Is Self-Reported Propensity for Everyday Illusions of Control Higher in Gamblers and Is It Associated With Gambling-Specific Erroneous Beliefs?

People who engage in gambling are known to hold erroneous views about the nature of gambling. One of the most commonly observed cognitive biases is the illusion of control, where people’s subjective appraisal of contingency between behavior and events is greater than the objective contingency. Such beliefs have been found to be strongest in problem gamblers and can lead to over-confidence in the ability to win money from gambling. A question, however, is whether such perceptions are (a) specific to gambling and whether gamblers display a tendency to over-estimate contingencies in everyday life and (b) if a tendency to endorse everyday illusion of control beliefs is related to specific gambling-related beliefs among those who gamble. Answers to these questions might provide insights into whether some people are potentially more vulnerable to beliefs that might have implications for gambling. An online sample of 788 adults completed a survey about simple everyday situations where people might attempt to exert control (e.g., pressing elevator buttons more often, throwing dice in games). The survey included a scale that captured everyday situations as well as established measures of illusion of control and superstition in gambling. The results showed that those who report greater control in everyday tasks scored higher on standardized measures of beliefs about chance and gambling-related cognitions relating to illusory control. Scores on both types of measures were higher in gamblers than non-gamblers. The findings suggest that gamblers may differ in how they generally perceive and respond to situations involving tasks largely dominated by chance or limited opportunities for genuine control.

Contingency Learning With Evaluative Stimuli

In two experiments, we tested the generality of the learning effects in the recently-introduced color-word contingency learning paradigm. Participants made speeded evaluative judgments to valenced target words. Each of a set of distracting nonwords was presented most often with either positive or negative target words. We observed that participants responded faster on trials that respected these contingencies than on trials that contradicted the contingencies. The contingencies also produced changes in liking: in a subsequent explicit evaluative rating task, participants rated positively-conditioned nonwords more positively than negatively-conditioned nonwords. Interestingly, contingency effects in the performance task correlated with this explicit rating effect in both experiments. In Experiment 2, all effects reported were independent of subjective and objective contingency awareness (which was completely lacking), even when awareness was measured at the item level. Our results reveal that learning in this type of performance task extends to nonword-valence contingencies and to responses different from those emitted during the performance task. We discuss the implications of these findings for theories about the processes that underlie contingency learning in performance tasks and for research on evaluative conditioning.

Does Evaluative Learning Rely on the Perception of Contingency?

An experiment is reported studying the impact of objective contingency and contingency judgments on cross-modal evaluative conditioning (EC). Both contingency judgments and evaluative responses were measured after a contingency learning task in which previously neutral sounds served as either weak or strong predictors of affective pictures. Experimental manipulations of contingency and US density were shown to affect contingency judgments. Stronger contingencies were perceived with high contingency and with low US density. The contingency learning task also produced a reliable EC effect. The magnitude of this effect was influenced by an interaction of statistical contingency and US density. Furthermore, the magnitude of EC was correlated with the subjective contingency judgments. Taken together, the results imply that propositional knowledge about the CS-US relationship, as reflected in contingency judgments, moderates evaluative learning. The data are discussed with respect to different accounts of EC.

Causal Judgement as Evaluation of Evidence: The use of Confirmatory and Disconfirmatory Information

There are four kinds of contingency information: occurrences and nonoccurrences of an effect in the presence and absence of a cause. In two experiments participants made judgements about sets of stimulus materials in which one of these four kinds had zero frequency. The experiments tested two kinds of predictions derived from the evidential evaluation model of causal judgement, which postulates that causal judgement depends on the proportion of instances evaluated as confirmatory for the cause being judged. The model predicts significant effects of manipulating the frequency of one kind of contingency information in the absence of changes in the objective contingency. The model also predicts that extra weight will be given to one kind of confirmatory information when the other kind has zero frequency, and to one kind of disconfirmatory information when the other kind has zero frequency. Results supported both sets of predictions, and also disconfirmed predictions of the power probabilistic contrast theory of causal judgement. This research therefore favours an account of causal judgement in which contingency information is transformed into evidence, and judgement is based on the net confirmatory or disconfirmatory value of the evidence.

Causal judgement from contingency information: Judging interactions between two causal candidates

In two experiments participants judged the extent to which occurrences and non-occurrences of an effect could be attributed to an interaction between two causal candidates A and B. In Experiment 1 judgements were influenced by the proportion of instances normatively evaluated as confirmatory for the interaction interpretation, when the objective contingency was held constant. Information about instances in which both candidates were present and the effect occurred was more influential than information about instances in which both candidates were absent and the effect did not occur. In Experiment 2 the occurrence rate of the effect when both candidates were present, when A alone was present, when B alone was present, and when both were absent was manipulated. Interaction judgements were mainly determined by occurrence rate when both were present. There was also a significant effect of occurrence rate when both were absent, but the other two occurrence rates had no significant effect. These results are interpreted as supporting a general model in which causal judgements are made according to the proportion of instances evaluated as supporting the interpretation being judged.

Perceiving a strong causal relation in a weak contingency: Further investigation of the evidential evaluation model of causal judgement

Contingency information is information about the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a certain effect in the presence or absence of a candidate cause. An objective measure of contingency is the δ P rule, which involves subtracting the probability of occurrence of an effect when a causal candidate is absent from the probability of occurrence of the effect when the candidate is present. Causal judgements conform closely to δ P but deviate from it under certain circumstances. Three experiments show that such deviations can be predicted by a model of causal judgement that has two components: a rule of evidence, that causal judgement is a function of the proportion of relevant instances that are judged to be confirmatory for the causal candidate, and a tendency for information about instances in which the candidate is present to have greater effect on judgement than instances in which the candidate is absent. Two experiments demonstrate how this model accounts for some recently published findings. A third experiment shows that it is possible to use the model to predict the occurrence of high causal judgements when the objective contingency is close to zero.