Human Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Detonations in New Delhi, India

The human casualties from simulated nuclear detonation scenarios in New Delhi, India are analyzed, with a focus on the distribution of casualties in urban environments and the theoretical application of a nuclear-specific triage system. Model estimates of nuclear war casualties employed ESRI's ArcGIS 9.3, blast and prompt radiation were calculated using the Defense Nuclear Agency's WE program, and fallout radiation was calculated using the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's (DTRA's) Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC) V404SP4, as well as custom GIS and database software applications. ESRI ArcGISTM programs were used to calculate affected populations from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory's LandScanTM 2007 Global Population Dataset for areas affected by thermal, blast and radiation data.  Trauma, thermal burn, and radiation casualties were thus estimated on a geographic basis for New Delhi, India for single and multiple (six) 25 kiloton (kt) detonations and a single 1 megaton (1000kt) detonation. Major issues related to the emergency management of a nuclear incident are discussed with specific recommendations for improvement.  The consequences for health management of thermal burn and radiation patients is the worst, as burn patients require enormous resources to treat, and there will be little to no familiarity with the treatment of radiation victims.

Determining optimal fallout shelter times following a nuclear detonation

In the event of a single, low-yield nuclear detonation in a major urban area, rapidly providing adequate shelter to affected populations could save 10 000–100 000 individuals from a fatal exposure to fallout radiation. However, poorly sheltered individuals may remain at risk. Current guidance and prior studies are not consistent as to the timing and conditions under which poorly sheltered individuals should leave their shelters to evacuate or obtain better shelter. This study proposes methods to determine the optimal shelter time based on information potentially available following a nuclear detonation. For the case in which individuals move to an adequate shelter that can be reached within 15 min, individuals should stay in a poor-quality shelter for at most 30 min after the detonation. If adequate shelter is available nearby (within 5 min), then poorly sheltered individuals should immediately proceed to the better shelter.