Intervening Agency and the Right of Non-Sacrifice

This chapter argues for the extension of an idea from the previous chapter, that of a right of non-sacrifice. It argues that this right exists in certain cases of intervening agency: when the intervening agent presents the primary agent with a choice either to submit to suffering a harm or to resist, knowing that the intervening agent will then harm others. The argument proceeds in four parts. First, the chapter explains why such a case is puzzling; second, it dismisses two unsuccessful attempts to resolve the puzzle; third, it explains why intervening agency sometimes has the effect of changing the nature of the causal structure in which an agent acts, though noting as well that intervening agency is not unique in having that effect; and finally, it explores how these ideas might be relevant to just war theory and eliminative killing in that context.

Putting the Mechanics of Claims in Perspective

This chapter covers two basic themes. First, it argues that the mechanics of claims is substantively preferable to the infringement model in two ways. First, it considers the main reason to adopt the infringement model: its account of the duty to compensate those who are “rightfully wronged.” This model is inferior to the account of compensation that one can articulate using the mechanics of claims. Second, it reviews four other problems that are particularly telling against the infringement model. Then it turns to the second theme, acknowledging the limits of the mechanics of claims and the need for some notion of threshold deontology. But it also explains how threshold deontology can complement the mechanics of claims.

A Theory of Rights

This chapter covers the theory of rights that sits at the core of this book. It starts with an account of the purpose of rights, the three principles that ground the space of rights, and the basic structure of rights, known as the mechanics of claims. Next, it gives a more formal account of what is meant by the mechanics of claims. It then contrasts it with the infringement model. Finally, it introduces, explains, and defends the restricting claims principle, which, in turn, can be used to defend a key principle in deontology: the means principle, that is, the principle that it is particularly hard to justify using another as a means if doing so imposes some cost on him, unless he has waived or forfeited his right not to be so used.

Conclusions

The final chapter offers concluding thoughts on the permissibility of eliminatively killing noncombatants who help unjust combatants. The limits of necessity and proportionality are profound. In addition, some noncombatants have a right to do what they do that helps unjust combatants. Practical difficulties and the law provide other limits. The chapter identifies four reasons why it may not be justifiable to eliminatively kill noncombatants, all things considered. The chapter also offers some concluding thoughts about rights, emphasizing the way the mechanics of claims enables us to avoid the normative gulf opened up by using the infringement model with its emphasis on forfeiture.

Introduction

Much contemporary just war theory is modeled on the theory of self-defense. The dominant account of rights used by people interested in the right of self-defense is doubly problematic: its internal tensions undermine the plausibility of the views people try to defend, and it is in some ways morally distorting. This book is primarily concerned with developing and then deploying a new account of rights, one that will put the discussion of the right to defend against threats on more solid footing. The introductory chapter covers four themes. First, to explain why the current state of just war theory calls for a new account of rights, the chapter traces a brief history of recent discussions of the right of self-defense. Second, the chapter describes when it is permissible to defend against threats. Third, it explains how this relates to current law and to other philosophical work on the topic. Finally, it sketches an outline of the rest of the book.

Avoiding a Misplaced Emphasis on Intentions

This chapter is meant to defuse the objection that intentions have been given short shrift. It starts with a discussion of Seth Lazar’s use of intentions in his effort to shore up the idea that it is harder to justify targeting noncombatants than it is to justify targeting combatants in war (the principle of distinction). It also adds a more general argument in defense of giving intentions relatively little significance in accounting for the permissible use of defensive force. The chapter concludes by applying the lesson of these arguments to Lazar’s argument that eliminatively killing noncombatants is generally impermissible and to the use of intentions in just war theory generally.

Negative Agent-Claims and the Agent–Patient Inference

This chapter’s goal is twofold. First, it refines the thought, argued for in Chapter 3, that an agent may be partial to herself, when serious harms to others are at stake, only insofar as she is exercising a negative agent-claim. It argues that this can be extended to action when the justification for inaction is that the agent could then serve as a means, at some cost to her, of preventing others from suffering harms. Second, it describes the conditions under which having a right to act comes with a claim-right against others that they not interfere: the agent–patient inference. I focus, in particular, on when competition should block the agent–patient inference. These are connected points because they are both necessary to rebut a commonly held view, to wit, that agents often have the right to resist another agent who is rightfully engaged in self-defense or warfare.

Basic Premises and Method

The reigning method in moral philosophy is the search for reflective equilibrium. An interesting feature of contemporary moral philosophy is how much weight most theorists put on matching intuitions in test cases, rather than finding plausible, relevant, high-level moral principles that can be used to generate mid-level principles and judgments in particular situations. This chapter covers four themes in two groups. The first group concerns the author’s general approach to moral theory. It includes the role of theory and cases in the author’s own work and the role of evidence and facts in justification. The second group concerns two topics specifically relevant to just war theory: reductive individualism and the distinctive causal structure of eliminative killing.

From Innocent Threats to Noncombatants Innocently Aiding Unjust Combatants

This chapter is the second part of the argument that there is no fundamental, principled reason why noncombatants who help unjust combatants to wage war may not be eliminatively killed. It argues that non-culpable aggressors and those who act without aggressing but who threaten have weaker claims not to be killed than innocent threats. It then argues that intervening agency does not generally strengthen an indirect threat’s claim not to be killed. Finally, the chapter argues that bearing a threat only because many others also contribute to that threat also does not strengthen a threat’s claim not to be killed. The primary restrictions on killing that protect noncombatants are necessity and proportionality.

Innocent Threats Versus Innocent Bystanders

This chapter is the first part of the argument that there is no fundamental, principled reason why noncombatants who help unjust combatants to wage war may not be eliminatively killed. It starts by explaining why it is hard to justify killing an innocent bystander to save an innocent victim. It then argues that the choice whether to kill an innocent threat or allow an innocent victim to die is a closer call. In particular, one cannot reason from the premise that a threat owes a victim some sacrifice to the conclusion that his harm can be discounted in the way suggested by those who would invoke a lesser-evil justification. Instead, there are both agent and patient effects of being a threat, effects that make it easier to justify killing a threat, even an innocent threat, than an innocent bystander. Finally, objections are raised and addressed.