rebate contract
Recently Published Documents


TOTAL DOCUMENTS

9
(FIVE YEARS 1)

H-INDEX

4
(FIVE YEARS 0)

2021 ◽  
pp. 89-118
Author(s):  
I. Thomson ◽  
Raichel Elsa Thomas ◽  
K. Susithra ◽  
S. Shobana ◽  
Arshinder Kaur ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Jizhou Zhan

In a two-level supply chain that includes one supplier and one capital-constrained retailer, this paper investigates a new bank financing model (Model N), in which, the supplier requires the retailer to order a quantity that is not less than a specified minimum ordering quantity (MOQ), rebates the per unit excess that sells over the MOQ, and promises to provide a partial warranty for the bank credit risk if the revenue is below the bankruptcy level of the retailer with the MOQ. This study shows that retailer's optimal order quantity increases with MOQ level and decreases with rebate rate, while supplier's optimal wholesale price shows an opposite tendency. Compared to the traditional bank financing model (Model T), the model N with an appropriate rebate contract will result in a larger order quantity of retailer. Furthermore, model N would benefit the entire supply chain and a Pareto zone of MOQ (or rebate rate) exists, in which, model N outperforms model T for each player. The numerical experiments are performed to illustrate that with increasing the marginal production cost of supplier, the MOQ level is decreasing while rebate rate is increasing in the Pareto zone.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-340
Author(s):  
Irina V. Berezinets ◽  
◽  
Nikolay A. Zenkevich ◽  
Natalia K. Nikolchenko ◽  
Alina S. Rucheva ◽  
...  

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chun-Hung Chiu ◽  
Tsan-Ming Choi ◽  
Ho-Ting Yeung ◽  
Yingxue Zhao

We explore in this paper the performance of sales rebate contracts in fashion supply chains. We conduct both analytical and numerical analyses via a mean-variance framework with reference to real empirical data. To be specific, we evaluate the expected profits and variance of profits (risk) of the fashion supply chains, fashion retailers, and manufacturers under (1) the currently implemented sales rebate practices, (2) the case without sales rebate, and (3) the theoretical coordination situation (if target sales rebate is adopted). In addition, we analyze how sales effort affects the performances of the supply chain and its agents. Our analysis indicates that the rebate contracts may hurt the retailer and the manufacturer of a fashion supply chain when it is inappropriately set. Moreover, a properly designed sales rebate contract not only can coordinate the supply chain (with retail sales effort) but can also improve expected profits and lower the levels of risk for both the manufacturer and the retailer.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document