Preschoolers use the means-ends structure of intention to make moral judgments

A basic question about the origins of moral judgment is whether children consider an actor’s intention when making decisions about right and wrong. While there is a rich literature on children’s understanding of intention in moral situations, in previous work, intention has generally been considered synonymous with an agent’s goal. However, a person’s intention is composed of more than just her goal; an intention also includes the means that she uses to bring about that goal. In this paper, we test to see if children (N=274 across 3 studies; Mage=5.1 yrs.) use the means-ends structure of intention to make moral judgments by seeing whether they use the “means principle.” We find that children can use an agent’s means, and not just her goal, to make a moral judgment.

The Morality of Defensive Force

This book provides an account of the central moral principles that regulate the permissible use of defensive force. The book argues that we cannot understand the morality of defensive force until we ask and answer deeper questions about how the use of defensive force fits with a more general account of justice and moral rights. In developing this view the book offers original accounts of liability, proportionality, and necessity. It also argues, contra the dominant view in the literature, that self-defence can sometimes be justified on the basis of an agent-relative prerogative to give greater weight to one’s own life and interests. The book also provides a novel conception of individual rights against harm. Unlike some, who believe that our rights against harm are fact-relative, Quong argues that our rights against being harmed by others must, in certain respects, be sensitive to the evidence that others can reasonably be expected to possess. The final chapter provides an extended defence of the means principle, a principle that prohibits harmfully using other persons’ bodies or other rightful property unless those persons are duty bound to permit this use or have otherwise waived their claims against such use.

Agent-Relative Prerogatives

Chapter 3 defends the view that we each possess a limited agent-relative prerogative to impose harm on people who are not liable to this harm in defence of things over which we have rightful claims. The chapter argues that this prerogative is needed to satisfactorily explain cases where someone who is not liable to defensive harm threatens an innocent person, for example, cases involving Nonresponsible Threats or Justified Attackers. The chapter also argues that the agent-relative prerogative to defensively harm nonliable persons is constrained by a particular version of the means principle. The chapter concludes by addressing a number of potential objections.

The Means Principle

Chapter 7 develops and defends a novel conception of the means principle. The chapter argues that there is an absolute prohibition on the harmful use of another person’s body or other rightful property, unless the person who is harmed is duty bound to permit this use, or has otherwise waived their claims against such use. He argues that this principle does not focus on an agent’s intentions, but rather only on whether achieving the outcome that ostensibly justifies an agent’s act requires the use of another person’s body or rightful property. The chapter argues that this conception of the means principle is superior to competing principles in the literature, and it outlines some of the implications for the morality of defensive force.

A Theory of Rights

This chapter covers the theory of rights that sits at the core of this book. It starts with an account of the purpose of rights, the three principles that ground the space of rights, and the basic structure of rights, known as the mechanics of claims. Next, it gives a more formal account of what is meant by the mechanics of claims. It then contrasts it with the infringement model. Finally, it introduces, explains, and defends the restricting claims principle, which, in turn, can be used to defend a key principle in deontology: the means principle, that is, the principle that it is particularly hard to justify using another as a means if doing so imposes some cost on him, unless he has waived or forfeited his right not to be so used.

Can Kant’s Formula of the End in Itself Condemn Capitalism?

Kantian socialists at the turn of the twentieth century, as well as contemporary authors seeking a principle with which to condemn capitalism, have turned to Kant’s Formula of the End in Itself (FEI). This article assesses the arguments from FEI against capitalism from the perspective of the issues that arise in interpreting and applying Kant’s formula. There are various strategies with which a Kantian might use FEI to condemn conduct that Kant did not use FEI to condemn. The article asks whether any of the existing arguments from FEI employ plausible versions of these strategies to derive a strict duty from that formula’s Never Merely as a Means principle that condemns capitalism.

Pancasila Sebagai Landasan Pemersatu Suku Bangsa Indonesia

The Unitary Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) is a country that has the basis of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Pancasila consists of two Sanskrit words: ‘pañca’ means five and ‘śīla’ means principle or principle. Those who have the aim of protecting the entire Indonesian nation and the whole of Indonesia's bloodshed and for advancing public welfare, educating the life of the nation, and participating in carrying out world order based on freedom, eternal peace and social justice.In the writing of the paper entitled "PANCASILA AS THE FOUNDATION OF THE INDONESIAN NATION SUCCESS PARTICIPATION" aims to find out the history of the Pancasila that can unite the Indonesian people from the time of the Majapahit kingdom until now.The problems discussed in this paper began with Gajah Mada's effort with the Palapa Oath that wanted to unite the archipelago, then a discussion about the Masyumi Party which was banned from standing in Indonesia, until a discussion about the establishment of Pancasila.Thus, hopefully this paper can benefit readers to add insight and can be used as academic studies for policy makers.

Omissions, Acts, and the Duty to Rescue

In criminal law, if the defendant omits to perform an action, he will typically not be liable unless he is under a duty to act. This chapter argues that the reason that individuals do not generally have a duty to rescue is part and parcel of a broader principle that also applies to acts. The means principle underlies the reason individuals need not act absent a duty, the constraint that their bodies and property may not be appropriated for the general good, and the permissibility of performing actions that allow others to be harmed. This principle also extends to a set of cases that look nothing like omissions: mediated harms, in which an attacker will harm a third party if and only if the defender fights back. Omissions, then, are not special, as the normative principle that underlies the duty requirement exists both when we act and when we omit.

The Influence of Motivation of Public Officials on their Corrupt Behavior in the System of Public Authority

The article analyzes the influence of motivation of public officials on their corrupt behavior. In the framework of normative-value conceptualization corruption is considered as anti-social, auto-destructive deviant behavior. The represented two-dimensional curve of motivation consists of two segments. The first, “thirst for recognition” segment consists of pro-social, positive and altruistic motives, and the second, “greed” segment consists of negative and selfish motives. This article shows that motivation, especially with external locus of control has a decisive influence on corrupt behavior as means of the goals achievement. Particularly, it directly allows public officials to use “aim justifies the means” principle, or indirectly predetermine the very aim of their actions.