could, and should, make to the Internalist component of their theory, and argues that the commitment to Metaphysical Disjunctivism remains, even if such a modification is made. The upshot is that the commitment to Metaphysical Disjunctivism on the part of (RED) is shown to be particularly robust.

World in Mind

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather Logue
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
External World ◽  
Naive Realism ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Relational View ◽  
Naïve Realism ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
External World Skepticism

I will begin this paper by sketching a view according to which perceptual phenomenal character is “extended”, in the sense of literally incorporating mind-independent entities in the subject’s environment (a view also known as Naïve Realism or the Relational View). I will then argue that this metaphysical thesis about perceptual phenomenal character affords a novel version of epistemological disjunctivism (a view that is elaborated and defended by John McDowell and Duncan Pritchard). I will conclude by comparing the resulting view with other versions of epistemological disjunctivism, and arguing that the version I have offered provides the most satisfying response to external world skepticism.

scholarly journals Disjuntivismo epistemológico e ceticismo radical

2017 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 624
Author(s):  
Breno Ricardo Guimarães Santos
Keyword(s):  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Duncan Pritchard

O disjuntivismo epistemológico é uma teoria filosófica que tem recebido uma atenção especial nos últimos anos. Particularmente porque ela tem sido encarada por muitos como uma via de renovação de discussões que vão desde a natureza da justificação das nossas crenças cotidianas até a possibilidade de desvendar as estruturas do ceticismo radical e responder ao problema estabelecido por ele. Duncan Pritchard é um dos autores que têm oferecido uma visão particular do disjuntivismo e maneiras de conceber tratamentos disjuntivistas para tais questões. Seu trabalho tem como fonte de inspiração, em grande medida, o trabalho seminal de John McDowell. Nesse artigo, eu apresento uma maneira de entender o problema cético radical e de que maneira o disjuntivismo epistemológico pretender oferecer soluções ao problema. Para isso, eu apresento a proposta disjuntivista geral de McDowell e discuto em que sentido essa proposta se diferencia da teoria disjuntivista defendida por Pritchard. Ao fim, eu tento mostrar como a abordagem de Pritchard pretender responder ao ceticismo radical não só apelando para uma leitura disjuntivista da nossa posição epistêmica, mas oferecendo uma revisão da nossa estrutura de razões.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM: NEO-WITTGENSTEINIAN AND MODERATE NEO-MOOREAN

Episteme ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 438-457
Author(s):  
Joshua Stuchlik
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Radical Skepticism ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Epistemic Modesty ◽  
Rational Evaluation

ABSTRACTDuncan Pritchard proposes a biscopic solution to the problem of radical skepticism, which consists in epistemological disjunctivism and a theory about the limits of rational evaluation inspired by Wittgenstein's On Certainty. According to the latter theory, we cannot have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses, a consequence that Pritchard finds attractive insofar as he thinks that claims to know the falsity of radical skeptical hypotheses are epistemically immodest. I argue that there is room for a neo-Moorean to dispute Pritchard's argument for the Wittgensteinian proposal and I raise some doubts about its underlying motivation. Finally, I put forward an alternative, which I call “moderate neo-Moorean epistemological disjunctivism.” While this theory contends that we possess rationally grounded anti-skeptical knowledge, it also allows for a degree of epistemic modesty, by conceding that perceptual knowledge never amounts to knowledge that is absolutely certain.

Epistemological Disjunctivism, by Duncan Pritchard.

Mind ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 123 (489) ◽  
pp. 235-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Littlejohn
Keyword(s):  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism

scholarly journals Pritchard, D. (2016). Epistemic Angst. Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press

2019 ◽  
pp. 271-276
Author(s):  
Vicente Raga Rosaleny
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Radical Skepticism ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Princeton University

El libro Epistemic Angst (2016a) de Duncan Pritchard pretende, de acuerdo con una lectura predominante del pensamiento de Wittgenstein, curarnos de la angustia epistémica que producen las variedades más relevantes del escepticismo contemporáneo (Pritchard, 2016a). El libro tiene un interés innegable tanto para los que cultivan dicho campo de investigación como para los estudiosos del pensamiento tardío de Wittgenstein o para los que se sientan atraídos por una de las variantes más significativas de la teoría del conocimiento y la percepción actuales, el disyuntivismo epistémico, auspiciada de manera destacada por John McDowell (1995, por ejemplo). Adicionalmente, y de manera central, el volumen que reseñamos supone un gran aporte al vigente, y muy activo en los últimos tiempos, campo de la conocida como “epistemología de goznes”, que desarrolla los supuestos epistémicos tan sólo esbozados en Sobre la certeza, obra póstuma compuesta a partir de los últimos cuadernos del ya mencionado Ludwig Wittgenstein. Finalmente, el libro tiene un gran atractivo por el modo en que dialoga críticamente con otros proponentes de dicha epistemología, así como con los defensores de respuestas alternativas al reto escéptico, bien sean internistas o externistas.

Epistemological Disjunctivism by Duncan Pritchard

Analysis ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 604-615
Author(s):  
Genia Schönbaumsfeld
Keyword(s):  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism

scholarly journals AN EXPLANATORY CHALLENGE FOR EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM

Episteme ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cameron Boult
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Adequate Response ◽  
Number Of Authors

ABSTRACTEpistemological Disjunctivism is a view about paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge. Duncan Pritchard claims that it is particularly well suited to accounting for internalist and externalist intuitions. A number of authors have disputed this claim, arguing that there are problems for Pritchard's way with internalist intuitions. I share the worry. However, I don't think it has been expressed as effectively as it can be. My aim in this paper is to present a new way of formulating the worry, in terms of an “explanatory challenge”. The explanatory challenge is a simple, yet powerful and illuminating challenge for Epistemological Disjunctivism. It is illuminating in the sense that it shows us why Epistemological Disjunctivism must take on certain internalistically problematic commitments. A secondary aim of this paper is to examine whether the recently much-discussed distinction between justifications and excuses in epistemology can support an adequate response. I will argue that it cannot.

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