Privacy-Aware Laser Wireless Power Transfer for Aerial Multi-Access Edge Computing: A Colonel Blotto Game Approach

Multi-access edge computing (MEC) has been recently considered in challenging environments lacking available terrestrial infrastructures by extending the computing resources to the air for further enhancing the computation capability of the new aerial user equipment (AUE). Additionally, wireless power transfer (WPT) is a promising solution to prolong the battery lifetime of energy-constrained wireless devices like AUEs. In this paper, we investigate the integration of laser-beamed WPT in the high-altitude platform (HAP) aided MEC systems for the HAP-connected AUEs. By discretizing the three-dimensional coverage space of the HAP, we present a multi-tier tile grid-based spatial structure to provide aerial locations for laser charging. With this setup, we identify a new privacy vulnerability caused by the openness during the air-to-air transmission of WPT signaling messages in the presence of a terrestrial adversary. A privacy-aware laser-powered aerial MEC framework is developed that addresses this vulnerability and enhances the location privacy of AUEs for laser WPT. Specifically, the interaction between the HAP as a defender and the adversary in their tile grid allocation as charging locations to AUEs is formulated as a Colonel Blotto game, which models the competition of the players for limited resources over multiple battlefields for a finite time horizon. Moreover, we derive the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of the tile grid allocation game for both symmetric and asymmetric tile grids between the defender and the adversary. Simulations results show that the proposed framework significantly outperforms the design baselines with a given privacy protection level in terms of system-wide expected total utilities.

Privacy-Aware Laser Wireless Power Transfer for Aerial Multi-Access Edge Computing: A Colonel Blotto Game Approach

Multi-access edge computing (MEC) has been recently considered in challenging environments lacking available terrestrial infrastructures by extending the computing resources to the air for further enhancing the computation capability of the new aerial user equipment (AUE). Additionally, wireless power transfer (WPT) is a promising solution to prolong the battery lifetime of energy-constrained wireless devices like AUEs. In this paper, we investigate the integration of laser-beamed WPT in the high-altitude platform (HAP) aided MEC systems for the HAP-connected AUEs. By discretizing the three-dimensional coverage space of the HAP, we present a multi-tier tile grid-based spatial structure to provide aerial locations for laser charging. With this setup, we identify a new privacy vulnerability caused by the openness during the air-to-air transmission of WPT signaling messages in the presence of a terrestrial adversary. A privacy-aware laser-powered aerial MEC framework is developed that addresses this vulnerability and enhances the location privacy of AUEs for laser WPT. Specifically, the interaction between the HAP as a defender and the adversary in their tile grid allocation as charging locations to AUEs is formulated as a Colonel Blotto game, which models the competition of the players for limited resources over multiple battlefields for a finite time horizon. Moreover, we derive the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of the tile grid allocation game for both symmetric and asymmetric tile grids between the defender and the adversary. Simulations results show that the proposed framework significantly outperforms the design baselines with a given privacy protection level in terms of system-wide expected total utilities.

Focality and Asymmetry in Multi-battle Contests

This article examines the influence of focality in Colonel Blotto games with a lottery contest success function, where the equilibrium is unique and in pure strategies. We hypothesize that the salience of battlefields affects strategic behaviour (the salient target hypothesis) and present a controlled test of this hypothesis against Nash predictions, checking the robustness of equilibrium play. When the sources of salience come from asymmetries in battlefield values or labels (as in Schelling, 1960), subjects over-allocate the resource to the salient battlefields relative to the Nash prediction. However, the effect is stronger with salient values. In the absence of salience, we find support for the Nash prediction.