The Equivalence Thesis and the Last Ventilator

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew McGee ◽  
Drew Carter
Keyword(s):  
Equivalence Thesis

scholarly journals Ulysses Contracts in psychiatric care: helping patients to protect themselves from spiralling

2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (11) ◽  
pp. 693-699 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harriet Standing ◽  
Rob Lawlor
Keyword(s):  
Psychiatric Care ◽  
Treatment Time ◽  
Mental Illnesses ◽  
Soft Paternalism ◽  
Equivalence Thesis

This paper presents four arguments in favour of respecting Ulysses Contracts in the case of individuals who suffer with severe chronic episodic mental illnesses, and who have experienced spiralling and relapse before. First, competence comes in degrees. As such, even if a person meets the usual standard for competence at the point when they wish to refuse treatment (time 2), they may still be less competent than they were when they signed the Ulysses Contract (time 1). As such, even if competent at time 1 and time 2, there can still be a disparity between the levels of competence at each time. Second, Ulysses Contracts are important to protect people’s most meaningful concerns. Third, on the approach defended, the restrictions to people’s liberty would be temporary, and would be consistent with soft paternalism, rather than hard paternalism: the contracts would be designed in such a way that individuals would be free to change their minds, and to change or cancel their Ulysses Contracts later. Finally, even if one rejects the equivalence thesis (the claim that allowing harm is as bad as doing harm), this is still consistent with the claim that, in particular cases, it can be as wrong to allow a harm as to do a harm. Nevertheless, controversies remain. This paper also highlights several safeguards to minimise risks. Ultimately, we argue that people who are vulnerable to spiralling deserve a way to protect their autonomy as far as possible, using Ulysses Contracts when necessary.

We Reject the “Equivalence Thesis”

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 53-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shimon Glick ◽  
Alan Jotkowitz
Keyword(s):  
Equivalence Thesis

Are Enabling and Allowing Harm Morally Equivalent?

Utilitas ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-383 ◽  
Author(s):  
KASPER LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN
Keyword(s):  
Reasonable Belief ◽  
Equivalence Thesis ◽  
Self Defence

It is sometimes asserted that enabling harm is morally equivalent to allowing harm (the moral equivalence thesis). In this article, I criticize this view. Positively, I show that cases involving self-defence and cases involving people acting on the basis of a reasonable belief to the effect that certain obstacles to harm will remain in place, or will be put in place, show that enabling harm is harder to justify than allowing it. Negatively, I argue that certain cases offered in defence of the moral equivalence thesis fail, because either (1) their similarity with the archetypal trolley case limits their relevance to an assessment of this thesis, or (2) they are compromised by their reliance on the elusive notion of a situation being completely stable.

scholarly journals Frege’s Equivalence Thesis and Reference Failure

Organon F ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 198-222
Author(s):  
Nathan Hawkins
Keyword(s):  
Equivalence Thesis

scholarly journals Intervention and Revolution

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando R. Tesón
Keyword(s):  
Self Determination ◽  
Just Cause ◽  
Foreign Intervention ◽  
Central Argument ◽  
Equivalence Thesis ◽  
Moral Difference

The chapter rejects the widely held belief that revolution to end tyranny is considerably more permissive than foreign intervention to end tyranny. It argues for the equivalence thesis: the just cause for both is exactly the same—ending tyranny. The reason why often revolution will be permissible while foreign intervention will not is that the latter is likely to be disproportionate. But by the same token, it is possible that intervention will be justified while revolution will not be. The chapter examines and rejects a central argument against the equivalence thesis: political self-determination. It concludes that the notion of self-determination has fatal conceptual and moral flaws, and thus cannot sustain the putative moral difference between intervention and revolution.

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