Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives

We study a model of cheap talk with one substantive assumption: The sender's preferences are state independent. Our main observation is that such a sender gains credibility by degrading self‐serving information. Using this observation, we examine the sender's benefits from communication, assess the value of commitment, and explicitly solve for sender‐optimal equilibria in three examples. A key result is a geometric characterization of the value of cheap talk, described by the quasiconcave envelope of the sender's value function.

Objects arranged randomly in space: an accessible theory

This expository paper deals with many problems concerning bounded objects arranged randomly in space. The objects are of rather general shapes and sizes, whilst the random mechanisms for positioning and orienting them are also fairly general. There are no restrictions on the dependence between shapes, sizes, orientations and positions of objects. The only substantive assumption is that the objects are distributed in a ‘statistically uniform' way throughout the whole of the space. We focus on the statistical properties of features seen in an observation window, itself of general size and shape.

Objects arranged randomly in space: an accessible theory

This expository paper deals with many problems concerning bounded objects arranged randomly in space. The objects are of rather general shapes and sizes, whilst the random mechanisms for positioning and orienting them are also fairly general. There are no restrictions on the dependence between shapes, sizes, orientations and positions of objects. The only substantive assumption is that the objects are distributed in a ‘statistically uniform' way throughout the whole of the space. We focus on the statistical properties of features seen in an observation window, itself of general size and shape.