bridge principle
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2021 ◽  
Vol 30 ◽  
pp. 252
Author(s):  
Nadine Theiler

It is often assumed that presuppositions in wh-questions project universally. However, Schwarz & Simonenko (2018) note examples of such questions where universal projection is absent. I discuss their account and propose an alternative: by reasoning about the pragmatics of question-answer discourse, I arrive at a version of Stalnaker's bridge principle that is sensitive to what the speaker already knows about the true answer to the question. This Epistemic Bridge predicts universal projection for canonical information-seeking questions, but less than universal projection for certain non-canonical question uses such as quiz questions.


Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
J.J. Cunningham

AbstractIt is now common to distinguishMetaphysicalfromEpistemologicalDisjunctivism. It is equally common to suggest that it is at least not obvious that the latter requires a commitment to the former: at the very least, a suitable bridge principle will need to be identified which takes one from the former to the latter. This paper identifies a plausible-looking bridge principle that takes one from the version of Epistemological Disjunctivism defended by John McDowell and Duncan Pritchard, which I labelReflective Epistemological Disjunctivismor (RED), to Metaphysical Disjunctivism. Moreover, it identifies a modification the proponent of (RED) could, and should, make to the Internalist component of their theory, and argues that the commitment to Metaphysical Disjunctivism remains, even if such a modification is made. The upshot is that the commitment to Metaphysical Disjunctivism on the part of (RED) is shown to be particularly robust.


2010 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Butchard ◽  
Robert D’Amico

John Searle’s argument that social-scientific laws are impossible depends on a special open-ended feature of social kinds. We demonstrate that under a noncontentious understanding of bridging principles the so-called “counts-as” relation, found in the expression “X counts as Y in (context) C,” provides a bridging principle for social kinds. If we are correct, not only are social-scientific laws possible, but the “counts as” relation might provide a more perspicuous formulation for candidate bridge principles.


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