Cooperative behavior in evolutionary snowdrift game with bounded rationality

2009 ◽  
Vol 388 (23) ◽  
pp. 4856-4862 ◽  
Author(s):  
Y.C. Ni ◽  
C. Xu ◽  
P.M. Hui ◽  
N.F. Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Snowdrift Game

scholarly journals Stochasticity, Selection, and the Evolution of Cooperation in a Two-Level Moran Model of the Snowdrift Game

Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian McLoone ◽  
Wai-Tong Louis Fan ◽  
Adam Pham ◽  
Rory Smead ◽  
Laurence Loewe
Keyword(s):  
Stochastic Dynamics ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Threshold Effect ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Multilevel Selection ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Interior Equilibrium ◽  
Moran Model ◽  
Snowdrift Game

The Snowdrift Game, also known as the Hawk-Dove Game, is a social dilemma in which an individual can participate (cooperate) or not (defect) in producing a public good. It is relevant to a number of collective action problems in biology. In a population of individuals playing this game, traditional evolutionary models, in which the dynamics are continuous and deterministic, predict a stable, interior equilibrium frequency of cooperators. Here, we examine how finite population size and multilevel selection affect the evolution of cooperation in this game using a two-level Moran process, which involves discrete, stochastic dynamics. Our analysis has two main results. First, we find that multilevel selection in this model can yield significantly higher levels of cooperation than one finds in traditional models. Second, we identify a threshold effect for the payoff matrix in the Snowdrift Game, such that below (above) a determinate cost-to-benefit ratio, cooperation will almost surely fix (go extinct) in the population. This second result calls into question the explanatory reach of traditional continuous models and suggests a possible alternative explanation for high levels of cooperative behavior in nature.

Spatial snowdrift game of a heterogeneous agent system: cooperative behavior

2013 ◽  
Vol 86 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ping-Ping Li ◽  
Jianhong Ke ◽  
Luo-Luo Jiang ◽  
Xian-Zhang Yuan ◽  
Zhenquan Lin
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Agent System ◽  
Heterogeneous Agent ◽  
Snowdrift Game

Influence of vertex weight on cooperative behavior in a spatial snowdrift game

2011 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 025802 ◽  
Author(s):  
C Y Xia ◽  
J Zhao ◽  
J Wang ◽  
Y L Wang ◽  
H Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Vertex Weight ◽  
Snowdrift Game

scholarly journals The Spread of Ideas in a Network—The Garbage-Can Model

Entropy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (10) ◽  
pp. 1345
Author(s):  
Dorota Żuchowska-Skiba ◽  
Maria Stojkow ◽  
Malgorzata J. Krawczyk ◽  
Krzysztof Kułakowski
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Chain Length ◽  
Hamming Distance ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Threshold Value ◽  
Temporal Networks ◽  
Garbage Can Model ◽  
The Third ◽  
Organizational Choice

The main goal of our work is to show how ideas change in social networks. Our analysis is based on three concepts: (i) temporal networks, (ii) the Axelrod model of culture dissemination, (iii) the garbage can model of organizational choice. The use of the concept of temporal networks allows us to show the dynamics of ideas spreading processes in networks, thanks to the analysis of contacts between agents in networks. The Axelrod culture dissemination model allows us to use the importance of cooperative behavior for the dynamics of ideas disseminated in networks. In the third model decisions on solutions of problems are made as an outcome of sequences of pseudorandom numbers. The origin of this model is the Herbert Simon’s view on bounded rationality. In the Axelrod model, ideas are conveyed by strings of symbols. The outcome of the model should be the diversity of evolving ideas as dependent on the chain length, on the number of possible values of symbols and on the threshold value of Hamming distance which enables the combination.

EVOLUTIONARY GAMES IN MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS OF WEIGHTED SOCIAL NETWORKS

2009 ◽  
Vol 20 (05) ◽  
pp. 701-710 ◽  
Author(s):  
WEN-BO DU ◽  
XIAN-BIN CAO ◽  
HAO-RAN ZHENG ◽  
HONG ZHOU ◽  
MAO-BIN HU
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Social Systems ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Multi Agent Systems ◽  
Snowdrift Game ◽  
Cooperation Level ◽  
The Social ◽  
Multi Agent

Much empirical evidence has shown realistic networks are weighted. Compared with those on unweighted networks, the dynamics on weighted network often exhibit distinctly different phenomena. In this paper, we investigate the evolutionary game dynamics (prisoner's dilemma game and snowdrift game) on a weighted social network consisted of rational agents and focus on the evolution of cooperation in the system. Simulation results show that the cooperation level is strongly affected by the weighted nature of the network. Moreover, the variation of time series has also been investigated. Our work may be helpful in understanding the cooperative behavior in the social systems.

scholarly journals LEARNING, COMPETITION AND COOPERATION IN SIMPLE GAMES

2000 ◽  
Vol 03 (03) ◽  
pp. 463-464 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. ÁNGELES R. DE CARA ◽  
ÓSCAR PLA ◽  
FRANCISCO GUINEA
Keyword(s):  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Self Organization ◽  
Simple Games ◽  
Minority Game ◽  
Amount Of Information ◽  
Competition And Cooperation ◽  
Crowd Effect

The Minority Game was introduced to study the competition between agents with bounded rationality. As the amount of information available decreases, agents manage to arbitrage away all the information, and collective gain is then reduced. This crowd effect arises from the fact that only a minority can profit at each moment, while all agents make their choices using the same input. The properties of the model change drastically if agents make choices based on their individual histories, keeping all remaining rules unaltered. This variation reduces the intrinsic frustration of the model, and improves the tendency towards cooperation and self organization. Finally, we study the stable mixing of individual and cooperative behavior.

Explaining Variation in Cooperative Behavior

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Friederike Mengel ◽  
Joël van der Weele
Keyword(s):  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Controlled Experiments ◽  
Mutual Cooperation ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Theoretical Literature ◽  
Economics Literature ◽  
Great Heterogeneity ◽  
Short Run

Casual observation and controlled experiments show that humans display great heterogeneity in their tendency to exploit others or invest in mutual cooperation. This chapter reviews models in the economics literature that can explain the coexistence of free riders (exploiters) and cooperators (investors). A distinction is made between models of full and bounded rationality. Although some models provide tentative explanations, there is a large gap between the empirical and theoretical literature, and there has been little effort to integrate long- and short-run models.

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