The Linguistic Idealism Question: Wittgenstein’s Method and his Rejection of Realism

After the publication of Wittgenstein’s posthumous work the question was raised whether that work involved idealist tendencies. The debate also engaged Wittgenstein’s immediate students. Resistance to presumed idealist positions had been ideologically central to G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell and other representatives of realism and early analytic philosophy. While Wittgenstein disagreed with them in key respects, he accepted their tendentious definition of ‘idealism’ at face value and bequeathed it to his students. The greatest flaw in the Realists’ view on idealism was their assumption of symmetry between realist and idealist approaches. For Realists, the chief task of philosophy was to establish what kinds of thing exist, and they took Idealists to offer an alternative account of that. However, the Idealists’ guiding concern was rather to investigate the subjective conditions of knowledge. In this respect, Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophical method was closer to theirs than to that of the Realists. This is especially obvious in his rejection of Moore’s idea of immediate knowledge. Ultimately, the trouble with Wittgenstein was not that he endorsed any kind of idealist ontology. It was his refusal to deliver the expected realist ontological messages on the supposed question of whether reality is independent of language or otherwise.

The Conspiracy of Objects

The task this essay set for itself is a reconsideration of the status of the “object” in contemporary forms of philosophical realism that postulate “flat ontologies.” I argue that the theoretical construction of the “object” often comes about in these ontologies through a fetishistic disavowal that effectively makes these objects speak. As a result, the construction of the generalized field of objectivity (according to which everything that exists is an object) passes through a double articulation. On the one hand, since contemporary realism defines itself as a rejection of all forms of linguistic idealism, it also tries to shift the focus away from human language as the primary medium of the construction of objectivity. On the other hand, however, this demotion of language proceeds in these works simultaneously with the elevation of the concept of “translation” to an ontological principle: these non-linguistic objects exist through their perpetual translations of each other. The fetishistic disavowal at work in realism (we know very well that objects do not speak, yet we act as if objectivity had to be construed as a field of translation) introduces the modality of fiction into the very heart of objectivity. This fictional dimension constitutive of objectivity can be described through an engagement of the Kantian notion of “purposiveness.” I argue that these translations that supposedly constitute objectivity rest on the fundamental presupposition that guides the entire Kantian system: we must presuppose purposiveness even where we can detect no evidence of it at all. Hence, today, the theory of the “democracy of objects” must be supplemented by its necessary correlate, a theory of the “conspiracy of objects.”

The Realist Challenge: Thinking the Reality of Language after Deconstruction

This chapter shows that realism and linguisticism are but two sides of the same medal. Naïve realism takes an entity, such as ‘matter’, ‘objects’, or ‘numbers’, to be simply given, thus constituting a kind of origin. While linguisticism presents an updated version of Kant’s critique of realism, it also asserts either that we cannot speak to an extra-linguistic real or that language is determined by the real, of which it cannot speak but toward which it nevertheless tends. While the first option seals us within linguistic idealism, the second tends to think of language in terms of a medieval semiology and a negative theology of the real. This chapter shows how speculative realists share in this negative theology and then turns to deconstruction and to Derrida’s engagement with Pierce’s semiology to develop a thinking of the reality of the sign.