Human Plight, Kantian as if, and Public Reasons in Korsgaard’s Moral Theory

The conception of two kinds of practical identities, which Korsgaard introduces in the Sources of Normativity, helps her explain how universal categorical reasoning is compatible with the moral content of individual practical decisions. Based on this conception, she devises an interpretation of the Kantian as if principle amended by her argument for the public shareability of reasons. I suggest that, in doing so, Korsgaard steps too far away from Kant’s architectonic approach to the question of why moral norms bind us, and that, as a result, the Korsgaardian explanation, as it stands, cannot be accomplished.

Twenty Steps Towards an Adequate Inferential Interpretation of p-Values in Econometrics

We suggest twenty immediately actionable steps to reduce widespread inferential errors related to “statistical significance testing.” Our propositions refer to the theoretical preconditions for using p-values. They furthermore include wording guidelines as well as structural and operative advice on how to present results, especially in research based on multiple regression analysis, the working horse of empirical economists. Our propositions aim at fostering the logical consistency of inferential arguments by avoiding false categorical reasoning. They are not aimed at dispensing with p-values or completely replacing frequentist approaches by Bayesian statistics.

Twenty steps towards an adequate inferential interpretation of p-values

We suggest twenty immediately actionable steps to reduce widespread inferential errors related to “statistical significance testing.” Our propositions refer first to the theoretical preconditions for using p-values. They furthermore include wording guidelines as well as structural and operative advice on how to present results, especially in research based on multiple regression analysis, the working horse of empirical economists. Our propositions aim at fostering the logical consistency of inferential arguments by avoiding false categorical reasoning. They are not aimed at dispensing with p-values or completely replacing frequentist approaches by Bayesian statistics.

Twenty steps towards an adequate inferential interpretation of p-values

We suggest twenty immediately actionable steps to reduce widespread inferential errors related to “statistical significance testing.” Our propositions refer first to the theoretical preconditions for using p-values. They furthermore include wording guidelines as well as structural and operative advice on how to present results, especially in research based on multiple regression analysis, the working horse of empirical economists. Our propositions aim at fostering the logical consistency of inferential arguments by avoiding false categorical reasoning. They are not aimed at dispensing with p-values or completely replacing frequentist approaches by Bayesian statistics.

Twenty steps towards an adequate inferential interpretation of p-values

We suggest twenty immediately actionable steps to reduce widespread inferential errors related to “statistical significance testing.” Our propositions refer first to the theoretical preconditions for using p-values. They furthermore include wording guidelines as well as structural and operative advice of how to present results, especially in multiple regression analysis. Our propositions aim at fostering the logical consistency of inferential arguments by avoiding false categorical reasoning. They are not aimed at dispensing with p-values or completely replacing frequentist approaches by Bayesian statistics.

Twenty steps towards an adequate inferential interpretation of p-values

We suggest twenty immediately actionable steps to reduce widespread inferential errors related to “statistical significance testing.” Our propositions refer first to the theoretical preconditions for using p-values. They furthermore include wording guidelines as well as structural and operative advice of how to present results, especially in multiple regression analysis. Our propositions aim at fostering the logical consistency of inferential arguments by avoiding false categorical reasoning. They are not aimed at dispensing with p-values or completely replacing frequentist approaches by Bayesian statistics.

The Parity in Health Promotion Issue

Health promotion is complex even when issues of justice and equity are not considered. The dynamic influences of culture, environments, education and upbringing all collude to make promoting fitness, happiness or healthy eating as exciting and unpredictable as a Mars mission. Add the goal of equivalence of benefit for all to this mix, and the launch pad is ever more volatile. To solve for parity we will need to struggle between two of the most time-honored of moral principles. Consequentialism holds that, as Star Trek's Dr. Spock said with his dying breath in his final episode, "the needs of the many are more important than the needs of a few." Categorical reasoning is a belief system where some things are morally righteous no matter the context. Choosing the right principles will require that we better leverage "citizen scientists" because one of the surest ways to satisfy a community's context is to recruit community partners.

Twenty steps towards an adequate inferential interpretation of p-values

We suggest twenty immediately actionable steps to reduce widespread inferential errors related to “statistical significance testing.” Our propositions refer first to the theoretical preconditions for using p-values. They furthermore include wording guidelines as well as structural and operative advice of how to present results, especially in multiple regression analysis. Our propositions aim at fostering the logical consistency of inferential arguments by avoiding false categorical reasoning. They are not aimed at dispensing with p-values or completely replacing frequentist approaches by Bayesian statistics.

Features of Social Dilemmas Solving in Older Adolescents with Different Levels of Intellectual Abilities

We discuss one of the aspects of social competence formation in older teens relevant in the light of the requirements of the second generation of Federal Educational Standards. The general hypothesis: Features of reasoning and decision-making in senior teenagers in social dilemmas are related to the level of their intellectual abilities and have sex specificity. The subject of the study was the relationship of intellectual abilities of students in grades 9-10 (N = 115, 65% were girls, 35% were boys) and their activity and critical reasoning, categorical position in solving social dilemmas. We revealed that verbal intelligence in older adolescents is positively related to criticality argument. Verbal intelligence relationship with the activity of reasoning and categorical position on social dilemmas was gender-specific. Girls with higher verbal intelligence have higher activity and low categorical reasoning; boys have higher categorical position. We conclude that verbal intellectual abilities are the cognitive basis of the processes of social cognition in older teens.