Международно-правовое положение Внутренней Монголии на рубеже XIX–XX вв. глазами ее правителя (записка хорчинского князя Удая, 1910 г.)

Introduction. The article publishes and provides a historical legal analysis of one letter by Prince Uday, ruler of Khorchin Khoshun (Horqin Banner) in Inner Mongolia at the end of 19th – first quarter of 20th century, who sent it to Pyotr Stolypin, the Prime-Minister of the Russian Empire, in 1910. This letter is a part of a file kept in the Russian State Historical Archive (St. Petersburg, Russia) in original Mongolian as well as in its Russian translation. As is known, the document was not published before. Goals. The aim of research is to extract from the Uday’s note — the information on the international legal status of Inner Mongolia which is given from the local ruler’s point of view. Results. The results of the research confirm the value of the note as a source, although its author attempted to emphasize his own significance in the eyes of the Russian authorities. Coupled with materials of other contemporaries (Russian and Western diplomats, intelligence officers, missionaries, merchants and scientists) it allows to give an authentic view on the status of Inner Mongolia at the international scene at the edge of 19th – 20th centuries. The utmost interest should be paid to the dynamics of relations of rulers of Inner Mongolia with the Qing imperial authorities that initiated a forced colonization of Mongolian lands through resettlement of Chinese peasant colonists, changes in relations of Manchu administration and Mongol feudal lords with Russian regional authorities and merchants, as well as strengthening of the Japanese influence in the region.

Rising from the ordinary: Virtue, the justice motif and moral change

Justice understood as a practical principle and virtue has remained an understudied subject in the anthropology of morality. Moral anthropology has explored the moral or ethical as a space of freedom and creativity, whereas justice has often been associated with rule-following or even the law. In contrast, my paper explores justice as a virtue whose social dynamic can initiate moral change in ordinary life. This virtue, as I understand it, comprises not only a disposition to conform to established norms but also a capacity to reformulate these in the pursuit of social justice. My ethnography of Chinese peasant lawyers’ moral agency suggests that their understanding of justice as an essentially social, rule-governed and outcome-oriented virtue can grant new insights into the dynamics of moral innovation that arise in ordinary life. The peasant lawyers of rural northern China pursue moral change through combining moral reasoning about justice with principled action for justice and the provision of benefits for victims of injustice. It is the concern with the consequences of principled action that distinguishes justice as a social virtue from the other virtues, and the justice motif from alternative drivers of social change.