scholarly journals NE BIS IN IDEM not Attached at the Suit of the Verdict of the Civil Code that is Declarative

Author(s):  
Kosmas Dohu Amajihono

A lawsuit in the civil procedure law there are two types of lawsuit voluntair and lawsuit contentiosa. The verdict against a lawsuit voluntair is a decision that is declarative. While the verdict of the lawsuit contentiosa consists of the ruling is declarative, the decision is constitutive, the verdict is kondemnator, of some kind of court verdict, the only verdict that is kondemnator that have permanent legal force, which have the nature of forcing the losing party to submit or empty the thing which is the object of litigation to the winning side, better submit its case voluntarily or by way of execution which was implemented by the court. While the decisions which are declarative and constitutive that have permanent legal force can not be implemented execution with the reasons for decisions which are declarative only declare something a state, in which case the state is a state that is valid according to the laws and the decisions which are constitutive only create a state of the new law, there is not a state of nature forcing the losing party to surrender or vacate its verdict. Therefore the solution that the ruling is declarative dankonstitutif can be executed the winning party can file a new lawsuit in the court of law which has to examine and decide the case with a lawsuit necessarily just adding and/or lists their petition judgment (kondemnatoir), so that the decisions which are declarative can be conducted by way of execution, but denganmemperhatikan carefully postulates a new lawsuit, so that is not attached to the principle of ne bis in idem.

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 209
Author(s):  
Grzegorz Jędrejek

RES IUDICATA and Pursuing Interests for Interests in ArrearsSummaryThe aim of the article is to explain the doubts concerning the admissibility of pursuing interest for interest in arrears. This problem evokes doubts in the practice. The article presents the interpretation of art. 482 of the Civil Code, which includes the prohibition of anatocism. The exceptions thereto were also discussed. If the plaintiff, apart from the basic claim, pursues interests as an additional claim, the issued verdict creates the state of res iudicata also with regard to interests (art. 366 of the Code of Civil Procedure). In case of filing a state of claims for the interests for the interests in arrears, which is one of the exceptions from the rule of anatocism, the plaintiff counts the interests from the moment of filing the statement of claims regarding


Author(s):  
Karl Widerquist ◽  
Grant S. McCall

Earlier chapters of this book found that the Hobbesian hypothesis is false; the Lockean proviso is unfulfilled; contemporary states and property rights systems fail to meet the standard that social contract and natural property rights theories require for their justification. This chapter assesses the implications of those findings for the two theories. Section 1 argues that, whether contractarians accept or reject these findings, they need to clarify their argument to remove equivocation. Section 2 invites efforts to refute this book’s empirical findings. Section 3 discusses a response open only to property rights theorists: concede this book’s empirical findings and blame government failure. Section 4 considers the argument that this book misidentifies the state of nature. Section 5 considers a “bracketing strategy,” which admits that observed stateless societies fit the definition of the state of nature, but argues that they are not the relevant forms of statelessness today. Section 6 discusses the implications of accepting both the truth and relevance of the book’s findings, concluding that the best response is to fulfil the Lockean proviso by taking action to improve the lives of disadvantaged people.


Author(s):  
Thomas Sinclair

The Kantian account of political authority holds that the state is a necessary and sufficient condition of our freedom. We cannot be free outside the state, Kantians argue, because any attempt to have the “acquired rights” necessary for our freedom implicates us in objectionable relations of dependence on private judgment. Only in the state can this problem be overcome. But it is not clear how mere institutions could make the necessary difference, and contemporary Kantians have not offered compelling explanations. A detailed analysis is presented of the problems Kantians identify with the state of nature and the objections they face in claiming that the state overcomes them. A response is sketched on behalf of Kantians. The key idea is that under state institutions, a person can make claims of acquired right without presupposing that she is by nature exceptional in her capacity to bind others.


Author(s):  
Christine Cheng

After war, rebuilding the state’s presence—or building it up for the first time—is both a physical and social endeavor requiring new norms of compliance and cooperation. Local authority is deeply contested and the state typically has minimal presence. These conditions are akin to those described in the state of nature. To escape these conditions, Hobbes and Locke argued for the necessity of a sovereign to impose order and impartial justice to form what I call the kernel of the state. Extralegal groups orient societies in that direction by performing a set of visible and hidden functions in contemporary post-conflict environments. But they are not intentionally state-making. Rather, extralegal groups are driven by the need to create a stable trading environment and state-making is a by-product of this imperative. In the contemporary era, the motivation that drives extralegal groups to begin state-making is trade, not war.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-93
Author(s):  
Mochamad Moro Asih ◽  
Tunjung Fitra Wijanarko

The position of the Memorandum of Understanding on Indonesian Civil Law, as a written form of understanding between the parties, is not a law based agreement. In consequences, no sanctions applied for those parties whose denying (the agreement(s), but on moral sanction. However, a Memorandum of Understanding that does not have a compelling legal force can have it sanctions for any parties involved. The strength to binding (parties) of the Memorandum of Understanding according to agreement law in Indonesia is found on Indonesian Civil Code, equate a Memorandum of Understanding with an “agreement”. Article 1338 of Indonesian Civil Code states that every agreement made, legally binding as a law for the parties who made such agreement (Pacta Sunt Servanda), but if the legal elements of the agreement in Article 1320 Indonesia Civil Law are not fulfilled, then the Memorandum of Understanding is anulled and void by law, and has no legal force. Keywords: Memorandum of Understanding, agreement, sanction, Code of Civil Law


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