scholarly journals A Cooperative Stochastic Differential Game of Transboundary Industrial Pollution between Two Asymmetric Nations

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongxi Yi ◽  
Rongwei Xu ◽  
Sheng Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Industrial Pollution ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Infinite Horizon ◽  
Pollution Abatement ◽  
Transboundary Pollution ◽  
Stochastic Differential Game ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Consistent Solution

Considering the fact that transboundary pollution control calls for the cooperation between interested parties, this paper studies a cooperative stochastic differential game of transboundary industrial pollution between two asymmetric nations in infinite-horizon level. In this paper, we model two ways of transboundary pollution: one is an accumulative global pollutant with an uncertain evolutionary dynamic and the other is a regional nonaccumulative pollutant. In our model, firms and governments are separated entities and they play a Stackelberg game, while the governments of the two nations can cooperate in pollution reduction. We discuss the feedback Nash equilibrium strategies of governments and industrial firms, and it is found that the governments being cooperative in transboundary pollution control will set a higher pollution tax rate and make more pollution abatement effort than when they are noncooperative. Additionally, a payment distribution mechanism that supports the subgame consistent solution is proposed.

scholarly journals A Differential Game of Ecological Compensation Criterion for Transboundary Pollution Abatement under Learning by Doing

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Zhigang Chen ◽  
Rongwei Xu ◽  
Yongxi Yi
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Pollution Abatement ◽  
Learning By Doing ◽  
Transboundary Pollution ◽  
Upstream Region ◽  
Ecological Compensation ◽  
Abatement Measure ◽  
Abatement Policy ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Strategies

This paper studies a stochastic differential game of transboundary pollution abatement between two kinds of ecological compensation and the abatement policy, in which the learning by doing is taken into account. Emission and pollution abatement between upstream and downstream region in the same basin is a Stackelberg game, and the downstream regions provide economic compensation for pollution abatement in the upstream region. We discuss the feedback Nash equilibrium strategies of proportional compensation and investment compensation, and it is found that an appropriate ecological compensation ratio can improve the investment level of pollution abatement in the two regions by accumulating experience in the process of learning by doing. In the long term, the investment compensation mechanism is an effective transboundary pollution abatement measure that can continuously reduce the water pollution stock in the upstream and downstream.

scholarly journals A stochastic differential game of low carbon technology sharing in collaborative innovation system of superior enterprises and inferior enterprises under uncertain environment

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 607-622 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shi Yin ◽  
Baizhou Li
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Innovation System ◽  
Stochastic Differential Game ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Nash Game ◽  
Low Carbon Economy ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Technology Level

AbstractConsidering the fact that the development of low carbon economy calls for the low carbon technology sharing between interested enterprises, this paper study a stochastic differential game of low carbon technology sharing in collaborative innovation system of superior enterprises and inferior enterprises. In the paper, we consider the random interference factors that include the uncertain external environment and the internal understanding limitations of decision maker. In the model, superior enterprises and inferior enterprises are separated entities, and they play Stacklberg master-slave game, Nash non-cooperative game, and cooperative game, respectively. We discuss the feedback equilibrium strategies of superior enterprises and inferior enterprises, and it is found that some random interference factors in sharing system can make the variance of improvement degree of low carbon technology level in the cooperation game higher than the variance in the Stackelberg game, and the result of Stackelberg game is similar to the result of Nash game. Additionally, a government subsidy incentive and a special subsidy that inferior enterprises give to superior enterprises are proposed.

scholarly journals A Stochastic Differential Game of Transboundary Pollution under Knightian Uncertainty of Stock Dynamics

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chunyan Fu ◽  
Yongxi Yi ◽  
Susu Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Robust Control ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Transboundary Pollution ◽  
Knightian Uncertainty ◽  
Stochastic Differential Game ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Optimal Output ◽  
Control Framework ◽  
Pollution Accumulation

With the robust control framework of Hansen and Sargent (2001), this paper investigates a stochastic differential game of transboundary pollution between two regions under Knightian uncertainty of stock dynamics. Both regions are assumed to play a noncooperative and a cooperative game, and the worst-case pollution accumulation processes for discrete robustness parameters are characterized. Our objective is to identify both regions’ optimal output and emission levels and analyze the effects of the Knightian uncertainty of pollution stock dynamics on both regions’ optimization behavior. We illustrate the results with some numerical examples.

scholarly journals Stochastic Differential Game-Based Malware Propagation in Edge Computing-Based IoT

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Li Miao ◽  
Shuai Li
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Infinite Horizon ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Edge Computing ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stochastic Differential Game ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Stochastic Fluctuations ◽  
Malware Propagation ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Solutions

Internet of Things (IoT) has played an important role in our daily life since its emergence. The applications of IoT cover from the traditional devices to intelligent equipment. With the great potential of IoT, there comes various kinds of security problems. In this paper, we study the malware propagation under the dynamic interaction between the attackers and defenders in edge computing-based IoT and propose an infinite-horizon stochastic differential game model to discuss the optimal strategies for the attackers and defenders. Considering the effect of stochastic fluctuations in the edge network on the malware propagation, we construct the Itô stochastic differential equations to describe the propagation of the malware in edge computing-based IoT. Subsequently, we analyze the feedback Nash equilibrium solutions for our proposed game model, which can be considered as the optimal strategies for the defenders and attackers. Finally, numerical simulations show the effectiveness of our proposed game model.

scholarly journals Dynamic Optimal Control Differential Game of Ecological Compensation for Multipollutant Transboundary Pollution

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Zhigang Chen ◽  
Qianyue Meng ◽  
Huichuan Wang ◽  
Rongwei Xu ◽  
Yongxi Yi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
River Basin ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Transboundary Pollution ◽  
Upstream Region ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Ecological Compensation ◽  
Stackelberg Differential Game ◽  
Downstream Region ◽  
Compensation Rate

This paper studies a Stackelberg differential game between an upstream region and a downstream region for transboundary pollution control and ecological compensation in a river basin and increases the number of pollutants assumed in the model to multiple. Emission and green innovation investment between upstream and downstream regions in the same basin is a Stackelberg game, and the downstream region provides economic compensation for green innovation investment in the upstream region. The results show that there is an optimal ecological compensation rate, and a Pareto improvement result can be obtained by implementing ecological compensation. Increasing the proportion of ecological compensation can improve the nonvirtuous chain reaction between green innovation investment cost, pollutant transfer rate, and ecological compensation rate. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a joint mechanism composed of the government and the market and formulate a reasonable green innovation subsidy scheme according to the actual situation of the basin, so as to restrict the emergence of this “individual rational” behavior. For river basin areas that can establish a unified management department and organize the implementation of decision-making, the cooperative game is a very effective pollution control decision.

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