Executive Turnover and Outside Directors on Two-Tiered Boards

The board of directors plays a crucial role as an internal structure of corporate governance. Certainly, its efficiency is needy on the existence of numerous issues; the greatest significance is correlated to its characteristics that relay principally to the individuality of its memberships, board dimension, combining the purposes of pronouncement and regulator as well the grade of the individuality of the audit board and the diverse gender of the committee. To assess the authenticity of our assumptions, which stipulate the presence of deterministic characteristics of the committee on the profitability of Tunisian banks, we evaluated by three different ratios i.e., ROA (return on asset), ROE (return on equity), and MP (market performance); and we estimate three models with linear regressions. The empirical findings were performed on a data sample composed of 11 Tunisian banks listed on the Stock Exchange of Tunisia (SET) during the period from 1999 to 2018. From the estimated regressions, we find a satisfactory outcome indicating the significance of the influence of the characteristics of the committee on the banking performance in Tunisia. Then, the percentage of outside directors negatively affects the level of the financial performance of banks. The number of institutional administrators performs an essential role in improving financial performance. Finally, the duality of the Presidency of the Council General-Directorate has a negative effect on the level of stock market performance of Tunisian banks.

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The SEC’s Impact on the Federalization of Corporate Governance—A Traditional Perspective

10.1093/oso/9780199934546.003.0003 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Marc I. Steinberg

Keyword(s):

Corporate Governance ◽

Mergers And Acquisitions ◽

Insider Trading ◽

Securities And Exchange Commission ◽

Outside Directors ◽

Tender Offers ◽

Going Private ◽

Rule Making

This chapter examines, from a traditional perspective, several areas where the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has impacted corporate governance in a meaningful way. By way of example, these subjects include insider trading, qualitative materiality, the role of gatekeepers (such as outside directors, attorneys, and accountants), the Commission’s use of disclosure to influence conduct, the implementation by subject companies of undertakings pursuant to SEC enforcement proceedings, and mergers and acquisitions (including tender offers and going-private transactions). This chapter’s focus is on the manner in which the SEC for well over 50 years has impacted corporate governance by means of exercising its rule-making and oversight authority.

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Corporate governance, corporate social responsibility and corporate performance

Journal of Management & Organization ◽

10.1017/s1833367200001784 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 16 (5) ◽

pp. 641-655 ◽

Cited By ~ 37

Author(s):

Chi-Jui Huang

Keyword(s):

Corporate Governance ◽

Corporate Social Responsibility ◽

Social Responsibility ◽

Financial Performance ◽

Corporate Social Performance ◽

Positive Impact ◽

Social Performance ◽

Outside Directors ◽

Asian Economy ◽

Corporate Social

AbstractPrevious research has analyzed and debated corporate governance (CG) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) independently. This paper aims to empirically explore the interrelationship between CG, CSR, financial performance (FP) and Corporate Social Performance (CSP) using a sample of 297 electronics companies operating in Taiwan, a newly industrialized Asian economy. The results show that a CG model which includes independent outside directors and which has specific ownership characteristics has a significantly positive impact on both FP and CSP, whereas FP itself does not influence CSP. The presence of independent outside directors in the firm has the greatest impact on the social performance of the firm's worker, customer, supplier, community and society dimensions. Government shareholders enhance a firm's social performance extraordinarily because government shareholders will be more likely to request that companies fulfill their social responsibilities. Only government shareholders positively and significantly relate to a firm's environmental performance. Furthermore, foreign institutional stockholders help to increase worker and supplier performance by paying more attention to employee policies and supply chain relationships. Finally, independent outside directors, foreign institutional stockholders and domestic financial institutional stockholders are shown to improve financial performance.

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Outside Review in a Wider Context: An Alternative to the Classic Board

Family Business Review ◽

10.1111/j.1741-6248.1989.00125.x ◽

1989 ◽

Vol 2 (2) ◽

pp. 125-140 ◽

Cited By ~ 25

Author(s):

Donald J. Jonovic

Keyword(s):

Family Businesses ◽

Outside Directors

Family businesses have special and urgent needs for outside review. The most common model suggested for achieving this review is the working board of outside directors. While such boards can be effective, there are reasons why they may be inadequate to the task in family companies. An alternative to the classic board model, a review council, with broader membership and mandate, may solve the outside review problem for the majority of family companies.

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