Predicting the Next Attacks

Many people expect terrorism experts to predict and prevent the next attacks, and some terrorism experts encourage such expectations with claims that they can identify the causes of radicalization. However, terrorism is so rare, and the causes are so broad, that attempts to identify risk factors cast unwarranted suspicion on millions of innocent people. Instead, this chapter proposes that we treat terrorism the same way we treat other threats to public health and safety, such as crime and pandemics, striking a responsible balance between security and personal liberties, and basing counterterrorism policy on evidence rather than on hyperbole and panic.

Uncle Sam versus Uncle Usama

Shifts in American foreign policy have had little effect on Muslim attitudes toward the United States—even the shift from the administration of Barack Obama to that of Donald Trump barely changed Muslims’ survey responses or the prevalence of revolutionary violence. So why should the United States bother to take Muslim sensibilities into account? Following the lead of Nobel Prize winner Shirin Ebadi and remarkable American humanitarians of the past century, this chapter proposes that the United States reorganize its counterterrorism policy around the interests of its liberal Muslim allies, rather than expose them to the dangers of militarism and authoritarianism.

Liberal Islam versus Revolutionary Islamism

Liberal Islamic movements represent a significant challenge for revolutionary Islamists, who loathe them for it. Rooted in 19th century Islamic reformism, liberal ideals such as democracy and peaceful coexistence are more popular among Muslims than theocracy and terrorism, according to survey data, election results, and mass mobilizations over the past generation. The mainstream position in many Muslim communities is a combination of cultural conservatism and political liberalism—apprehensive about many aspects of Western liberalism, but staunchly opposed to revolutionary violence. In many Muslim-majority countries, adherents of liberal Islam find themselves under attack both by Islamist revolutionaries and by authoritarian regimes.

Thoroughly Modern Mujahidin

The self-proclaimed Islamic State is scornful of modern values, but it is still a thoroughly modern phenomenon. Like al-Qaida, its recruits are largely modern-educated. It adopts the latest technologies for recruitment and data-driven military strategies, and it created bureaucratic institutions in the territories under its control. These characteristics set it apart from the Taliban, whose militants have little modern education. Yet another set of Islamic revolutionaries are nationalist groups such as Hamas and Hizbullah that seek to build modern nation-states. Tensions among these groups form potential fissures that continually concern the terrorists, and that their opponents should work to exploit.

Radical Sheik

In 1970, the American author Tom Wolfe coined a phrase to describe nonrevolutionary people who claim to support revolutionary causes: “radical chic.” This chapter applies the pun “radical sheik” to Muslims who considered al-Qaida and the self-proclaimed Islamic State to be anti-imperialist heroes, but did not actually support revolutionary violence. The more that the revolutionaries targeted Muslims, in an attempt to polarize society and drag the masses into battle, the less popular the revolutionaries became. Instead, Muslims turned in much larger numbers to the revolutionaries’ religious competitors, such as apolitical pietism, liberal Islam, and nonrevolutionary Islamism, all of which denounced terrorism.

Why There Are So Few Muslim Terrorists

On a warm winter day in early 2006, a young man drove through a plaza at the University of North Carolina, trying to kill as many people as possible in the name of Islamic revolution. Terrorism is as simple as driving onto the sidewalk. So why are terrorist attacks so rare in the United States and much of the world? Islamist revolutionaries complain about frequently about Muslims’ unwillingness to engage in militancy, going so far as to call the bulk of the world’s Muslim population “scum.” This chapter introduces data on the prevalence of Islamic terrorism and the risks of overreaction.