Cooperative Behavior in N-person Evolutionary Snowdrift Game on Barab\'asi-Albert Network with Link Rewiring Mechanism

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (11) ◽  
pp. 4519-4529 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaowen Zhong
Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian McLoone ◽  
Wai-Tong Louis Fan ◽  
Adam Pham ◽  
Rory Smead ◽  
Laurence Loewe

The Snowdrift Game, also known as the Hawk-Dove Game, is a social dilemma in which an individual can participate (cooperate) or not (defect) in producing a public good. It is relevant to a number of collective action problems in biology. In a population of individuals playing this game, traditional evolutionary models, in which the dynamics are continuous and deterministic, predict a stable, interior equilibrium frequency of cooperators. Here, we examine how finite population size and multilevel selection affect the evolution of cooperation in this game using a two-level Moran process, which involves discrete, stochastic dynamics. Our analysis has two main results. First, we find that multilevel selection in this model can yield significantly higher levels of cooperation than one finds in traditional models. Second, we identify a threshold effect for the payoff matrix in the Snowdrift Game, such that below (above) a determinate cost-to-benefit ratio, cooperation will almost surely fix (go extinct) in the population. This second result calls into question the explanatory reach of traditional continuous models and suggests a possible alternative explanation for high levels of cooperative behavior in nature.


2013 ◽  
Vol 86 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ping-Ping Li ◽  
Jianhong Ke ◽  
Luo-Luo Jiang ◽  
Xian-Zhang Yuan ◽  
Zhenquan Lin

2011 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 025802 ◽  
Author(s):  
C Y Xia ◽  
J Zhao ◽  
J Wang ◽  
Y L Wang ◽  
H Zhang

2009 ◽  
Vol 20 (05) ◽  
pp. 701-710 ◽  
Author(s):  
WEN-BO DU ◽  
XIAN-BIN CAO ◽  
HAO-RAN ZHENG ◽  
HONG ZHOU ◽  
MAO-BIN HU

Much empirical evidence has shown realistic networks are weighted. Compared with those on unweighted networks, the dynamics on weighted network often exhibit distinctly different phenomena. In this paper, we investigate the evolutionary game dynamics (prisoner's dilemma game and snowdrift game) on a weighted social network consisted of rational agents and focus on the evolution of cooperation in the system. Simulation results show that the cooperation level is strongly affected by the weighted nature of the network. Moreover, the variation of time series has also been investigated. Our work may be helpful in understanding the cooperative behavior in the social systems.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document