Spatial structure favors cooperative behavior in the snowdrift game with multiple interactive dynamics

2017 ◽  
Vol 468 ◽  
pp. 299-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qi Su ◽  
Aming Li ◽  
Long Wang
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Structure ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Snowdrift Game ◽  
Interactive Dynamics

scholarly journals The Ultimate Guide to Bacterial Swarming: An Experimental Model to Study the Evolution of Cooperative Behavior

2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 293-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jinyuan Yan ◽  
Hilary Monaco ◽  
Joao B. Xavier
Keyword(s):  
Machine Learning ◽  
Pseudomonas Aeruginosa ◽  
Spatial Structure ◽  
Regulatory Network ◽  
Learning Algorithm ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Machine Learning Algorithm ◽  
Proximate Mechanisms ◽  
Cooperative Behaviors ◽  
Bacterial Swarming

Cooperation has fascinated biologists since Darwin. How did cooperative behaviors evolve despite the fitness cost to the cooperator? Bacteria have cooperative behaviors that make excellent models to take on this age-old problem from both proximate (molecular) and ultimate (evolutionary) angles. We delve into Pseudomonas aeruginosa swarming, a phenomenon where billions of bacteria move cooperatively across distances of centimeters in a matter of a few hours. Experiments with swarming have unveiled a strategy called metabolic prudence that stabilizes cooperation, have showed the importance of spatial structure, and have revealed a regulatory network that integrates environmental stimuli and direct cooperative behavior, similar to a machine learning algorithm. The study of swarming elucidates more than proximate mechanisms: It exposes ultimate mechanisms valid to all scales, from cells in cancerous tumors to animals in large communities.

scholarly journals Stochasticity, Selection, and the Evolution of Cooperation in a Two-Level Moran Model of the Snowdrift Game

Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian McLoone ◽  
Wai-Tong Louis Fan ◽  
Adam Pham ◽  
Rory Smead ◽  
Laurence Loewe
Keyword(s):  
Stochastic Dynamics ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Threshold Effect ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Multilevel Selection ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Interior Equilibrium ◽  
Moran Model ◽  
Snowdrift Game

The Snowdrift Game, also known as the Hawk-Dove Game, is a social dilemma in which an individual can participate (cooperate) or not (defect) in producing a public good. It is relevant to a number of collective action problems in biology. In a population of individuals playing this game, traditional evolutionary models, in which the dynamics are continuous and deterministic, predict a stable, interior equilibrium frequency of cooperators. Here, we examine how finite population size and multilevel selection affect the evolution of cooperation in this game using a two-level Moran process, which involves discrete, stochastic dynamics. Our analysis has two main results. First, we find that multilevel selection in this model can yield significantly higher levels of cooperation than one finds in traditional models. Second, we identify a threshold effect for the payoff matrix in the Snowdrift Game, such that below (above) a determinate cost-to-benefit ratio, cooperation will almost surely fix (go extinct) in the population. This second result calls into question the explanatory reach of traditional continuous models and suggests a possible alternative explanation for high levels of cooperative behavior in nature.

Spatial snowdrift game of a heterogeneous agent system: cooperative behavior

2013 ◽  
Vol 86 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ping-Ping Li ◽  
Jianhong Ke ◽  
Luo-Luo Jiang ◽  
Xian-Zhang Yuan ◽  
Zhenquan Lin
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Agent System ◽  
Heterogeneous Agent ◽  
Snowdrift Game

Influence of vertex weight on cooperative behavior in a spatial snowdrift game

2011 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 025802 ◽  
Author(s):  
C Y Xia ◽  
J Zhao ◽  
J Wang ◽  
Y L Wang ◽  
H Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Vertex Weight ◽  
Snowdrift Game

Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game

Nature ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 428 (6983) ◽  
pp. 643-646 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Hauert ◽  
Michael Doebeli
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Structure ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Snowdrift Game

EVOLUTIONARY GAMES IN MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS OF WEIGHTED SOCIAL NETWORKS

2009 ◽  
Vol 20 (05) ◽  
pp. 701-710 ◽  
Author(s):  
WEN-BO DU ◽  
XIAN-BIN CAO ◽  
HAO-RAN ZHENG ◽  
HONG ZHOU ◽  
MAO-BIN HU
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Social Systems ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Multi Agent Systems ◽  
Snowdrift Game ◽  
Cooperation Level ◽  
The Social ◽  
Multi Agent

Much empirical evidence has shown realistic networks are weighted. Compared with those on unweighted networks, the dynamics on weighted network often exhibit distinctly different phenomena. In this paper, we investigate the evolutionary game dynamics (prisoner's dilemma game and snowdrift game) on a weighted social network consisted of rational agents and focus on the evolution of cooperation in the system. Simulation results show that the cooperation level is strongly affected by the weighted nature of the network. Moreover, the variation of time series has also been investigated. Our work may be helpful in understanding the cooperative behavior in the social systems.

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