A revised sales rebate contract with effort‐dependent demand: a channel coordination approach

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 438-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jafar Heydari ◽  
Javad Asl‐Najafi
Keyword(s):  
Channel Coordination ◽  
Rebate Contract ◽  
Dependent Demand

scholarly journals Coordinating a Supply Chain with a Loss-Averse Retailer and Effort Dependent Demand

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liying Li ◽  
Yong Wang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Special Class ◽  
Numerical Study ◽  
Supply Chain Performance ◽  
Channel Coordination ◽  
Gain Loss ◽  
Decision Making Behavior ◽  
Dependent Demand

This study investigates the channel coordination issue of a supply chain with a risk-neutral manufacturer and a loss-averse retailer facing stochastic demand that is sensitive to sales effort. Under the loss-averse newsvendor setting, a distribution-free gain/loss-sharing-and-buyback (GLB) contract has been shown to be able to coordinate the supply chain. However, we find that a GLB contract remains ineffective in managing the supply chain when retailer sales efforts influence the demand. To effectively coordinate the channel, we propose to combine a GLB contract with sales rebate and penalty (SRP) contract. In addition, we discover a special class of gain/loss contracts that can coordinate the supply chain and arbitrarily allocate the expected supply chain profit between the manufacturer and the retailer. We then analyze the effect of loss aversion on the retailer’s decision-making behavior and supply chain performance. Finally, we perform a numerical study to illustrate the findings and gain additional insights.

scholarly journals Coordinating Contracts for Two-Stage Fashion Supply Chain with Risk-Averse Retailer and Price-Dependent Demand

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Minli Xu ◽  
Qiao Wang ◽  
Linhan Ouyang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Channel Coordination ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Mean Variance ◽  
Variance Approach ◽  
Dependent Demand

When the demand is sensitive to retail price, revenue sharing contract and two-part tariff contract have been shown to be able to coordinate supply chains with risk neutral agents. We extend the previous studies to consider a risk-averse retailer in a two-echelon fashion supply chain. Based on the classic mean-variance approach in finance, the issue of channel coordination in a fashion supply chain with risk-averse retailer and price-dependent demand is investigated. We propose both single contracts and joint contracts to achieve supply chain coordination. We find that the coordinating revenue sharing contract and two-part tariff contract in the supply chain with risk neutral agents are still useful to coordinate the supply chain taking into account the degree of risk aversion of fashion retailer, whereas a more complex sales rebate and penalty (SRP) contract fails to do so. When using combined contracts to coordinate the supply chain, we demonstrate that only revenue sharing with two-part tariff contract can coordinate the fashion supply chain. The optimal conditions for contract parameters to achieve channel coordination are determined. Numerical analysis is presented to supplement the results and more insights are gained.

INVENTORY MODEL OF DETERIORATING ITEMS FOR LINEAR HOLDING COST WITH TIME DEPENDENT DEMAND

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-36
Author(s):  
N Mishra ◽  
SP Mishra ◽  
Srichandan Mishra ◽  
J Panda ◽  
UK Misra
Keyword(s):  
Inventory Model ◽  
Deteriorating Items ◽  
Time Dependent ◽  
Holding Cost ◽  
Dependent Demand

AN INVENTORY MODEL FOR TWO STORAGE SYSTEM WITH STOCK DEPENDENT DEMAND

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 42
Author(s):  
KUMAR ATTRI AMIT ◽  
S. R. SINGH ◽  
CHOUDHARY SHWETA ◽  
◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Storage System ◽  
Inventory Model ◽  
Stock Dependent Demand ◽  
Dependent Demand

Price Signaling and Channel Coordination

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruitong Wang ◽  
Yi Zhu ◽  
Akshay R. Rao
Keyword(s):  
Channel Coordination
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