A differential game analysis of multipollutant transboundary pollution in river basin

2019 ◽  
Vol 535 ◽  
pp. 122484 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huiquan Li ◽  
Genlong Guo
Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Zhigang Chen ◽  
Qianyue Meng ◽  
Huichuan Wang ◽  
Rongwei Xu ◽  
Yongxi Yi ◽  
...  

This paper studies a Stackelberg differential game between an upstream region and a downstream region for transboundary pollution control and ecological compensation in a river basin and increases the number of pollutants assumed in the model to multiple. Emission and green innovation investment between upstream and downstream regions in the same basin is a Stackelberg game, and the downstream region provides economic compensation for green innovation investment in the upstream region. The results show that there is an optimal ecological compensation rate, and a Pareto improvement result can be obtained by implementing ecological compensation. Increasing the proportion of ecological compensation can improve the nonvirtuous chain reaction between green innovation investment cost, pollutant transfer rate, and ecological compensation rate. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a joint mechanism composed of the government and the market and formulate a reasonable green innovation subsidy scheme according to the actual situation of the basin, so as to restrict the emergence of this “individual rational” behavior. For river basin areas that can establish a unified management department and organize the implementation of decision-making, the cooperative game is a very effective pollution control decision.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chunyan Fu ◽  
Yongxi Yi ◽  
Susu Cheng

With the robust control framework of Hansen and Sargent (2001), this paper investigates a stochastic differential game of transboundary pollution between two regions under Knightian uncertainty of stock dynamics. Both regions are assumed to play a noncooperative and a cooperative game, and the worst-case pollution accumulation processes for discrete robustness parameters are characterized. Our objective is to identify both regions’ optimal output and emission levels and analyze the effects of the Knightian uncertainty of pollution stock dynamics on both regions’ optimization behavior. We illustrate the results with some numerical examples.


2014 ◽  
Vol 687-691 ◽  
pp. 1662-1667
Author(s):  
Xue He ◽  
Shuang Liang Tian ◽  
Ping Chen ◽  
Wen Wen Tian

Using the differential game theory, we studied the investment problem on public libraries, and established the Leader-follower differential game model, which is between the governments and the private enterprises (social organization). By building the Hamiltonian solving the Stackelberg balanced optimal solutions in the main two game players when they choose their strategies. By adjusting the strategy of government and social utility’s coefficient of dynamic to increase the comprehensive social utility of libraries.


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