Conclusion

The arrival of Israeli tanks in Lebanon in June 1982 set in motion the mobilization of part of the militant Shiite world around a desire to take up arms against the invaders. But this drive initially translated into a very localized military organization: the IRL. The civilian council representing the main currents within the IRL was soon replaced by Hezbollah. Officially dedicated to the defense of the Resistance's social and political interests, Hezbollah was given responsibility for mobilization on the Resistance's behalf and for defusing threats against it on the domestic scene. Of all the factors sustaining the continued mobilization of Hezbollah over time, the strongest consists of a set of perceptions -- more precisely, the gradually developed and regularly renewed meaning given to its actions and its achievements. The effect of these interpretations is especially durable because the party's followers had triggered an identity shift. Indeed, between 2000 and 2010, the Shiites sense of self-esteem improved rapidly. The admiration, trust, and, especially, gratitude felt towards Hezbollah – without which such a liberation of community identity and its ascendancy would have remained a long-term aspiration – undeniably constitutes the rock-solid base which the party's mobilization can rely on today.

Hezbollah in the Eyes of Its Public

At no point in the preceding ten chapters has the presentation of Hezbollah proceeded in an encyclopedic spirit -- they deal only with those aspects of Hezbollah's historical, sociological, and organizational reality that explain the strength of its mobilization. The focal point of the book thus far has been issuance, and only the elements that served to foster the formation of a specific perception of the party by its supporters have been addressed. The present chapter now turns to reception: how the public close to Hezbollah dwelled on, reworked, and integrated these elements into reasons for retaining its political leanings over the years.

Escalation, Collapse, and Temporary Status Quo

The reverberations from Israeli news in Lebanon after the 2006 war, the repeated violations of Lebanese sovereignty by Tel Aviv's troops, the Israeli threats and psychological warfare, are one series of elements that will positively impact the Shiite mobilization around Hezbollah's cause. Though the showdown with the government, affairs of March 14th, the battle over the reconstruction, the quarrel over an International Tribunal, the presidential election, the debate over a united government and the dangerous rise of confessionalist, anti-Shiite discourse, Hezbollah's military intervention on Beirut's streets in May 2008 widened the gap between itself and its local adversaries, using them to secure the loyalty of its own followers.

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the Syrian Conflict

By directly taking the reins of power in Lebanon in early 2011, Hezbollah seemed to have succeeded in protecting itself against any deleterious effects of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. But when it brought down the Hariri cabinet and installed itself in parliament, the party leadership did not yet know that the flipping of power relations within the chamber would also enable it to cope with a totally different kind of threat, much more severe than that posed by the tribunal: the revolt in Syria against the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Thus, in the 2010s, Hezbollah has been under fire from three sides: the Syrian opposition, Israel, and Lebanese anti-Syrian Sunnism.

“New Middle East”, “Cedar Revolution”

This chapter looks into the years that follow the Liberation of 2000, and the political redistribution of power after the Syrian withdrawal of 2005. The abductions of Israeli soldiers by the IRL and the prisoner exchanges with Tel-Aviv, the conservative Christian comeback on the domestic scene, the bittersweet relations with Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, the attacks of September 11 and the American "War on Terror" as well as the end of the Syrian tutelage on Lebanon, were all factors that were perceived as real threats for Hezbollah and the IRL. In reality, a certain Lebanese context, and regional and international considerations would turn these threats into opportunities for Hezbollah to strengthen its mobilization.

Hezbollah, A Social Entrepreneur?

It seems to be a universally accepted thesis that Hezbollah's mobilization derives its strength from the party's vast clientelist network of social and welfare institutions that are woven through the Shiite community. However, calling Hezbollah an employer and welfare organization, or even a "state within the state", overstates the case. There is no question that the party to some extent performs the functions of a state that for all intents and purposes is largely missing from the Shiite areas of the country. But Hezbollah does not have exclusive pride of place in this regard, since most Lebanese political parties, as well as many prominent political figures, for a long time have operated networks of social welfare associations, and continue to do so, quite dynamically in some cases. It is true that among all Lebanese extra-governmental institutions active in Shiite areas, Hezbollah ranks near the top, when it is not ranked first, but a careful reading of its performance relative to the community's size proves that the party cannot boast of being its welfare institution.

Trajectory of an Islam of Resistance

In June 1982, when Israeli tanks crossed the border and headed towards Beirut, Tel Aviv's troops has already been occupying a portion of Lebanon's territory that the Israelis called the "security zone" and that the Lebanese called "the occupied strip". They remained there for eighteen more years, until May 2000, when they left Lebanon, defeated by the IRL. A period of glory then started for the IRL and Hezbollah. Meanwhile, Hezbollah's style in its relationship to the Shia and the Lebanese in general remained hesitant for a few years, before going through a thorough transformation into what would be perceived as a "civilized" party "with clean hands".

On the Origins of Hezbollah

The groups from which Hezbollah's first members emerged are more varied than is generally asserted. Their interconnecting points and decision centers are embodied in persons other than the actors cited in the official versions. Hezbollah's appearance in the early 1980s was in fact the result of the merging of two militant Islamic networks that had developed in different regions of the country. In Beirut, they were quietist; their effort consisted essentially of setting in motion a religious renewal of society, focused on current events in the Lebanese—but also the national or global—world of the Shiite clerics. In the Bekaa, the action already consisted of mobilization favoring armed resistance, with reliance at all times on Islamic values. It follows that these two types of Shiite Islamic militancy, one cultural, the other inspiring resistance, would react in different ways to the events that shook Lebanon during the transitions of the 1970s and 1980s.

The Hassan Nasrallah Phenomenon

The personality of Hezbollah's third secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, and his militant path combine into a major element in the attraction the party holds for militants as well as supporters. Without question, Nasrallah has over the past years earned a place among the top leaders of the Arab world. Several Western commentators have described him for some time as a "second Che Guevara". Whether he arouses admiration and enthusiasm or insult and rejection, there is no denying that his career is now an integral part of the history of the Middle East. This chapter reconstructs the rise of Nasrallah's mature yet still evolving charisma. Setting the stage for this effort is as rigorous and detailed a biography of the man as possible, from his childhood until his accession to the post of secretary-general. From this indeed emerge sources of perception which then will lend themselves to an analysis of his charisma per se, starting from his appointment as secretary-general. From that point on, instead of charting a factual biographical course, the focus shifts to a change of perception that occurred among some of the public between 1992 and 2000.

Hezbollah’s Internal Organization Structure, Membership, Internal Operations

While the Lebanese use the term "party" ("hizb") as a practical category for referring to the country's various political groups, in public law the only collective action structure, political or otherwise, is that of the "association" ("jamiyya"). However, despite its concern for acting within the law, Hezbollah is not listed with the Ministry of Interior under this rubric. The reason is simple: Hezbollah does not present itself as an association, but as a group of networked institutions. The party's institutional oddity is heightened by the hybrid nature of the ideological and cultural roots of its institutions as well as of its organizational functioning. Hezbollah is usually understood as an Islamist group, but its structure is nothing like that of the Muslim Brotherhood or Sunni al-Qaida. Admittedly, an Islamic version of the decision-making process is to some extent reflected by the collegial command structure ("shura"). But the organization at heart is not Islamic. Indeed, Hezbollah's structure and its internal operations owe a good deal to communist and socialist models.