scholarly journals Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives

Econometrica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 88 (4) ◽  
pp. 1631-1660 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elliot Lipnowski ◽  
Doron Ravid
Keyword(s):  
Value Function ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Geometric Characterization ◽  
Main Observation ◽  
Substantive Assumption

We study a model of cheap talk with one substantive assumption: The sender's preferences are state independent. Our main observation is that such a sender gains credibility by degrading self‐serving information. Using this observation, we examine the sender's benefits from communication, assess the value of commitment, and explicitly solve for sender‐optimal equilibria in three examples. A key result is a geometric characterization of the value of cheap talk, described by the quasiconcave envelope of the sender's value function.

Geometric characterization of additively manufactured polymer derived ceramics

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 95-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob M. Hundley ◽  
Zak C. Eckel ◽  
Emily Schueller ◽  
Kenneth Cante ◽  
Scott M. Biesboer ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Geometric Characterization ◽  
Polymer Derived Ceramics

scholarly journals OBLIGATION BLACKWELL GAMES AND P-AUTOMATA

2017 ◽  
Vol 82 (2) ◽  
pp. 420-452
Author(s):  
KRISHNENDU CHATTERJEE ◽  
NIR PITERMAN
Keyword(s):  
Markov Chains ◽  
Decision Problem ◽  
Value Function ◽  
Acceptance Condition ◽  
Parity Games ◽  
The Value Function

AbstractWe generalize winning conditions in two-player games by adding a structural acceptance condition called obligations. Obligations are orthogonal to the linear winning conditions that define whether a play is winning. Obligations are a declaration that player 0 can achieve a certain value from a configuration. If the obligation is met, the value of that configuration for player 0 is 1.We define the value in such games and show that obligation games are determined. For Markov chains with Borel objectives and obligations, and finite turn-based stochastic parity games with obligations we give an alternative and simpler characterization of the value function. Based on this simpler definition we show that the decision problem of winning finite turn-based stochastic parity games with obligations is in NP∩co-NP. We also show that obligation games provide a game framework for reasoning about p-automata.

A Geometric Characterization of Nonnegative Bands

2004 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-263
Author(s):  
Alka Marwaha
Keyword(s):  
Invariant Subspace ◽  
Geometric Structure ◽  
Finite Rank ◽  
Special Kind ◽  
Maximal Rank ◽  
Geometric Characterization ◽  
Idempotent Operators ◽  
Rank One ◽  
Standard Subspace

AbstractA band is a semigroup of idempotent operators. A nonnegative band S in having at least one element of finite rank and with rank (S) > 1 for all S in S is known to have a special kind of common invariant subspace which is termed a standard subspace (defined below).Such bands are called decomposable. Decomposability has helped to understand the structure of nonnegative bands with constant finite rank. In this paper, a geometric characterization of maximal, rank-one, indecomposable nonnegative bands is obtained which facilitates the understanding of their geometric structure.

Compatible Tight Riesz Orders

1976 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 186-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. M. W. Glass
Keyword(s):  
Geometric Characterization ◽  
Permutation Groups ◽  
Algebraic Characterization ◽  
Partially Ordered ◽  
Ordered Field ◽  
Ordered Groups

N. R. Reilly has obtained an algebraic characterization of the compatible tight Riesz orders that can be supported by certain partially ordered groups [13; 14]. The purpose of this paper is to give a “geometric“ characterization by the use of ordered permutation groups. Our restrictions on the partially ordered groups will likewise be geometric rather than algebraic. Davis and Bolz [3] have done some work on groups of all order-preserving permutations of a totally ordered field; from our more general theorems, we will be able to recapture their results.

scholarly journals Cheap Talk and Editorial Control

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Newton
Keyword(s):  
Information Transmission ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Simple Models

AbstractThis paper analyzes simple models of editorial control. Starting from the framework developed by Krishna and Morgan (2001a), we analyze two-sender models of cheap talk where one or more of the senders has the power to veto messages before they reach the receiver. A characterization of the most informative equilibria of such models is given. It is shown that editorial control never aids communication and that for small biases in the senders’ preferences relative to those of the receiver, necessary and sufficient conditions for information transmission to be adversely affected are (i) that the senders have opposed preferences relative to the receiver and (ii) that both senders have powers of editorial control. It is shown that the addition of further senders beyond two weakly decreases information transmission when senders exercising editorial control are anonymous, and weakly increases information transmission when senders exercising editorial control are observed.

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