Thermodynamic Properties of the U.S. Banking System

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bakhodir Ergashev
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Peter Conti-Brown ◽  
Sean H. Vanatta

The U.S. banking holiday of March 1933 was a pivotal event in twentieth-century political and economic history. After closing the nation's banks for nine days, the administration of newly inaugurated president Franklin D. Roosevelt restarted the banking system as the first step toward national recovery from the global Great Depression. In the conventional narrative, the holiday succeeded because Roosevelt used his political talents to restore public confidence in the nation's banks. However, such accounts say virtually nothing about what happened during the holiday itself. We reinterpret the banking crises of the 1930s and the 1933 holiday through the lens of bank supervision, the continuous oversight of commercial banks by government officials. Through the 1930s banking crises, federal supervisors identified troubled banks but could not act to close them. Roosevelt empowered supervisors to act decisively during the holiday. By closing some banks, supervisors made credible Roosevelt's claims that banks that reopened were sound. Thus, the union of FDR's political skills with the technical judgment of bank supervisors was the key to solving the banking crisis. Neither could stand alone, and both together were the vital precondition for further economic reforms—including devaluing the dollar—and, with them, Roosevelt's New Deal.


2020 ◽  
Vol 91 ◽  
pp. 646-658
Author(s):  
James W. Kolari ◽  
Félix J. López-Iturriaga ◽  
Ivan Pastor Sanz
Keyword(s):  

1977 ◽  
pp. 50-56
Author(s):  
Paul Einzig ◽  
Brian Scott Quinn
Keyword(s):  

1994 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Champ ◽  
Neil Wallace ◽  
Warren E. Weber

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.

Universal banks arose in the U.S. during two periods in the past century—the 1920s and the late 1990s. On both occasions, universal banks in the U.S. and Europe promoted intense boom-and-bust cycles that led to global calamities—the Great Depression of the early 1930s and the Great Recession of 2007–09. Universal banks received extensive bailouts on both sides of the Atlantic during both crises. Three core features of universal banks cause them to generate destructive boom-and-bust cycles. First, pervasive conflicts of interest prevent them from acting as objective lenders or as impartial investment advisers. Second, bonus-driven cultures encourage their insiders to take speculative risks to produce short-term profits. Third, their ability to convert loans into asset-backed securities allows them to package risky loans into securities sold as purportedly “safe” investments to poorly informed investors. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 broke up universal banks and established structural buffers that prevented spillovers of risk between the banking system and other financial sectors. The U.S. avoided systemic financial crises after World War II until Glass-Steagall was undermined by regulators and ultimately repealed by Congress. Congress failed to adopt similar structural reforms after the Great Recession. As a result, universal banks continue to dominate our financial markets and pose unacceptable systemic dangers. We urgently need a new Glass-Steagall Act to break up universal banks again and restore a more stable and resilient financial system.


1969 ◽  
Vol 47 (18) ◽  
pp. 3469-3470 ◽  
Author(s):  
Loren G. Hepler

Thermodynamic data that have been obtained subsequent to compilations by the U.S. National Bureau of Standards and Latimer now permit calculation of ΔGf0, ΔHf0, and [Formula: see text] values for RuO42− (aq) and MoO42− (aq). Use of these quantities is illustrated by calculation of thermodynamic properties of Ag2MoO4 (c).


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