Transnational Antitrust Law

In light of the significant diversity that remains among legal systems regarding the purpose and substance of market regulation, it is no surprise that efforts to develop a body of international antitrust law have failed. Instead, we rely on a diverse set of norms and transnational practices to regulate the increasingly globalized economy. This chapter discusses those practices, focusing on the actors and institutions involved. Section II addresses the production of substantive antitrust law at different levels (national, regional, and international) and discusses some of the ways in which these norms spread across legal systems. Section III turns to mechanisms for improving cooperation among legal systems in the enforcement of divergent regulatory norms, as well as to continuing sites of contestation among regimes. Section IV concludes with an analysis of the prospects for increased convergence in the field of antitrust law and policy.

Lead Jurisdiction Concepts: Prospects and Limits for Rationalizing International Competition Policy Enforcement

Lead jurisdiction models represent one option how to extend and enhance contemporary interagency cooperation among competition policy regimes. They constitute a multilateral, case-related form of cooperation that is suited to effectively create a one-stop-shop for the prosecution of international cartels, the handling of cross-border mergers and acquisitions and the governance of international antitrust cases. Thus, lead jurisdiction models offer considerable economic benefits. However, they also entail several caveats. Three possible working problems and downside effects of lead jurisdiction models in international competition policy enforcement are discussed in this paper.