Deposit Insurance and Risk Management of the U.S. Banking System: What is the Loss Distribution Faced by the FDIC?

2005 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 217-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Kuritzkes ◽  
Til Schuermann ◽  
Scott M. Weiner
2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 249-268
Author(s):  
Basgul Fajzullohonovna Isupova

In this article, an analysis of the fundamental methods of risk assessment and risk management of credit portfolio is conducted. In particular, complex and qualitative methods of risk management of credit portfolio studied in details, namely analytical, statistical and coefficient methods. Based on the coefficient method the author proposes a number of standards for the assessment of potential losses in credit activity. 


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Peter Conti-Brown ◽  
Sean H. Vanatta

The U.S. banking holiday of March 1933 was a pivotal event in twentieth-century political and economic history. After closing the nation's banks for nine days, the administration of newly inaugurated president Franklin D. Roosevelt restarted the banking system as the first step toward national recovery from the global Great Depression. In the conventional narrative, the holiday succeeded because Roosevelt used his political talents to restore public confidence in the nation's banks. However, such accounts say virtually nothing about what happened during the holiday itself. We reinterpret the banking crises of the 1930s and the 1933 holiday through the lens of bank supervision, the continuous oversight of commercial banks by government officials. Through the 1930s banking crises, federal supervisors identified troubled banks but could not act to close them. Roosevelt empowered supervisors to act decisively during the holiday. By closing some banks, supervisors made credible Roosevelt's claims that banks that reopened were sound. Thus, the union of FDR's political skills with the technical judgment of bank supervisors was the key to solving the banking crisis. Neither could stand alone, and both together were the vital precondition for further economic reforms—including devaluing the dollar—and, with them, Roosevelt's New Deal.


1987 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 739-755 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barrie A. Wigmore

International, rather than domestic, causes of both the Bank Holiday of 1933 and the calm in the banking system that followed are emphasized here. New information on gold losses by the New York Federal Reserve, rather than domestic currency hoarding, serve to explain the Bank Holiday's specific timing. Expectations that Roosevelt would devalue the dollar stimulated much of the gold loss. I also argue that Roosevelt's restrictions on gold holdings and foreign exchange dealings and his devaluation of the dollar by 60 percent were more important to the stability of the banking system after the Bank Holiday than was deposit insurance.


Author(s):  
John Nkeobuna Nnah Ugoani

Credit risk management is central to the success or failure of a banking institution because banks earn the greatest quantum of their interest income from interest on loans which represents a critical component of a bank’s profitability. Therefore, any carelessness with regard to credit risk management automatically results to creating huge nonperforming loans which often prepares the grounds for bank distress or failure. In the 1990s and specifically in 1995, 50 percent of 120 banks became technically distressed, as they were characterized by poor management and weak liquidity ratio. For example, in 1995, the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans was about 33 percent compared to about 5 percent in 2015, and the average liquidity ratio of banks in 1995 was 0.49, against 58.18 in 2015. Also the loans, to deposit ratio in 1995 was 58.4 and 73.21 in 2015, while the number of banks with average liquidity ratio of less than 30 percent was 50 in 1995 against 1 in 2015. Distress persisted in the Nigerian banking system in the 1990s with dwindling profitability and the erosion of shareholders’ equity. In 1995, the adjusted shareholders funds was – N8791.1million against N3,240 billion in 2015, while the capital to total risk weighted asset ratio was about 67.18 percent in 1995 and only about 17.66 percent in 2015. In 1995, the ratio of nonperforming loans to shareholders’ funds was about 496 percent against about 13 percent in 2015. These major performance indicators showed that there was improved credit risk management and bank management effectiveness after 1995 until 2015. The expo-facto research design was employed for the study and the result showed strong positive relationship between credit risk evaluation management and bank management effectiveness. The study was not exhaustive, and further research could examine the relationship between regulatory efficiency and the performance of deposit money banks in Nigeria. The board of directors of banks should always take measures to avoid lending arrangements over and above the repayment capacity of borrowers to reduce the creation of nonperforming loans.


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