An evaluation of the question types used by criminal justice professionals with complainants in child sexual assault trials

The way that complainants of child sexual assault are questioned about their experiences can profoundly influence the accuracy, credibility, and consistency of their evidence. This is the case for all people, but especially children whose language, social, and cognitive capacity is still developing. In this study, we examined the questions used by a representative sample of Australian prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges/magistrates to determine if this is an area that warrants improvement. Our focus was the type of questions used by the different professionals and how (if at all) these varied across complainant age groups (children, adolescents, and adults, total N = 63). Our findings revealed that each complainant group was questioned in a manner known to heighten misunderstanding and error (e.g., complex and leading questions were used frequently by all professional groups). There was also little indication of question adaption according to age (e.g., prosecutors asked children more complex questions than they asked adults). When the results are considered in the context of the broader literature on the impact of different question styles, they suggest that professional development in questioning would improve the quality of trial advocacy and judicial rulings.

Solicitors’ rights of audience, competence and regulation: a responsibility rights approach

This paper takes as its context the decision of the Solicitors Regulation Authority in England and Wales to abandon before the event regulation of lower court trial advocacy. Although solicitors will continue to acquire rights of audience on qualification, they will no longer be required to undertake training or assessment in witness examination, by contrast with other, competing, legal professions. Their opportunities to acquire competence outside the classroom will remain limited. The paper first explores this context and its implications for the three key factors of rights to perform, competence and regulatory accountability. The current regulatory system is then displayed as a Hohfeldian network of rights and duties held in tension between stakeholders intended to inhibit the incompetent exercise of rights to conduct trial advocacy. The SRA's proposal weakens this tension field and threatens the competitive position of solicitors. The paper therefore finally offers a radical alternative reconceptualisation of rights of audience in terms of Waldron's ‘responsibility rights’ as a solution, albeit one with significant implications for the individual advocate. This model, applicable globally, is closer to notions of societal good and professionalism than to those of the competitive market, whilst inhibiting incompetent performance and remediating the SRA's approach.

A Permanent Crisis

This chapter traces the rocky implementation of Gideon v. Wainwright between 1963 and 1973, continuing the Massachusetts case study begun in chapter 2 and also addressing developments in Philadelphia and other localities. Although states could technically comply with Gideon in a variety of ways (e.g. appointing private counsel case-by-case),many lawyers and reform organizations interpreted Gideon as a broader mandate to establish and expand institutionalized public defender offices. The Ford Foundation and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA) embarked upon the National Defender Project, an ambitious nationwide effort. As a result of such efforts, the 1960s witnessed change and growth in public defender offices around the country. In Massachusetts, for example, the organization initially founded as a voluntary defender was converted from a private charity into a statewide public defender agency, hired dozens of new lawyers, and was soon handling tens of thousands of cases each year. Yet, criticisms quickly emerged that public defenders had overwhelming caseloads and resorted too often to plea bargaining, rather than trial advocacy. Reformers diagnosed a new problem, the “indigent defense crisis” that persists today.

Defence Investigative Ethics

The investigation of war crimes has proved to be a challenging task for the Defence at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). At the Court’s infancy, civil trained defence counsel with no experience in adversarial party-driven procedures were unfamiliar with aspects of case preparation and trial advocacy, such as gathering evidence by conducting their own investigation, or cross-examination through leading questions based on a coherent theory of the case. These adversarial modalities also came with specific ethical duties. This chapter offers some practical advice and best practices relevant to Defence Counsel practising in national jurisdictions of the former Yugoslavia region and elsewhere, where adversarial modalities similar to those found in the ICTY procedure have been adopted in reforming their criminal procedures—transitioning them from civil law to a more hybrid system.

Pericles Should Learn to Fix a Leaky Pipe – Why Trial Advocacy Should Become Part of the LLB Curriculum (Part 2)

The inescapable reality is that most law school graduates are headed for professional life. This means that law schools have some accountability for the competence of their graduates, and thus an educational responsibility to offer their students instruction in the basic skills of legal representation. The most obvious and direct gain from the university law school offering more training in the generally neglected applied legal skills of trial advocacy, interviewing, counselling, drafting and negotiation, is the benefit to students in helping them bridge the gap between traditional basic legal education and practice. Although I strongly believe that the LLB curriculum should also include courses in legal writing, negotiation, client counselling, and witness interviewing, I emphasise adding a clinical course in trial advocacy to the LLB curriculum for a number of specific reasons. Trial advocacy consists of a set of skills that transcends the walls of the courtroom. It is difficult to conceive of a practising lawyer who does not, in some way and at some time, utilise the skills of advocacy - fact analysis, legal integration and persuasive speech. Even the technical "forensic skills" of trial advocacy, such as courtroom etiquette and demeanour, learning how to phrase a question to elicit a favourable response, and making an effective oral presentation, transfer readily to a wide range of applications within both the legal and business worlds. In addition to learning how to prepare and present a trial from the opening speech through to the closing argument, in a trial advocacy course students would also learn to apply procedural, substantive and ethical rules of law to prove or defend a cause of action. Moreover, if university law schools fail to contribute to establishing a substantial body of competent trial lawyers, our failure will ultimately take its toll on our system of justice. The quality of courtroom advocacy directly affects the rights of litigants, the costs of litigation, the proper functioning of the justice system, and, ultimately, the quality of justice. Also, traditional law school teaching in legal ethics is necessarily abstract and a-contextual. It can be effective at providing instruction in the law of lawyering, but it is seldom as productive when it comes to examining more subtle questions. The university trial advocacy course is the ideal forum in which to raise ambiguous and textured ethical issues. Ethics problems cannot be avoided or rationalised, because the student trial lawyer must always make a personal decision. In the ethics classroom, it is all too easy to say what lawyers should do. In the simulated courtroom, students have to show what they have chosen to do. I argue that a university trial advocacy course should not be antithetical to the university mission. Thus, students should be given the opportunity to learn not only "how" to conduct a trial, but also "why" their newly acquired skills should be used in a certain way, and "what" effect the use of that skill could have. Through properly constructed case files, assignments and class discussions, students should be able to reflect on issues that go beyond the mere mastery of forensic skills. A university course in trial advocacy must be infused with instruction in evidence, legal ethics, procedure, litigation planning, the encouragement of critical thinking about the litigation and trial process, and the lawyer's role in the adversary system. I also suggest, in concrete terms and by way of example, the outlines of both the theoretical and practical components of a university trial advocacy course that would result in a highly practical course of solid academic content.

Pericles Should Learn to Fix a Leaky Pipe – Why Trial Advocacy Should Become Part of the LLB Curriculum (Part 1)

It is a sad fact that at most university law schools in South Africa, a student can graduate without ever having set foot in a courtroom, and without ever having spoken to, or on behalf of, a person in need of advice or counsel. The past several years have witnessed a swelling chorus of complaints that the current LLB curriculum produces law graduates who were "out of their depth" in practice. My purpose is to make a case for the inclusion in the LLB curriculum of a course in trial advocacy. This endeavour of necessity invokes the broader debate over the educational objectives of a university law school – a debate memorably framed by William Twining as the two polar images of "Pericles and the plumber". My thesis is that the education of practising lawyers should be the primary mission of the university law school. The first part of this contribution is a response to those legal academics who hold that the role of the law school is to educate law students in the theories and substance of the law; that it is not to function as a trade school or a nursery school for legal practice. With reference to the development of legal education in the United States, I argue that the "education/training" dichotomy has been exposed as a red herring. This so-called antithesis is false, because it assumes that a vocational approach is necessarily incompatible with such values as free inquiry, intellectual rigour, independence of thought, and breadth of perspective. The modern American law school has shown that such so-called incompatibility is the product of intellectual snobbery and devoid of any substance. It is also often said that the raison d'être of a university legal education is to develop in the law student the ability "to think like a lawyer". However, what legal academics usually mean by "thinking like a lawyer" is the development of a limited subset of the skills that are of crucial importance in practising law: one fundamental cognitive skill – analysis – and one fundamental applied skill – legal research. We are not preparing our students for other, equally crucial lawyering tasks – negotiating, client counselling, witness interviewing and trial advocacy. Thinking like a lawyer is a much richer and more intricate process than merely collecting and manipulating doctrine. We cannot say that we are fulfilling our goal to teach students to "think like lawyers", because the complete lawyer "thinks" about doctrine and about trial strategy and about negotiation and about counselling. We cannot teach students to "think like lawyers" without simultaneously teaching them what lawyers do. An LLB curriculum that only produces graduates who can "think like lawyers" in the narrow sense ill-serves them, the profession and the public. If the profession is to improve the quality of the services it provides to the public, it is necessary for the law schools to recognise that their students must receive the skills needed to put into practice the knowledge and analytical abilities they learn in the substantive courses. We have an obligation to balance the LLB curriculum with courses in professional competence, including trial advocacy – courses that expose our students to what actually occurs in lawyer-client relationships and in courtrooms. The skills our law students would acquire in these courses are essential to graduating minimally-competent lawyers whom we can hand over to practice to complete their training. The university law school must help students form the habits and skills that will carry over to a lifetime of practice. Nothing could be more absurd than to neglect in education those practical matters that are necessary for a person's future calling.

EXPOSING THE TRUE ARGUMENT, A STUDENT’S RESPONSE TO DR WILLEM GRAVETT: ‘PERICLES SHOULD LEARN TO FIX A LEAKY PIPE’*

The purpose of this article is not to come to the defence of the individual academics that Gravett has decided to criticise, for they can surely defend themselves. I wish only to make clear the importance of the work they are doing as a way to point critics of the current system away from their colleagues and onto the legal education system at large, which is the real obstacle standing in the way of Trial Advocacy. This article superficially only argues that the there is no real threat to a destruction of the antithesis between theory and practice and that few oppose this position. Subsequent articles will hopefully answer to the underlying concerns Gravett poses to the critical thinking, constitutionalism and transformative constitutionalism are possibly breaking down the rule of law etc; WH Gravett ‘Pericles should learn to fix a leaky pipe — Why trial advocacy should become part of the LLB curriculum (Part 1)’ (2018) 21 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal (PER/PELJ) at 4.