The Right to Wage Private Wars of Subsistence

Some philosophers have recently argued for the revisionist just war doctrine that individuals can have the right to initiate war in defense of their human rights when their government fails in its duty to protect them. It was a central tenet of early modern just war theory, too, that when judicial recourse is not available, individuals are entitled to enforce their basic rights by force of war. How should we conceptualize such remedial rights to secure basic rights by armed force? And where to fit such rights within ethical theories of war? This chapter explores these questions by critically contrasting two ways to ground individual rights to wage so-called “private subsistence wars”: via “modern” duties of global justice and via “old” rights of necessity. I argue that the right-of-necessity model—for better or worse—can sidestep problems of indeterminate and underdetermined moral liability by grounding resistance rights in enforceable rights (of subsistence) rather than in enforceable duties (of global justice). My analysis thus charts normative implications of dispensing with the legitimate authority condition by analyzing what it means for rights and duties to be enforceable.

Just War Doctrine – Relic or Relevant?

In the article, I examine the relevance of Just War Doctrine to contemporary conflicts. Just War Doctrine, which grew out of Western Christian thinking, presupposes that evil might be confronted with force, if there is no alternative way to restore a just order. But modern trends call into question the certainty and universality of this doctrine. On the one hand, ideas of moral relativism and comparative justice have become more widespread, potentially undermining the use of the notions “just” and “justified” in relation to military conflicts. On the other hand, the nature of war is changing, as warfare is no longer only kinetic in character. I offer examples of how the evolving character of warfare challenges the traditional understanding of Just War Doctrine. For example, there is the growing threat of cyber warfare, but the ethical criteria for its use are not defined. In relation to Just War Doctrine, questions of whether and when pre-emptive cyber attack is permissible arise, what should constitute legitimate targets of cyber warfare and to what degree collateral damage could be acceptable. Another challenge to the traditional understanding of Just of War Doctrine was the putative doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Prima facie, humanitarian interventions do not comply with ius ad bellum criteria of Just War Doctrine, because of the absence of a direct military threat to the intervening state. The justification of humanitarian intervention is based on the assertion of an intolerable violation of accepted values. The weakness of such approach, as discussed in the article, is that it implicitly assumes that one protagonist’s values are superior to others. A further example of emerging challenges to Just War Doctrine is the phenomenon of hybrid war, a term used to describe a type of conflict that is multi-faceted and in which kinetic warfare is not dominant. The orchestration of several strands of conflict, each designed to be below the threshold to provoke a military response, exploits the absence of legal and ethical norms regulating such activity. I conclude the article by suggesting that, firstly, for Just War Doctrine to remain relevant, it should be expanded to include harms caused by non-kinetic actions, and, secondly, the distinctions between the states of war and peace should be redefined to reflect the changing character of war more accurately.

Grotius on Reprisal

In neither of his two major forays into the laws of war and peace – De iure praedae or De iure belli ac pacis – did Hugo Grotius discuss the legal institutions of reprisal – whether special or general – or privateering in their own right. His profoundly novel reading of the just war doctrine in the context of his theory of natural rights, however, gave powerful legitimisation to the practices of special reprisals, as well as of privateering in times of war and of peace.

‘Remedium repraesaliarum’: The Medieval and Early Modern Practice and Theory of Reprisal within the Just War Doctrine

Centuries before being included in Hugo Grotius’s De iure belli ac pacis and De iure praedae, the subject of reprisal was already being discussed in medieval literature. The aim of this paper is to examine the medieval and early modern practice and theory of reprisal as it developed before and during Grotius’s lifetime. Its first part investigates a number of important foundational elements, such as the issues of definition and terminology, and the common characteristics of a reprisal case. In the second half, the author explores why reprisals were deemed to be a ‘perversus mos’ or ‘bad custom’ and how continued reliance on this practice was nonetheless justified by inserting it into the medieval just war doctrine. The paper does not provide a systematic study of Grotius’s own engagement with medieval reprisal sources. Rather, it should be read in conjunction with another publication in this same volume, ‘Grotius on Reprisal’ by Randall Lesaffer.

Reinhold Niebuhr and the Christian realist pendulum

Reinhold Niebuhr is widely acknowledged as the father of Christian realism and a staunch critic of pacifism. In a famous exchange with his brother H. Richard in The Christian Century, Niebuhr defended the necessity of entering the fray of battle to combat evil as opposed to opting for non-violent detachment that ultimately usurps God’s authority to decide on final matters. Niebuhr, however, never endorsed an aggressive Just War doctrine. Striving to reconcile the Christian command of love with the harsh realities of power resulting from universal sinfulness, Niebuhr emphasised the necessity of negotiating the distance between the two extremes of a pendulum swinging from Christian pacifism to the endorsement of interventionist policies. Rather than this being an expression of the ambiguity of his moral convictions, this paper argues that it is a product of his sensitivity to applying contextual moral and political judgement as an exercise of theological responsibility.

Inferring Intentions from Consequences: How Moral Judgments Shape Citizen Perceptions of Wartime Conduct

How people interpret the intentions of others is fundamental to politics. This article examines intention understanding in the domain of how citizens evaluate wartime conduct. Drawing on recent work in moral psychology, it argues that people are more likely to attribute intentionality to wartime actions that produce morally bad consequences than otherwise identical actions that produce morally good consequences. We test this theory with two vignette-based survey experiments. Our results show that this hypothesis holds in a variety of contexts relating to civilian casualties and the destruction of heritage sites during war. By unlocking the moral psychology of intention understanding, this article contributes to the field of political psychology in general, and more specifically to theoretical debates in International Relations (IR) about public opinion on just war doctrine.

FOXES IN THE HENHOUSE: LEGAL CRITIQUE TO THE “JUS BELLUM JUSTUM” DOCTRINE FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION THROUGH THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

ABSTRACT Objective: The paper presents a legal analysis of R2P in light of contemporary international law. It questions whether R2P is lawful as a just war (jus bellum justum) doctrine under international law, specifically under the general prohibition for the use of force pursuant to the Charter of the United Nations. The paper first analyzes the just war doctrine in light of international law; thereafter, there is a study of the legal framework for the use of force in the United Nations Charter; and, in a third step, the study of the R2P in legal light as a just war doctrine. Methodology: The research is executed through a deductive approach, its scientific objective is exploratory, and its research technique is a bibliographical and documentary survey. The methodological limit is in a legal approach of the subject from a normative perspective, focused on the legal validity of the institute under international law. Results: It is concluded from the study that R2P has legal flaws and does not stand against United Nations Charter regulation on the usage of force, notably the norm that states that the use of force in international relations is an exclusive responsibility of the United Nations Security Council. Contributions: The study shows its pertinence as an endeavor into a strictly legal analysis of a complex and highly political subject of humanitarian interventions. Keywords: Responsibility to protect; humanitarian intervention; just war doctrine; United Nations Security Council. RESUMO Objetivo: O artigo apresenta uma análise jurídica da R2P à luz do Direito Internacional contemporâneo; questiona se a R2P é juridicamente válida como uma doutrina de guerra justa (jus bellum justum) sob o Direito Internacional, especificamente à luz da proibição geral de uso da força de acordo com a Carta das Nações Unidas. Para tanto, o artigo analisa a doutrina da guerra justa à luz do Direito Internacional; em seguida, estuda o marco legal para o uso da força na Carta da ONU; e, em terceiro lugar, estuda a R2P como uma doutrina de guerra justa. Metodologia:A pesquisa é executada através de abordagem dedutiva, seu objetivo científico é exploratório e sua técnica de pesquisa é bibliográfica e documental. O limite metodologia é uma abordagem legal do seu objeto em uma perspectiva normativa com foco na validade legal do instituto à luz do Direito Internacional.Resultados: Conclui-se do estudo que a R2P tem falhas jurídicas e não se coaduna com a normativa da Carta das Nações Unidas sobre o uso da força, notadamente a norma que estabelece que o uso da força nas relações internacionais é uma responsabilidade quase exclusiva do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas. Contribuições: O estudo mostra sua pertinência por se tratar de análise estritamente legal de um assunto complexo e altamente político que são as intervenções humanitárias. Palavras-chave: Responsabilidade de proteger; intervenção humanitária; doutrina da guerra justa; Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas.

Peace, Nonviolence, and Disarmament

This chapter explores the pacifism of the early Christian church and how the conversion of Constantine in the fourth century led to the development of the just war doctrine. At the conclusion of World War II, the advent of the nuclear arms race rendered some aspects of the just war doctrine obsolete. Pope John XXIII addressed these concerns in his encyclical Pacem in Terris, released in 1963. Numerous Catholic peace groups thought that the Vatican did not take a strong enough stance on war, militarism, and nuclear weapons. The Catholic Worker movement called for a return to pacifism and introduced the techniques of nonviolent noncooperation with civil defense drills in the 1950s. The chapter covers other Catholic peace movements and organizations, including Pax Christi, the Catholic Left that opposed the Vietnam War through draft card burnings and draft board raids, and the Plowshares movement, whose members damaged nuclear weapons to obstruct the nuclear arms race. Eventually, the US Catholic Bishops released the pastoral letter The Challenge of Peace, which condemned nuclear weapons and called for disarmament.