The Deep Battle, the CIA, and the Sorrows of General Rogers

The Cold War versions – ‘AirLand Battle’, ‘AirLand Battle 2000’, and ‘Follow-On Forces Attack’ – of the ‘Deep Battle’ concepts developed by Germany and the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s, caused the flare-up of rare criticism within the community of defence experts and, in particular, friction between the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army and, on a broader spectrum, between the USA and its European allies. Thanks to recently declassified documents, we can now also add the CIA to the chorus of critical voices; the CIA’s scepticism provoked serious disagreements with General Rogers, the then Supreme Allied Commander for Europe. The likely inadequacies of the various forms of Deep Battle for fighting the Soviet threat, along with the total or partial absence of external factors that normally drive the changing of military doctrines, suggest the existence of more prosaic, parochial reasons for their ideation and adoption.

The CIA and the USSR: The Challenge of Understanding the Soviet Threat

This chapter outlines how countering the perceived threat from the USSR became the central mission of the CIA. It also details just how little information the CIA had to work with, and how central judgements and analysis came to be in shaping policy direction about possible USSR actions. Developing analytical capabilities was key to this, and it was institutionalised in CIA as early as 1946 with the creation of the Office of Reports and Estimates. Meanwhile, the CIA continued to evolve. Particularly significant in this regard was Walter Bedell Smith. Document: Intelligence on the Soviet Bloc