Loss of potential competition through a minority stake? Takeaways from Amazon/Deliveroo

On 4 August 2020, after a Phase 2 investigation, the Competition and Markets Authority cleared Amazon's proposed minority investment in Deliveroo. The CMA's original concern had been that the investment could damage competition by discouraging Amazon from re-entering restaurant food delivery in the UK and altering its competitive incentives in respect of online delivery of ‘convenience’ groceries. However, the CMA concluded that whilst it was likely that, absent the transaction, Amazon would have re-entered, it was not sufficiently likely that the transaction would have had a material impact on Amazon's incentives to re-enter or its approach following re-entry. Therefore, the transaction would not have resulted in a substantial reduction in potential competition. This article provides some background on the case and analyses the competitive effect of minority shareholdings between potential (as opposed to existing) competitors and discusses some broader factors in the assessment of potential competition concerns.

The Identification of Up- and Downstream Industries using Input–Output Tables and a Firm-level Application to Minority Shareholdings

We present a method for identifying up- and downstream industries in inter-industry datasets via input–output tables. We apply this approach to aggregated European input–output data and present results on identified industry links and their sensitivity to threshold definitions. We furthermore test the time-consistency of the up- and downstream assignments based on input–output tables, and discuss the limitations of this method. Finally, the method is used to test anti-competitive effects of non-controlling minority shareholdings.

The Current Rights of Minority Shareholders in Saudi Arabia

The preceding articles examined the legal framework of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia and the important elements of the institutional framework for Saudi corporate governance. The discussion in this chapter first focuses on government and government-regulated institutions established to enforce compliance and see that the actions of corporations are in line with corporate governance law. This chapter then examines minority shareholdings interests and rights and investigates minority shareholder protection under the CL. In addition, the board of directors is described, which controls and guides firm operations in compliance with corporate governance standards and regulations.

El sometimiento de las adquisiciones minoritarias que no otorgan el control a las normas sobre el control de las concentraciones = The control under merger rules of acquisitions of non-controlling minority shareholdings

Resumen: El trabajo aborda la conveniencia de someter al control de concentraciones las adquisiciones minoritarias que no otorgan el control del objetivo tanto a nivel europeo como nacional. La Comisión Europea propone la modificación del Reglamento de concentraciones con el fin de introducir un sistema de transparencia selectivo y evaluar estas adquisiciones aplicando el criterio de la restricción significativa de la competencia. El artículo analiza la conveniencia de reformar también la LDC en el mismo sentido.Palabras clave: Adquisiciones de participaciones minoritarias. Control de concentraciones. Reforma Reglamento de concentraciones y LDC. Mecanismos de remisión.Abstract: The article handle with the need to extend the Merger control rules to the acquisition of non-controlling minority shareholdings at European and national level. The Commission proposes to modify de Merger Regulation in order to introduce the transparency system and apply the substantive test for mergers: the significant restriction of competition. This work analyses the convenience of the reform of the LDC as well.Keywords: Acquisition of non-controlling minority shareholdings. Merger control. Merger Regulation and LDC reform. Case referrals.

The Role of Non-Coordinated Effects in the Assessment of Minority Shareholdings

This article focusses on the non-coordinated effects of minority shareholdings in oligopolistic markets. It is demonstrated that minority shareholdings even when they fall below the usual thresholds can lead to a significant impediment of effective competition (SIEC) on a purely non-coordinated basis. This is particularly likely in a market with differentiated products, when a firm partially acquires shareholdings in its closest competitor and when the next best alternative products are only weak substitutes.