scholarly journals Competition, Outside Directors and Executive Turnover: Implications for Corporate Governance in the EU

2016 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Achim Buchwald
Author(s):  
Marc I. Steinberg

This chapter examines, from a traditional perspective, several areas where the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has impacted corporate governance in a meaningful way. By way of example, these subjects include insider trading, qualitative materiality, the role of gatekeepers (such as outside directors, attorneys, and accountants), the Commission’s use of disclosure to influence conduct, the implementation by subject companies of undertakings pursuant to SEC enforcement proceedings, and mergers and acquisitions (including tender offers and going-private transactions). This chapter’s focus is on the manner in which the SEC for well over 50 years has impacted corporate governance by means of exercising its rule-making and oversight authority.


2010 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 641-655 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chi-Jui Huang

AbstractPrevious research has analyzed and debated corporate governance (CG) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) independently. This paper aims to empirically explore the interrelationship between CG, CSR, financial performance (FP) and Corporate Social Performance (CSP) using a sample of 297 electronics companies operating in Taiwan, a newly industrialized Asian economy. The results show that a CG model which includes independent outside directors and which has specific ownership characteristics has a significantly positive impact on both FP and CSP, whereas FP itself does not influence CSP. The presence of independent outside directors in the firm has the greatest impact on the social performance of the firm's worker, customer, supplier, community and society dimensions. Government shareholders enhance a firm's social performance extraordinarily because government shareholders will be more likely to request that companies fulfill their social responsibilities. Only government shareholders positively and significantly relate to a firm's environmental performance. Furthermore, foreign institutional stockholders help to increase worker and supplier performance by paying more attention to employee policies and supply chain relationships. Finally, independent outside directors, foreign institutional stockholders and domestic financial institutional stockholders are shown to improve financial performance.


2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-76
Author(s):  
Paweł Pisany

Abstract This article presents and assesses the methodology and results of a comparative analysis conducted by Bruno Amable in financial systems and corporate governance in the context of current policy and regulatory challenges. The article, which is based on a literature review and game theory examples, first describes and evaluates the methodology and final classification given by Amable. The role of Amable’s core concept; namely, institutional complementarity, is underlined. A game theory application in comparative institutional studies is then presented, including the author’s own “institutional game.” Finally, we assess Amable’s achievements in financial systems and corporate governance, concluding that they are valuable, innovative and useful despite some (perhaps justified) criticisms of the framework Amable used. In particular, the value of introducing institutional complementarity into comparative studies should not be underestimated. The analysis presented here suggests that Amable’s methodology may also be applicable when designing current financial reforms in the EU, especially European Capital Markets Union (CMU), because it can broaden policy maker’s horizons and promote consistent solutions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (21) ◽  
pp. 12316
Author(s):  
Alessio M. Pacces

EU securities regulation has established a taxonomy of environmentally sustainable activities. This article discusses, from a law and economics standpoint, the potential of this taxonomy to support sustainable corporate governance. Corporate governance can be an efficient way to channel investor preferences towards sustainability because the concentration of institutional shareholding has lowered the transaction costs of shareholder action. However, there is a principal-agent problem between institutional investors and their beneficiaries, which depends on greenwashing and undermines sustainable corporate governance. This article argues that introducing environmental sustainability into EU mandatory disclosure aligns the institutional investors’ incentives with the interest of their beneficiaries and may foster the efficient inclusion of sustainability in corporate governance. The argument is threefold. Firstly, the EU taxonomy may curb greenwashing by standardizing the disclosure of environmental sustainability. Secondly, this information may become salient for the beneficiaries as the same standards define the sustainability preferences to be considered in recommending and marketing financial products. Thirdly, sustainability disclosure prompts institutional investors to compete for sustainability-minded beneficiaries. Being unable to avoid unsustainable companies altogether, institutional investors are expected to cater to beneficiaries’ preferences for environmental sustainability using voice instead of an exit.


2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 254-262 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Kyriazopoulos

This study examines the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure employing data from the Athens Stock Exchange for the period 2005-2014. This period encompasses the sovereign debt crisis erupted in Greece at the end of 2009 and still continues to hit households and businesses alike. The results from the panel regression analysis signify the role of corporate governance structures in determining the capital structure of the Greek listed firms. In particular, the empirical results reveal a negative impact of board size on debt levels, which is weakened during the debt crisis period. In contrast, the presence of outside directors provides the appropriate certification to use more debt. Finally, growth opportunities and profitability are the two firm-specific factors which effect was weakened during the financially-constraint period.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beatrice Sarpong-Danquah ◽  
Prince Gyimah ◽  
Richard Owusu Afriyie ◽  
Albert Asiama

This paper assesses the effect of corporate governance on the financial performance of manufacturing firms in a developing country. Specifically, the paper investigates whether gender diversity, board independence, and board size affects return on asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) of manufacturing listed firms in Ghana. We use the generalized least squares (GLS) panel regression model to analyze the dataset of 11 listed manufacturing firms from 2009-2013. Our result reveals an insignificant representation of women on boards. Also, the empirical result shows that board independence and board gender diversity have significant positive effect on ROE and ROA. However, there is no statistical significant relationship between board size and firm performance (ROE and ROA). We suggest that manufacturing firms should appoint female board members as well as outside directors on their boards as this can make significant contribution to firm’s performance. Our study provides the first comprehensive explicit exposition of corporate governance-performance nexus using data from the manufacturing sector in Ghana.


2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 158-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Balsmeier ◽  
Achim Buchwald ◽  
Alexander Dilger

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