Iconic Fictional Object as Separately Copyrighted Work from the Original Work

Copyright is one of the IPR branches that protect the human’s intellectual work in the field of science, arts, and literature. The film is a creation that is protected by copyright. In a film, there are not only characters that are easy to remember but also specific properties uniquely used by the characters, especially the main character. This property is called an iconic fictional object. This normative juridical legal research will discuss one legal issue, whether an iconic fictional object can be separately protected from the original work. Based on the analysis in this study, an iconic-fictional object is not explicitly stated as work protected by copyright according to Article 40 of Copyright Law No. 28 of 2014. However, iconic fictional objects fulfil elements of a work entitled to copyright protection: The creative work in the fields of science, art, and literature; Created by the ability, skill or expertise of the creator; and Expressed in real form. Furthermore, The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on DC Comics vs Mark Towle Batmobile case had argued that iconic fictional objects could be separately protected from the original work as long as they meet three conditions: (1) Physical as well as conceptual qualities, (2) Sufficiently delineated, and (3) Especially distinctive and contain some unique elements of expression.

What does it take for an author to create a fictional object?

Neste artigo eu respondo à objeção principal de Stuart Brock (2010, 2016) ao artefactualismo. De acordo com Brock, artefactualistas como Amie Thomasson (1999) não conseguem explicar como e quando os objetos ficcionais são criados, sendo o artefactualismo, portanto, um tipo de criacionismo teológico. Contrariamente a Brock, e adaptando a teoria dos atos de fala de John Austin (1962) ao presente caso, eu argumento que objetos ficcionais são criados através de um proferimento performativo que, para ser feliz, deve (i) ser realizado pelo indivíduo adequado (um autor ou autora), (ii) com as intenções apropriadas (o ato de realização de ficção), no contexto adequado (associado às nossas práticas pré-estabelecidas de ficção) onde o autor ou autora (iv) nomeia, fornece ao menos uma descrição ou oferece uma imagem para instituir o objeto individual através dos seus atos intencionais.

Towards a Phenomenological Analysis of Fictional Emotions

What are fictional emotions and what has phenomenology to say about them? This paper argues that the experience of fictional emotions entails a splitting of the subject between a real and a phantasy ego. The real ego is the ego that imagines something; the phantasy ego is the ego that is necessarily co-posited by any experience of imagining something. Fictional emotions are phantasy emotions of the phantasy ego. The intentional structure of fictional emotions, the nature of their fictional object, as well as the process of constituting the phantasy ego in representificational acts of consciousness are further elaborated to provide the groundwork for a phenomenological analysis of fictional emotions.

Centaurs, Pegasus, Sherlock Holmes: Against the Prejudice in Favour of the Real

Meinong’s thought has been rediscovered in recent times by analytic philosophy: his object theory has significant consequences in formal ontology, and especially his account of impossible objects has proved itself to be decisive in a wide range of fields, from logic up to ontology of fiction. Rejecting the traditional ‘prejudice in favour of the real’, Meinong investigates what there is not: a peculiar non-existing object is precisely the fictional object, which exemplifies a number of properties (like Sherlock Holmes, who lives in Baker Street and is an outstanding detective) without existing in the same way as flesh-and-blood detectives do. Fictional objects are in some sense incomplete objects, whose core of constituent properties is not completely determined. Now, what does it imply to hold that a fictional object may also occur in true statements? We shall deal with the objections raised by Russell and Quine against Meinong’s view, pointing out limits and advantages of both perspectives.