Plea Bargaining – Procedure with Victimology Approach : An Analysis

Plea Bargaining – Procedure with Victimology Approach : An Analysis

Are labor unions important for business cycle fluctuations? Lessons from Bulgaria

In this paper, we investigate the quantitative importance of collective bargaining agreements for the observed fluctuations in Bulgarian labor markets. Following Maffezzoli (Rev Econ Dyn 4:860–892, 2001), we introduce a monopoly union into a real-business-cycle model with government sector. We calibrate the model to Bulgarian data for the period following the introduction of the currency board arrangement (1999–2018), and compare and contrast it to a model without unions. We find that the sequential bargaining procedure between the monopoly union and the stand-in firm produces an important internal propagation mechanism within the theoretical setup, which allows the monopoly model to fit data better than the alternative framework with perfectly-competitive labor markets.

COALITION FORMATION IN DYNAMIC MULTICRITERIA GAMES

In this paper new approaches to obtain optimal behavior in dynamic multicriteria games are constructed. The multicriteria Nash equilibrium is obtained via the Nash bargaining design (Nash products), and the cooperative equilibrium is determined by the Nash bargaining procedure for the entire planning horizon. Coalition formation process in dynamic multicriteria games is investegated. To construct the characteristic function the Nash bargaining scheme is applied where the multicriteria Nash equilibrium plays the role of the status-quo points. Two variants of characteristic function's determination that take into account information structure of the game are presented (models without information and with informed players). Dynamic multicriteria bioresorce management problem is considered. The players' strategies and the size of the resource are compared under cooperative and noncooperative behavior and for different variants of characteristic function determination.

Social Responsibility of Business: Legal Aspects of the Economic Concept

The article deals with the problem of creation of the business (corporative) social responsibility conception and key elements of this conception. The functioning of the market economy in the modern society is impossible without strong ties between society and business community, social obligations of companies, corporations, firms and so on. Idea of business (corporative) social responsibility reflects these ties and is based on the philosophical doctrine of moral ideals as the goal of social progress. Business (corporative) social responsibility supposes free-will initiatory social activity of companies — activity, that is not related to commercialization. There are some areas of such activity: occupational safety, providing favourable conditions of employment, protection the environment, social security, health protection, culture and education. The author has attempted to characterize principles of companies’ social activity. These are: respect for law order, which means not only subjection to the law, but voluntary renunciation of using deficiencies of law and other law imperfections; respect for international laws; respect for human rights; concerning for moral ideals. Companies realize social responsibility in different ways. First of all through collective bargaining procedure. The next way is cooperation with government and local communities. Cooperation with non-government organizations (civil society organizations) and charity are also possible.

PLEA BARGAINING: A PANACEA TOWARDS PRISON DECONGESTION IN NIGERIA

Against the panoramic view of the criminal justice reform agenda in Nigeria, the plea bargaining procedure is yet to be fully recognized as a major intervention strategy to deal with the problems in the Nigerian criminal justice administration. This paper therefore conceptualized the concept of plea bargaining. The legal basis for plea, the justifications for plea as well as the merits and demerits of the plea are discussed. The paper also highlights the major problems afflicting criminal justice administration and examines the steps being taken to deal with the problems. The emphasis is on strengthening arguments for a mutual acceptance of plea bargaining as a credible exist strategy by both the state and an alleged offender. The way forward in form of recommendations for the expansion and institutionalization of the practice is also discussed.

A Simple Bargaining Procedure for the Myerson Value

We consider situations where the cooperation and negotiation possibilities between pairs of agents are given by an undirected graph. Every connected component of agents has a value, which is the total surplus the agents can generate by working together. We present a simple, sequential, bilateral bargaining procedure, in which at every stage the two agents in a link, (i,j) bargain about their share from cooperation in the connected component they are part of. We show that this procedure yields the Myerson value (Myerson, 1997) if the marginal value of any link in a connected component is increasing in the number of links in that connected component.

Bargaining over Risky Assets

We analyze the subgame-perfect equilibria of a game where two agents bargain in order to share the risk in their assets that will pay dividends once at some fixed date. The uncertainty about the size of the dividends is resolved gradually by the payment date and each agent has his own view about how the uncertainty will be resolved. As agents become less uncertain about the dividends, some contracts become unacceptable to some party to such an extent that at the payment date no trade is possible. The set of contracts is assumed to be rich enough to generate all the Pareto-optimal allocations. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium allocation, and it is Pareto-optimal. Immediate agreement is always an equilibrium outcome; under certain conditions, we further show that in equilibrium there cannot be a delay. In this model, the equilibrium shares depend on how the uncertainty is resolved, and an agent can lose when his opponent becomes more risk-averse. Finally, we characterize the conditions under which every Pareto-optimal and individually rational allocation is obtainable via some bargaining procedure as the unique equilibrium outcome.

A NON-COOPERATIVE BARGAINING PROCEDURE GENERALISING THE KALAI-SMORODINSKY BARGAINING SOLUTION TO NTU GAMES

We present a new NTU value, which generalises the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution to NTU games using three approaches. In the first section, we define the new NTU value as the only efficient point in the segment defined by an upper and a lower bound. Next, we define a bargaining procedure and prove that this procedure leads to a single, subgame perfect equilibrium payoff vector, which coincides with the new NTU value. Finally, we characterise the new value using several properties.