Europe’s Cosmopolitan Union

The chapter provides a Kantian reading of EU internal market law and the refugee crisis of 2015. The chapter argues that the EU should be viewed as a cosmopolitan union. The authors ask whether EU law, understood as positive cosmopolitan law, can be qualified as an extension of the legal condition, and whether it can be viewed as consistent with the other two parts of public law, especially with the freedom of EU member states which also depend on the possible connection to global, much less extensive, systems of positive cosmopolitan law such as migration law.

Theory of Law, Jurilinguistics and Legal Language: A common task

This paper sets a clear interdisciplinary boundary of the joint work between the Theory of Law and Jurilinguistics, surrounding the role of legal language. The paper attempts to contemplate the challenges of the globalization of Law in the 21st century, and launches the challenge of the formation of a common place, to be established by political language and legal language, in order to favour the procedural and gradual development of Global Law. Thus, today, in the period of transition between international law and cosmopolitan law, the regulation of global life increasingly demanding of translation professionals. For this reason, when practising legal translation, their contribution is not limited to the transition from language a quo to language ad quem, but to the construction of classes that form a tertium, and it is from this residue of translation processes that it starts to open itself to the possibility of a legal expertise common to everybody starts to open up. Jurilinguistics has the task of collating and systemising these practices, to contribute to the Theory of Law, towards achieving the new scale of the project of modernity, that is, the formation of transnational justice.

O DIREITO DE HOSPITALIDADE UNIVERSAL E O COLONIALISMO NO PENSAMENTO DE KANT

RESUMONa segunda seção, Kant menciona: “Os artigos definitivos para a paz perpétua entre os Estados são três: o primeiro, a Constituição civil em cada Estado deve ser republicana. A constituição de um Estado preocupado com a liberdade das pessoas, enquanto componentes de uma sociedade, da sua dependência a uma legislação comum e da sua igualdade como cidadãos. O direito das gentes deve ser fundado sobre um federalismo de Estados livres. Para garantir um estado de paz, Kant sugere a formação de uma união entre os povos, que não seria o mesmo que um Estado congregando povos, pois cada um tem e deve conservar a sua individualidade e o terceiro, o direito cosmopolita deve ser limitado às condições da hospitalidade universal. Essa ultima concepção, Kant no final do século XVII, já falava do “direito da posse comunitária da superfície da Terra”, e que, em virtude de suas dimensões limitadas, somos obrigados a conviver uns com os outros, tornando-se necessário exercitar. Essa ultima concepção, permite problematizar a questão dos estrangeiros e do colonialismo reforçando a necessidade da liga das nações em assegurar o direito cosmopolita, regulador das relações entre Estado e Cidadãos de outros estados (Estrangeiros), em não ser tratados com hostilidade em qualquer parte do globo, numa perspectiva de uma cidadania universal.Palavras chaves: Direito dos povos, direito cosmopolita, colonialismo.In the second section, Kant mentions: “There are three definitive articles for perpetual peace between states: the first, the civil constitution in each state must be republican. The constitution of a State concerned with people's freedom, as components of a society, of their dependence on common legislation and of their equality as citizens. People's law must be founded on a federalism of free states. To guarantee a state of peace, Kant suggests the formation of a union between peoples, which would not be the same as a State congregating peoples, since each one has and must preserve its individuality and the third, the cosmopolitan right must be limited to conditions of universal hospitality. This last conception, Kant at the end of the 17th century, already spoke of the “right to community possession of the Earth's surface”, and that, due to its limited dimensions, we are obliged to live with each other, making it necessary to exercise. This latter conception allows us to problematize the issue of foreigners and colonialism, reinforcing the need for the league of nations to ensure the cosmopolitan right, which regulates relations between the State and Citizens of other states (Foreigners), in not being treated with hostility anywhere in the world. globe, in a perspective of universal citizenship.Key words: Peoples' law, cosmopolitan law, colonialism

Non-State Peoples and Cosmopolitan Exit From the State of Nature

Non-state peoples cannot be subjects of Kant’s international law, which accordingly affords them no protection against external interference. They might also lack the dynamic of private law at the basis of the duty of state entrance. Prima facie, this compels Kant to allow that their lands be appropriated and that they be forced out of the state of nature. But this conclusion is at odds with his cosmopolitanism, particularly its anti-imperialistic commitments: non-state peoples are protected against annexation, under Kant’s cosmopolitan law. The paper makes three contributions to the debate on this tension. Firstly, it disambiguates scope, ground, and relata of the duty to exit the state of nature. Secondly, it argues that non-state peoples have an inter-group duty to exit the state of nature; and that this holds for a non-state people regardless of whether it also has an intra-group duty of state entrance, which remains unenforceable by outside parties. Finally, it offers a construal of the former duty as a cosmopolitan duty to interact peacefully even in the absence of a shared culture. Recebido / Received: 1o. de junho de 2020 / 1st June 2020Aceito / Accepted: 30 de junho de 2020 / 30 June 2020.

Kant on Structural Domination and Global Justice

This paper offers a novel reading of Immanuel Kant’s mature political philosophy. It argues that Kant’s doctrine of right is best understood as dealing with the question of how to justify practices of social power. It thereby suggests that the main object of Kant’s doctrine of right should be read in terms of individuals’ higher order power of free choice and action (“Willkür”). It then argues that the main normative problem Kant discusses in the doctrine of right is the problem of domination. While Kant must allow persons the exercises of their capacities for free choice and action for reasons of freedom, the structural upshots of such exercises by a multitude of empirically interconnected persons leads to a structure of private right, which is normatively problematic. This paper suggests interpreting this problem as one of structural domination. This reading sheds new light on Kant’s institutional theory of global justice. It enables us to better understand Kant’s theory of global institutionalization, particularly with regard to the question of why national and global institutionalization are so important in Kant’s theory and with regard to the question of what type of law cosmopolitan law is.