Citizen Demands and Strategic Responsiveness in Autocratic Regimes - Evidence from the German Democratic Republic

Do autocrats strategically respond to citizen demands to ensure regime survival? To answer this question, we assemble a novel panel of housing-related petitions to the government of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in combination with data on housing construction between 1945 -1989. Exploiting the timing of the largest GDR housing program, we employ a difference-in-differences design to show that the housing program was targeted at regions with higher rates of petitioning. We then demonstrate that strategic concerns about regime survival drove responsiveness. We show that the regime was more responsive to petitions from counties with export industries and counties with high collective action potential. Finally, we show that responsiveness lastingly impacts regime support. In the first democratic elections after the demise of the GDR, the authoritarian successor party received more votes in regions targeted by the housing program.