Lifting the Emergency

This chapter grapples with the different hypotheses about the lifting of the Emergency. It delves into three possible explanations: foreign pressure, directly and indirectly applied; Mrs Gandhi’s mea culpa, prompted by the realisation that Sanjay had gone too far and become too violent in implementing the Emergency’s programmes; and, most significantly, her belief that she could win the elections. This belief was based on unreliable information she received from her entourage and the fact that the opposition was in complete disarray. Finally, the chapter discusses the subsequent return to democracy and the Janata Party’s brief stint in power, paving the way for the return of Mrs Gandhi in 1977.

The Uneven Geography of Tyranny

This chapter analyses the asymmetrical impact of the central policies on states. Federal structure and geographical distance meant that the spatial reach of these policies was not uniform. The arbitrary powers of the Emergency were a stronger presence in the Hindi belt than in the South, and in the states ruled by the Congress than in the holdouts. This was due to various factors such as the strengths and weaknesses of local Congresses vis-à-vis the opposition and the party at the centre; the strategies of state elites and bureaucracies; electoral considerations; factional competition; lobby influence; and the solipsism of the regime in Delhi. These were all determinants in the spread of the geography of tyranny which, on the whole, resulted in the Emergency being felt more strongly in the capital, its neighbouring states, and the Hindi belt than in states ruled by the opposition—the North East and South India.

An Era of Sultans

This chapter explores the informal dynastic transition that occurred in December 1975, signalling a change in the priorities of the Emergency’s programmes. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s power waned, as did interest in her Twenty-Point Programme, while the extra-constitutional powers of Sanjay Gandhi were strengthened. Sanjay was even more ruthless and more of a centraliser than his mother, and deferential state leaders competed with one another to implement his Five-Point Programme. It was as a part of Sanjay’s twin obsessions—family planning and urban gentrification—that some of the worst instances of state violence took place in the framework of a sultanist variant of authoritarianism as typified by Linz.

Mrs Gandhi’s Personalisation of Power, 1966–1975

This chapter focuses on the internal factors that led to the declaration of the Emergency. It primarily explores Mrs Gandhi’s authoritarian personality and the deinstitutionalisation of the Congress Party. The power structure within the Congress, especially after Mrs Gandhi split the party in 1969, meant that checks and balances ceased to exist. This factionalism enabled her to impose her authoritarian tendencies on the government as safeguards were dismantled. The chapter further explores the relation between authoritarianism and populism. It uses the political situation in India from the late 1960s to the early 1970s as an illustration. Mrs Gandhi, like other populist leaders, was convinced that she was the people of India. This idea was epitomised by D. K. Barooah’s slogan: ‘Indira is India and India is Indira.’

An Incongruous Coalition

This chapter illustrates the unusual allies of the Congress who made authoritarian rule possible. These include the political partners of the Congress like the Communist Party of India, the Republican Party of India and the Shiv Sena, all of which have completely different ideologies. The regime was also aided by some sections of the media, the business community, the bourgeoisie and the trade unions. Industrialists were the biggest beneficiaries of the regime’s policies and, therefore, supported it in return. The bureaucracy which suffered from a colonial hangover was primed for survival and thus adapted to the circumstances. The chapter also analyses the intersection between the interests of the elites and the Emergency. It examines the resilience of long-standing social and cultural values and attitudes, including a deep-rooted sense of hierarchy and respect for authority.

An Uneven Resistance

This chapter deals with the regime’s few opponents. The resistance came from sections of the press, judiciary, political class and civil society—albeit in a feeble manner. The deficient performance of the media, in particular, was highlighted by Advani’s phrase: ‘When you were merely asked to bend, you chose to crawl.’ The political opposition was comprised of socialists, Hindu nationalists, Akali Dal and CPI(M) cadres, and revolutionaries were among the many who went underground and resisted the regime. The chapter describes the resistance as uneven and unimpressive, plagued by factionalism and tokenistic gestures. The chapter goes on to characterise the Emergency as a dictatorship by consent.

Conclusion

This chapter pursues the following questions: (1), was the Emergency a parenthesis, a turning point or was the difference between it and the periods that bookended it more a matter of degree? And (2), how exceptional was this episode for the average Indian? It compares the Emergency to the post-independence period of democracy that preceded it, as well as to the decades following it. The chapter places India’s first experiment with authoritarianism and the regime itself in a broader historical perspective. In sum, the conclusion interprets the Emergency and positions it in India’s postcolonial history.

The Political Economy of the Emergency Looking for Ideology

The chapter presents a balance sheet of the political economy during the Emergency. It focuses on the divergence between the socialist rhetoric of Mrs Gandhi’s Twenty-Point Programme and her dirigiste corporatism in practice. It also denotes the complementarity of authoritarianism and populism, as populism has no ideology either. This depoliticization, which is described as a major characteristic of authoritarian regimes by Linz, helped to bridge the class divide in order to maintain the status quo. This was followed by policies to allow some redistribution, such as land reforms and by keeping essential commodities affordable to prevent mass protests. However, the chapter concludes that the little progress that was made due to redistribution policies was offset by the class war, with the elites eventually maintaining the status quo.

Introduction

This chapter begins by describing the Emergency as the panic button and ne plus ultra which could be triggered by Article 352 of the Indian constitution. It elaborates on how this provision in the Indian constitution was used to erode the institutional pillars of democracy: the judiciary, parliament and media. It also traces the events that led to the imposition of the Emergency in India on 25 June 1975. The two major setbacks for Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in the Gujarat elections and the Allahabad High Court ruling in the lead up to the Emergency are explained in detail. The introductory chapter attempts to make sense of this period in Indian history and set the stage for the chapters to follow.

A Constitutional Dictatorship

This chapter examines state repression and the discourse that served as its justification. It discusses the prime minister’s modus operandi of making democracy dependent on discipline and deeming any dissent to be anti-national. In 1971, she used a campaign slogan Garibi Hatao (Get Rid of Poverty) to justify the imposition of the state of emergency, claiming it was necessary to improve the lives of the poor. On the back of the 1971 election victory, laws such as the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA), the Defence of India Act (DIR) and the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (COFEPOSA) were used to suppress all forms of dissent. The media was also censored and categorised by the government as either friendly, neutral or hostile. Linz’s typology is used in this chapter to describe the regime as a constitutional dictatorship. The chapter further states that the Emergency in India was not an anomaly as far as world history is concerned: many of India’s neighbours also drifted towards authoritarian rule. This is explained by the common problems they faced, including high unemployment; foreign dependence; growing rural–urban, regional and class divisions; and an incomplete demographic transition.