Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game

Nature ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 428 (6983) ◽  
pp. 643-646 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Hauert ◽  
Michael Doebeli
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Structure ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Snowdrift Game

scholarly journals Emergence of Spatial Structure in Cell Groups and the Evolution of Cooperation

2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. e1000716 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carey D. Nadell ◽  
Kevin R. Foster ◽  
João B. Xavier
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Structure ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Cell Groups

scholarly journals Effect of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation

2009 ◽  
Vol 80 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos P. Roca ◽  
José A. Cuesta ◽  
Angel Sánchez
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Structure ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation

scholarly journals Ordering structured populations in multiplayer cooperation games

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Peña ◽  
Bin Wu ◽  
Arne Traulsen
Keyword(s):  
Population Structure ◽  
Spatial Structure ◽  
Structured Populations ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Multiplayer Games ◽  
Spatial Games ◽  
Population Structures ◽  
Single Structure ◽  
Containment Order ◽  
Update Rules

AbstractSpatial structure greatly affects the evolution of cooperation. While in two-player games the condition for cooperation to evolve depends on a single structure coefficient, in multiplayer games the condition might depend on several structure coefficients, making it difficult to compare different population structures. We propose a solution to this issue by introducing two simple ways of ordering population structures: the containment order and the volume order. If population structure 𝒮1 is greater than population structure 𝒮2 in the containment or the volume order, then 𝒮1 can be considered a stronger promoter of cooperation. We provide conditions for establishing the containment order, give general results on the volume order, and illustrate our theory by comparing different models of spatial games and associated update rules. Our results hold for a large class of population structures and can be easily applied to specific cases once the structure coefficients have been calculated or estimated.

scholarly journals Eco-evolutionary spatial dynamics of non-linear social dilemmas

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chaitanya S. Gokhale ◽  
Hye Jin Park
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Structure ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Spatial Dynamics ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Evolutionary Trajectory ◽  
The Public ◽  
Non Linear

AbstractSpatial dynamics can promote the evolution of cooperation. While dispersal processes have been studied in simple evolutionary games, real-world social dilemmas are much more complicated. The public good, in many cases, does not increase linearly as per the investment in it. When the investment is low, for example, every additional unit of the investment may help a lot to increase the public good, but the effect vanishes as the number of investments increase. Such non-linear behaviour is the norm rather than an exception in a variety of social as well as biological systems. We take into account the non-linearity in the payoffs of the public goods game as well as the natural demographic effects of population densities. Population density has also been shown to impact the evolution of co-operation. Coupling these non-linear games and population size effect together with an explicitly defined spatial structure brings us one step closer to the complexity of real eco-evolutionary spatial systems. We show how the non-linearity in payoffs, resulting in synergy or discounting of public goods can alter the effective rate of return on the cooperative investment. Synergy or discounting in public goods accumulation affects the resulting spatial structure, not just quantitatively but in some cases, drastically changing the outcomes. In cases where a linear payoff structure would lead to extinction, synergy can support the coexistence of cooperators and defectors. The combined eco-evolutionary trajectory can thus be qualitatively different in cases on non-linear social dilemmas.

Effect of Growing Size of Interaction Neighbors on the Evolution of Cooperation in Spatial Snowdrift Game

2012 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 541-546 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan-Juan Zhang ◽  
Juan Wang ◽  
Shi-Wen Sun ◽  
Li Wang ◽  
Zhen Wang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Snowdrift Game
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