scholarly journals El sometimiento de las adquisiciones minoritarias que no otorgan el control a las normas sobre el control de las concentraciones = The control under merger rules of acquisitions of non-controlling minority shareholdings

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 314
Author(s):  
Natividad Goñi Urriza
Keyword(s):  
National Level ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Control Rules ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
Minority Shareholdings

Resumen: El trabajo aborda la conveniencia de someter al control de concentraciones las adquisiciones minoritarias que no otorgan el control del objetivo tanto a nivel europeo como nacional. La Comisión Europea propone la modificación del Reglamento de concentraciones con el fin de introducir un sistema de transparencia selectivo y evaluar estas adquisiciones aplicando el criterio de la restricción significativa de la competencia. El artículo analiza la conveniencia de reformar también la LDC en el mismo sentido.Palabras clave: Adquisiciones de participaciones minoritarias. Control de concentraciones. Reforma Reglamento de concentraciones y LDC. Mecanismos de remisión.Abstract: The article handle with the need to extend the Merger control rules to the acquisition of non-controlling minority shareholdings at European and national level. The Commission proposes to modify de Merger Regulation in order to introduce the transparency system and apply the substantive test for mergers: the significant restriction of competition. This work analyses the convenience of the reform of the LDC as well.Keywords: Acquisition of non-controlling minority shareholdings. Merger control. Merger Regulation and LDC reform. Case referrals.

EU merger review of the acquisition of non-controlling minority shareholdings: where to now?

2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-92
Author(s):  
Frank Montag ◽  
Mary Wilks
Keyword(s):  
White Paper ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Potential Benefits ◽  
One Year ◽  
Minority Shareholdings ◽  
Minority Interests ◽  
Policy Proposals ◽  
Benefits And Costs ◽  
The Eu

AbstractOn 9 July 2014, the European Commission (the Commission) published its White Paper “Towards more effective EU merger control”, which reviewed the operation of the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR) ten years after the introduction of the substantive test of “significant impediment to substantial competition” (SIEC) and proposed certain specific improvements, including the review of non-controlling minority interests under the EUMR. The 2014 White Paper followed approximately one year of consultation with Member States and interested parties, and was accompanied by a Staff Working Document, which analyses in more detail the considerations underlying the policy proposals in the 2014 White Paper, and an Impact Assessment, which analyses the potential benefits and costs of the various policy options considered.Less than six months after the consultation on the 2014 White Paper closed, Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager indicated that the Commission is reconsidering its proposals to allow it to review the acquisition of non-controlling minority shareholdings under the EUMR. This decision has been welcomed by many in the business and legal community as the “targeted transparency system” proposed by the Commission had raised a number of concerns regarding proportionality, legal certainty, cost and administrative burden.Whilst we await the Commission’s next move, this article considers whether non-controlling minority shareholdings should be subject to EU merger control and the extent to which the Commission’s originally envisaged system adequately dealt with the issues it sought to address. This article also proposes a number of principles that the authors suggest should be taken into account when designing a balanced system of merger review for acquisitions of non-controlling minority shareholdings in which the burden of the additional review is proportionate to the goals pursued.

scholarly journals Did Lloyds/HBOS mark the failure of an enduring economics-based system of merger regulation?

2020 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 539-552
Author(s):  
Andreas Stephan
Keyword(s):  
Public Interest ◽  
General Public ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Merger Regulation

This article asks whether the merger of Lloyds TSB and Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) in 2008, on public interest grounds, marked the failure of an enduring economics-based system of merger regulation. It argues that, far from marking a failure, the Lloyds/HBOS merger highlights the importance of only allowing public interest interventions on exceptional grounds in specific industries. Economics-based merger control is transparent and preferable to general public interest assessments, which are unpredictable and open to abuse. Concerns raised which support arguments for greater political interventions can be more effectively addressed in other ways.

21. Mergers (2): EU law

2021 ◽  
pp. 871-958
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Control Section ◽  
The Eu

This chapter examines EU merger control. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of EU merger control. Section 3 discusses the jurisdictional rules which determine whether a particular merger should be investigated by the European Commission in Brussels or by the national competition authorities (‘the NCAs’) of the Member States. Section 4 deals with the procedural considerations such as the mandatory pre-notification to the Commission of mergers that have a Union dimension and the timetable within which the Commission must operate. Section 5 discusses the substantive analysis of mergers under the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), and section 6 explains the procedure whereby the Commission may authorise a merger on the basis of commitments, often referred to as remedies, offered by the parties to address its competition concerns. The subsequent sections describe the Commission’s powers of investigation and enforcement, judicial review of Commission decisions by the EU Courts and cooperation between the Commission and other competition authorities, both within and outside the EU. The chapter concludes with an examination of how the EUMR merger control provisions work in practice.

Reforming EU merger control to capture ‘killer acquisitions’ – the case for caution

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 51-67
Author(s):  
Nicholas Levy ◽  
Henry Mostyn ◽  
Bianca Buzatu
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Review Process ◽  
Digital Age ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Digital Platforms ◽  
Control Rules ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Start Ups

This article examines whether EU merger control rules should be recalibrated to address concerns said to arise from acquisitions of innovative start-ups by established digital platforms – commonly referred to as ‘killer’ or ‘nascent’ acquisitions. It assesses various proposals designed to remedy two failings: a perceived failure to review anti-competitive transactions due to inadequate jurisdictional thresholds and a perceived failure to detect competition problems during the merger review process. It argues that, given the large number of transactions already subject to merger control, any expansion of existing rules should occur only where there is clear evidence of a significant enforcement gap. In the view of the authors, there is no persuasive evidence that a material number of anti-competitive digital acquisitions are escaping antitrust scrutiny, that the analytical framework applied by the European Commission should be significantly changed, or that the methodological tools employed to review concentrations are unfit for purpose. The authors therefore disfavour wide-ranging changes to the EU's rules and instead propose a series of incremental improvements to ensure that EU merger enforcement is tailored to the digital age.

28. Competition Law:

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Merger Policy ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
Academic Debate ◽  
The Way

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter discusses EU law on mergers, first examining the policy reasons underlying merger control. It then considers the jurisdictional, procedural, and substantive aspects to EU merger policy. Jurisdictional issues cover the types of concentration that are subject to the Merger Regulation and the inter-relationship between merger control at EU and national levels. Procedural issues cover matters such as the way in which notice of a proposed merger must be given and the investigative powers possessed by the Commission. Substantive issues of merger policy include matters such as the test for determining whether a merger or concentration should be allowed and the extent to which efficiencies produced by the concentration should be taken into account.

scholarly journals The New Substantive Test in the EC Merger Regulation—Bridging the Gap between Economics and Law?

2008 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 263-285 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giorgio Monti
Keyword(s):  
Review Process ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Economic Evidence ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
Ec Competition Law ◽  
Court Of First Instance

In the last 20 years, the application of EC competition law by the Commission has been increasingly informed by economics. However, whilst the Commission has operated an economically enlightened regime in the field of merger control as a whole, its policy on conglomerate mergers and ambiguity over the role of efficiencies have received adverse comment. Several defeats in the Court of First Instance suggested poor handling of economic evidence in the merger review process.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document