Negation and Denial

It is assumed that we can assert that something is not the case. A simple alternative would be to deny that thing instead. The equivalence thesis, however, says that denial is simply equivalent to asserting the negation, and hence we do not need a separate act of denial in addition to assertion. We have seen, however, that such a move leads directly to an insoluble problem of finding truthmakers for negative truths. Instead, the equivalence thesis could be rejected, and there are some reasonable grounds to do so. Denial has distinct functions from the functions of assertion. Assertion requires a truthmaker and is relatively determinate. Denial, in contrast, is conventionally responsive and directly registers incompatibility. This suggests that denial is prior to negation, though the latter has become the standard way of marking the former. The account tells us that, rather than assert not-P, we are better simply denying P.

Ulysses Contracts in psychiatric care: helping patients to protect themselves from spiralling

This paper presents four arguments in favour of respecting Ulysses Contracts in the case of individuals who suffer with severe chronic episodic mental illnesses, and who have experienced spiralling and relapse before. First, competence comes in degrees. As such, even if a person meets the usual standard for competence at the point when they wish to refuse treatment (time 2), they may still be less competent than they were when they signed the Ulysses Contract (time 1). As such, even if competent at time 1 and time 2, there can still be a disparity between the levels of competence at each time. Second, Ulysses Contracts are important to protect people’s most meaningful concerns. Third, on the approach defended, the restrictions to people’s liberty would be temporary, and would be consistent with soft paternalism, rather than hard paternalism: the contracts would be designed in such a way that individuals would be free to change their minds, and to change or cancel their Ulysses Contracts later. Finally, even if one rejects the equivalence thesis (the claim that allowing harm is as bad as doing harm), this is still consistent with the claim that, in particular cases, it can be as wrong to allow a harm as to do a harm. Nevertheless, controversies remain. This paper also highlights several safeguards to minimise risks. Ultimately, we argue that people who are vulnerable to spiralling deserve a way to protect their autonomy as far as possible, using Ulysses Contracts when necessary.

Intervention and Revolution

The chapter rejects the widely held belief that revolution to end tyranny is considerably more permissive than foreign intervention to end tyranny. It argues for the equivalence thesis: the just cause for both is exactly the same—ending tyranny. The reason why often revolution will be permissible while foreign intervention will not is that the latter is likely to be disproportionate. But by the same token, it is possible that intervention will be justified while revolution will not be. The chapter examines and rejects a central argument against the equivalence thesis: political self-determination. It concludes that the notion of self-determination has fatal conceptual and moral flaws, and thus cannot sustain the putative moral difference between intervention and revolution.