KECENDERUNGAN PELANGGARAN PERJANJIAN UTANG PADA PERUSAHAAN KONSTRUKSI DAN PROPERTI DI BEI

The importance of debt covenant violation is to minimize the debtholder default risk. The possibility of debtholder’s default risk may be caused by liquidity problems, low profitability, and bad quality of earnings. Hence, this study aims to proof the tendency of debtholder to violate debt covenants by measuring current ratio volatility, return on assets, and earnings quality as independent variables. By using five companies from construction and property sub-sector that listed on Indonesia Stocks Exchange in 2016- 2018, the data are analyzed with multiple linear regression model for panel data. From this study, we can conclude that the impact of return on assets to debt covenant violation is significantly negative, debtholders with poor financial performance have higher potential to do debt covenant violation. However, there is no evidence that debt covenant violation is affected current ratio volatility and earnings quality.

Debt covenant violation, competition and cost of new debt

This article empirically shows that the cost of new debt is higher for firms that commit covenant violations. Using a proxy for product market competition to capture exogenous changes to a firm’s competitive environment, I find that the cost is systematically higher for firms that operate in competitive markets. Moreover, I identify channels through which violations can increase the cost of new debt, namely, the incidence, timing and frequency effects, and I document these effects to be more acute for competitive markets. Overall, the study finds that the market prices financial contracts by taking into account the information content of the violation and the risk arising from market competition. JEL Classification: G12, G30

MANAJEMEN LABA PADA PERUSAHAAN YANG MELANGGAR PERJANJIAN UTANG

This research aims to give empirical evidence concerning earnings management in firms violating debt covenant and to test whether earnings management in those firms are larger than that in control firms. Research population is manufacturing company listed at Bursa Efek Indonesia. The sample includes 17 firms violating debt covenant and 22 firms complying debt covenant as control firms. The sampling method is purposive sampling. Method of statistics used is t-test. The statistic test of first hypothesis shows that mean of discretionary accruals at a year before violation is significantly larger than that at the year debt covenant violation. This result supports debt covenant hypothesis. But, mean difference at the year of violation and at a year after violation does not provide the support for the hypothesis. The statistic test of second hypothesis shows that mean of discretionary accruals of firms violating debt covenant at a year before and at the year violation of debt covenant is significantly larger than that of control firms. Thus, we can conclude that violation of debt covenant motivate management to perform earnings management.

Creditor Influence and CEO Compensation: Evidence from Debt Covenant Violations

ABSTRACT Debt covenant violation alters firm dynamics, providing creditors with the right to demand repayment, and via that right, influence firm actions. We provide evidence consistent with creditors employing that channel to influence CEO compensation. Using regression discontinuity analysis, we show that in the year after a covenant violation, after controlling for other factors, CEO compensation is 8.5 percent lower and the CEO's compensation package contains fewer risk-taking incentives, as the vega associated with newly granted options is 26 percent lower. These changes are more pronounced when the creditor has greater influence, such as when the borrower and creditor have a prior lending relationship, the creditor is a highly reputable bank, or when the borrower is financially weaker. We also find that CEOs' risk-taking incentives decrease with the number of debt covenants; in particular, the number of performance debt covenants being breached. JEL Classifications: G21; G34.

MANAJEMEN LABA PADA PERUSAHAAN YANG MELANGGAR PERJANJIAN UTANG

This research aims to give empirical evidence concerning earnings management in firms violating debt covenant and to test whether earnings management in those firms are larger than that in control firms. Research population is manufacturing company listed at Bursa Efek Indonesia. The sample includes 17 firms violating debt covenant and 22 firms complying debt covenant as control firms. The sampling method is purposive sampling. Method of statistics used is t-test. The statistic test of first hypothesis shows that mean of discretionary accruals at a year before violation is significantly larger than that at the year debt covenant violation. This result supports debt covenant hypothesis. But, mean difference at the year of violation and at a year after violation does not provide the support for the hypothesis. The statistic test of second hypothesis shows that mean of discretionary accruals of firms violating debt covenant at a year before and at the year violation of debt covenant is significantly larger than that of control firms. Thus, we can conclude that violation of debt covenant motivate management to perform earnings management.