The reshaping of the administrative procedure through technology as an opportunity to reinforce subjects’ rights

The digital transformation of public administrations is visible in the way several services are being delivered, in the communication tools that are being used and on access to administrative information. Technology intervenes more deeply in decision-making procedures. The administrative decisions are increasingly based on automated processing, either partially or fully. Automated decision-making can facilitate the correctness of decisions, insofar as computing and algorithms potentially make the application of law less conducive to errors of fact and errors of law, and to motivations beyond the protected legal interests. It, however, poses interesting challenges: it redefines the very concept of executive application of the law (e.g., creating or making use of an administrative intermediate rationality), of procedural information gathering, of the duty to give reasons for decisions and of the way of reviewing them. Regardless of the automatization of decision-making, the administrative information systems interoperability conciliated with the data portability right redefine the gathering of information and evidence, reinforcing the principle of investigation, which can mean a higher accuracy of fact-finding with less burden on individuals. In both cases, the use of technology in the administrative procedure demands rethinking the meaning of central values of the exercise of administrative powers.

Verifiable Autonomy and Responsible Robotics

The move towards greater autonomy presents challenges for software engineering. As we may be delegating greater responsibility to software systems and as these autonomous systems can make their own decisions and take their own actions, a step change in the way the systems are developed and verified is needed. This step involves moving from just considering what the system does, but also why it chooses to do it (since decision-making may be delegated). In this chapter, we provide an overview of our programme of work in this area: utilising hybrid agent architectures, exposing and verifying the reasons for decisions, and applying this to assessing a range of properties of autonomous systems.

NE BIS IN IDEM not Attached at the Suit of the Verdict of the Civil Code that is Declarative

A lawsuit in the civil procedure law there are two types of lawsuit voluntair and lawsuit contentiosa. The verdict against a lawsuit voluntair is a decision that is declarative. While the verdict of the lawsuit contentiosa consists of the ruling is declarative, the decision is constitutive, the verdict is kondemnator, of some kind of court verdict, the only verdict that is kondemnator that have permanent legal force, which have the nature of forcing the losing party to submit or empty the thing which is the object of litigation to the winning side, better submit its case voluntarily or by way of execution which was implemented by the court. While the decisions which are declarative and constitutive that have permanent legal force can not be implemented execution with the reasons for decisions which are declarative only declare something a state, in which case the state is a state that is valid according to the laws and the decisions which are constitutive only create a state of the new law, there is not a state of nature forcing the losing party to surrender or vacate its verdict. Therefore the solution that the ruling is declarative dankonstitutif can be executed the winning party can file a new lawsuit in the court of law which has to examine and decide the case with a lawsuit necessarily just adding and/or lists their petition judgment (kondemnatoir), so that the decisions which are declarative can be conducted by way of execution, but denganmemperhatikan carefully postulates a new lawsuit, so that is not attached to the principle of ne bis in idem.

Powerful Private Players in the Digital Economy: Between Private Law Freedoms and the Constitutional Principle of Equality

The digital economy has been driven by countless start-up companies but also by extremely powerful players such as Facebook, Twitter, Google, Amazon, or Paypal. They have not only accumulated a significant if not dominant position in their relevant markets but they have also gained enormous relevance for the economic and social relationships of individual citizens or consumers, and even traders and politicians. At the same time, citizens are at risk of being denied access to their services, or of having to pay individualized prices, due to their personal circumstances or their shopping or credit history. This article shows that traditional concepts of contract law and also data protection law offer little help to these citizens. It therefore explores the application of the fundamental right to equality to powerful digital players and the legal consequences of such application, including the right not to be subjected to arbitrariness and the right to be given reasons for decisions.

Human Factors and Medical Device Instructions for Use: It’s Not Just Good Business and Good Science, It’s the Law

The stated purpose of this panel was to discuss how the application of human factors science to the design, evaluation and development of medical device labeling and instructions for use is both good business and consistent with the law. Specific examples of the law were briefly discussed in the panel and are described in more detail in this paper. Questions posed by the audience quickly made it apparent that a higher-level conversation around risk was desired. One of the main topics addressed was that of unintended misuse; a summary of that discussion is also included in the paper. The overarching theme of the panel was as follows: The best we can do as human factors professionals is perform good science, document the work that we’ve done and the reasons for decisions that were made. We should also always strive to create the best product which requires balancing numerous constraints and competing goals.

Part V Separation of Powers, Ch.27 The Judicature

This chapter analyses the Australian judicature as a whole, as well as the individual courts that comprise it. It begins with a survey of the development of the common law conception of a court. The chapter next identifies four characteristics that have emerged as central to the definition of a court. These are: decisional independence and impartiality, the provision of procedural fairness, the dispensation of justice in open court, and the provision of reasons for decisions. Here, the evolution of the modern conception of a court reveals an apparent paradox from which the modern institution derives its strength, purpose, and identity: a sovereign's courts are independent of that sovereign.

Values in medicine

Medical doctors should be studying in the future not only about the “alleviation of physical and mental pain and suffering” but also about the “restoration of social functioning of their patients. Medical professionals are urged to carry their culture of helping and caring as contributions to society. They also assume responsibility for the careful use of available resources and their equitable distribution. Central values of medicine are respect for human dignity, respect for self-determination and autonomy, the primacy of patient welfare, the principle of noninjury, and solidarity. Questions of values deal with particularly complex areas of personal identity, because values are causes and reasons for decisions and actions. The potential damage of medical interventions is not automatically justified by the desire to help. The ratio between benefit and risks of medical measures must always be critically appreciated. The professional medical ethic is the basis for the contract between medicine and society with three basic principles: primacy of patient welfare, respect for the rights of self-determination (autonomy) of patients (informed consent), and promoting social justice in health care (solidarity). From these principles, normative values are derived, indispensably connected with medical responsibilities and obligations. Development of these values is discussed in the light of the philosophical background of the dignity of the individual person and the process of decision-making.

11. Giving Reasons for Decisions

This chapter examines the content and scope of the duty to give reasons, suggesting that giving reasons for decisions should be treated as a central facet of procedural fairness in administrative law. It first differentiates the duty to give reasons from the duty to give notice, the possibility of inferring unreasonableness from an absence of reasons, the proportionality doctrine, and the duty of candour. It then considers why reasons are required and goes on to discuss the duty to give reasons at common law. It also describes statutory duties and other duties to give reasons, paying attention to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Finally, it analyzes the question of whether a duty to give reasons has been discharged, and provides an overview of the remedial consequences of a breach of the duty to give reasons.