“You Don't Know Khrushchev Well”

The ouster of Nikita Khrushchev in October 1964 was a key moment in the history of elite politics in one of the most important authoritarian regimes of the twentieth century. Yet political scientists and historians have long seemed uninterested in Khrushchev's downfall, regarding it as the largely “inevitable” result of his supposedly unpopular policies. Archival sources that have recently come to light cast serious doubt on this assessment and demonstrate new ways of measuring contingency. By showing the countermeasures Khrushchev could have taken, the importance of timing, and the sense among the plotters that their move was highly risky, this article demonstrates that Khrushchev's defeat was far from preordained. The lesson of October 1964 is not that policy differences or failures lead inexorably to political defeat, but that elite politics in Marxist-Leninist regimes is inherently ambiguous, personal, and, most importantly, highly contingent.

Political Participation and Varying Understandings of Democracy

This chapter focuses on the behavioral implications of popular conceptions of democracy, that is, the attitude-to-behavior connections and in particular, conventional and unconventional political participation. The chapter shows that overall, compared to their fellow citizens emphasizing the instrumental values of democracy, people embracing the procedural understanding of democracy are significantly more likely to cast ballots, help with electoral campaigns, contact political and government agencies or agents, join a demonstration, march in a protest, or use violence for a political cause. Meanwhile, this impact varies significantly, depending on the features of the regime in a society: it is much stronger in authoritarian regimes than in democracies. In some cases, the impact even reverses as we move from autocracies to democracies. The chapter argues that such patterns are primarily driven by the expressive values served by political participation, which people embracing the procedural conception of democracy are more sensitive to.

Przedsiębiorcy odpowiedzialni społecznie wobec reżimów totalitarnych i autorytarnych

Increasingly, there are voices of dissatisfaction in the public opinion towards the actions of entrepreneurs who indirectly support authoritarian or totalitarian authorities. The aim of this article is to find an answer to the question whether a socially responsible entrepreneur, obliged to respect and protect human freedoms and rights, can undertake actions supporting totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. When looking for answers, I will refer to business ethics, the concept of corporate social responsibility, soft law, as well as to normative obligations under national law.

The Stalin Cult as Political Religion

Political religion is a concept that gained prominence around the middle of the twentieth century, being associated for many with the idea of a totalitarian regime. Political religion was seen as a secular ideology whose followers took it up with the enthusiasm and commitment normally associated with adherence to religion. Comprising liturgy, ritual and the sacralization of politics, it created a community of believers, and usually had a transcendental leadership and a millennial vision of a promised future. This paper will explore the utility of this concept for understanding leader cults in authoritarian regimes. Such cults have been prominent features of authoritarian regimes but there is little agreement at the conceptual level about how they should be understood. One of the most powerful of such cults was that of Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union from 1929 to 1953. This paper analyses this cult in terms of liturgy and ritual and concludes that despite some aspects that are common between the cult and religion, most ritualistic aspects of religion find no direct counterpart in the cult.

واقع الحرية في الحضارات القديمة ومنطلقات ممارستها في المجتمعات الإسلامية المعاصرة (The Reality of Freedom in Past Civilizations and Its Practices in Contemporary Islamic Societies)

Historical reading of the actual picture of freedom in ancient civilizations and today’s realities indicates that the values of freedom and human rights have been violated. It also indicates that people have been subjugated by authoritarian regimes. The purpose of this research is to reflect on the actual reality of freedom in contemporary Islamic societies. To this effect, the study adopted a descriptive and historical approach using a survey to review the opinions of academics about freedom in contemporary Islamic societies. The study suggests that freedom is not granted easily but is rather obtained by force. It also indicates that freedom is inherent in human nature and it is often enhanced by persistence, enriched by satisfaction, and prescribed by good legislations. The opinions obtained by the survey also suggest that there exists an utterly insignificant and limited space of freedom in Islamic societies. To yield fruitful results in our contemporary life, freedom must be originated from the servitude to the Almighty Allah by adhering to the Islamic constants in the Quran and Prophetic traditions and referring to Islamic legislation in which all rights are protected without favor nor exception.

Constitutional Politics

In 1948, the Constitution was enacted by the Constitutional National Assembly, and a presidential system was adopted. But it was a hybrid system with both presidential and parliamentary system elements. Even though nine constitutions have been promulgated since then, this characteristic has remained fundamentally unchanged. Under the authoritarian regimes, the dictators forcibly revised the Constitution to strengthen their power and extend their terms of office. Constitutional politics, then, was fraught with serious conflict. South Korea was democratized in 1987, and the Constitution was democratically revised accordingly. The most important thing in this new Constitution was the restoration of the popularly elected presidential system. But the 1987 Constitution was modelled on the 1962 Constitution, and does not fit well with today’s democratized and diverse Korean society. The need to decentralize the authority and power of central government is another reason for constitutional reform.

The Inter-American Rule of Law in South American constitutionalism

The objective of this text is to present the modification of the conception of Rule of Law in the South America constitutionalism, from the dialogue and synergy between the Inter-American System of Human Rights and the new constitutions that emerged after dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, and internal wars, taking Operation Condor as a clandestine inter-American system or as unconventional status quo. We problematize how it is possible to speak of "Inter-American Rule of Law", which means the reconstruction of that State compatible with the ACHR in the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary spheres, as well the conventionality control and the standards emanating from the IACourtHR to laws, public policies, and national court decisions. Therefore, we defend the thesis that this dialogue can be the key to access the engine room of the constitutions, with the pro persona principle. The methodology used was a theoretical and normative approach, from a hypothetical deductive perspective and prioritizing as sources the bibliography and the caselaw of the IACourtHR.

Making reform and stability compatible with each other: elite redeployment in Meiji Japan

Nineteenth-century Japan remains a void in the literature on institutions and growth. Developmental institutions evolved in Japan after the Meiji Restoration despite the absence of political participation. Authoritarian change agents usually face a trade-off between reform and stability: they have coercive power to remove underproductive institutions, but at the risk of inviting instability, as politically influential deprivileged elites may engage in counteraction to recover what they perceive as their entitlement. Many authoritarian regimes, thus, coopt elites by allowing them access to rent, but such buying-off inevitably compromises institutional improvement. How did Meiji Japan overcome this dilemma and liberate major fiscal and administrative spaces for productive players who generate wealth and increase the size of the economic pie for society? This article presents a model that it calls ‘elite redeployment’ to answer this puzzle. In lieu of elite bargains in participatory polities in Europe, the revolutionary authoritarian regime in Japan coercively deprivileged traditional elites and redeployed those with financial or human capital among them in productive institutions. By doing so, the Japanese authoritarian change agents dismantled the incumbent institutions in an irreversible manner and swiftly built new institutions such as modern administrative, educational, financial, and commercial sectors, while maintaining stability.