interdependent valuations
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2022 ◽  
pp. 2920-2939
Author(s):  
Alon Eden ◽  
Kira Goldner ◽  
Shuran Zheng

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maciej H. Kotowski

Consider a first‐price sealed‐bid auction with interdependent valuations and private budget constraints. Focusing on the two‐bidder case, we identify new sufficient conditions for the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. In equilibrium, agents may adopt discontinuous bidding strategies that result in a stratification of competition along the budget dimension. Private budgets can simultaneously lead to more aggressive bidding (a high‐budget agent leverages his wealth to outbid rivals) and more subdued bidding (competition becomes less intense among bidders at distinct budget levels). The presence of budget constraints may lead to multiple symmetric equilibria in the first‐price auction.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-38
Author(s):  
Kim-Sau Chung ◽  
◽  
Jeffrey C. Ely ◽  

Econometrica ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 87 (4) ◽  
pp. 1367-1390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi-Chun Chen ◽  
Wei He ◽  
Jiangtao Li ◽  
Yeneng Sun

We consider a general social choice environment that has multiple agents, a finite set of alternatives, independent types, and atomless type distribution. We show that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism, there exists an equivalent deterministic mechanism that (1) is Bayesian incentive compatible; (2) delivers the same interim expected allocation probabilities and the same interim expected utilities for all agents; and (3) delivers the same ex ante expected social surplus. This result holds in settings with a rich class of utility functions, multidimensional types, interdependent valuations, and in settings without monetary transfers. To prove our result, we develop a novel methodology of mutual purification, and establish its link with the mechanism design literature.


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