scholarly journals Equilibrium strategies in a multiregional transboundary pollution differential game with spatially distributed controls

Automatica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 125 ◽  
pp. 109411
Author(s):  
Javier de Frutos ◽  
Paula M. López-Pérez ◽  
Guiomar Martín-Herrán
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Transboundary Pollution ◽  
Equilibrium Strategies ◽  
Spatially Distributed ◽  
Distributed Controls

scholarly journals A Stochastic Differential Game of Transboundary Pollution under Knightian Uncertainty of Stock Dynamics

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chunyan Fu ◽  
Yongxi Yi ◽  
Susu Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Robust Control ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Transboundary Pollution ◽  
Knightian Uncertainty ◽  
Stochastic Differential Game ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Optimal Output ◽  
Control Framework ◽  
Pollution Accumulation

With the robust control framework of Hansen and Sargent (2001), this paper investigates a stochastic differential game of transboundary pollution between two regions under Knightian uncertainty of stock dynamics. Both regions are assumed to play a noncooperative and a cooperative game, and the worst-case pollution accumulation processes for discrete robustness parameters are characterized. Our objective is to identify both regions’ optimal output and emission levels and analyze the effects of the Knightian uncertainty of pollution stock dynamics on both regions’ optimization behavior. We illustrate the results with some numerical examples.

scholarly journals A Cooperative Stochastic Differential Game of Transboundary Industrial Pollution between Two Asymmetric Nations

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongxi Yi ◽  
Rongwei Xu ◽  
Sheng Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Industrial Pollution ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Infinite Horizon ◽  
Pollution Abatement ◽  
Transboundary Pollution ◽  
Stochastic Differential Game ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Consistent Solution

Considering the fact that transboundary pollution control calls for the cooperation between interested parties, this paper studies a cooperative stochastic differential game of transboundary industrial pollution between two asymmetric nations in infinite-horizon level. In this paper, we model two ways of transboundary pollution: one is an accumulative global pollutant with an uncertain evolutionary dynamic and the other is a regional nonaccumulative pollutant. In our model, firms and governments are separated entities and they play a Stackelberg game, while the governments of the two nations can cooperate in pollution reduction. We discuss the feedback Nash equilibrium strategies of governments and industrial firms, and it is found that the governments being cooperative in transboundary pollution control will set a higher pollution tax rate and make more pollution abatement effort than when they are noncooperative. Additionally, a payment distribution mechanism that supports the subgame consistent solution is proposed.

scholarly journals A Differential Game of Ecological Compensation Criterion for Transboundary Pollution Abatement under Learning by Doing

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Zhigang Chen ◽  
Rongwei Xu ◽  
Yongxi Yi
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Pollution Abatement ◽  
Learning By Doing ◽  
Transboundary Pollution ◽  
Upstream Region ◽  
Ecological Compensation ◽  
Abatement Measure ◽  
Abatement Policy ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Strategies

This paper studies a stochastic differential game of transboundary pollution abatement between two kinds of ecological compensation and the abatement policy, in which the learning by doing is taken into account. Emission and pollution abatement between upstream and downstream region in the same basin is a Stackelberg game, and the downstream regions provide economic compensation for pollution abatement in the upstream region. We discuss the feedback Nash equilibrium strategies of proportional compensation and investment compensation, and it is found that an appropriate ecological compensation ratio can improve the investment level of pollution abatement in the two regions by accumulating experience in the process of learning by doing. In the long term, the investment compensation mechanism is an effective transboundary pollution abatement measure that can continuously reduce the water pollution stock in the upstream and downstream.

scholarly journals Dynamic Optimal Control Differential Game of Ecological Compensation for Multipollutant Transboundary Pollution

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Zhigang Chen ◽  
Qianyue Meng ◽  
Huichuan Wang ◽  
Rongwei Xu ◽  
Yongxi Yi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
River Basin ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Transboundary Pollution ◽  
Upstream Region ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Ecological Compensation ◽  
Stackelberg Differential Game ◽  
Downstream Region ◽  
Compensation Rate

This paper studies a Stackelberg differential game between an upstream region and a downstream region for transboundary pollution control and ecological compensation in a river basin and increases the number of pollutants assumed in the model to multiple. Emission and green innovation investment between upstream and downstream regions in the same basin is a Stackelberg game, and the downstream region provides economic compensation for green innovation investment in the upstream region. The results show that there is an optimal ecological compensation rate, and a Pareto improvement result can be obtained by implementing ecological compensation. Increasing the proportion of ecological compensation can improve the nonvirtuous chain reaction between green innovation investment cost, pollutant transfer rate, and ecological compensation rate. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a joint mechanism composed of the government and the market and formulate a reasonable green innovation subsidy scheme according to the actual situation of the basin, so as to restrict the emergence of this “individual rational” behavior. For river basin areas that can establish a unified management department and organize the implementation of decision-making, the cooperative game is a very effective pollution control decision.

A TIME-CONSISTENT AGREEMENT IN AN INTERREGIONAL DIFFERENTIAL GAME ON POLLUTION AND TRADE

2006 ◽  
Vol 08 (03) ◽  
pp. 369-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
FRANCISCO CABO ◽  
ELENA ESCUDERO ◽  
GUIOMAR MARTÍN-HERRÁN
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Environmental Problem ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Transboundary Pollution ◽  
The Other ◽  
Intermediate Good ◽  
Total Production ◽  
Allocation Mechanism ◽  
Interregional Trade ◽  
Pollution Problem

This paper studies a transboundary pollution problem between two neighbour regions as a dynamic game. These two regions do not only share an environmental problem but they are also engaged in interregional trade. A good produced in one region is traded to the other which uses it as an input. This intermediate good is supplied by the former and demanded by the latter. The supply-demand scheme determines the price and production of the intermediate good. Thus total production is fixed in both regions, and the emissions of pollutants are also determined as a by-product. Cooperation cuts down production and trade, and in consequence the emissions of pollutants. Therefore, the environmental gain from cooperation overcomes the shrink in the interregional trade. An allocation mechanism to share the surplus of cooperation is defined, which guarantees a time-consistent agreement between both regions.

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