The emergence of cooperation by evolutionary generalization

In principle, any cooperative behaviour can be evolutionarily stable as long as it is incentivized by a reward from the beneficiary, a mechanism that has been called reciprocal cooperation. However, what makes this mechanism so powerful also has an evolutionary downside. Reciprocal cooperation faces a chicken-and-egg problem of the same kind as communication: it requires two functions to evolve at the same time—cooperation and response to cooperation. As a result, it can only emerge if one side first evolves for another reason, and is then recycled into a reciprocal function. Developing an evolutionary model in which we make use of machine learning techniques, we show that this occurs if the fact to cooperate and reward others’ cooperation become general abilities that extend beyond the set of contexts for which they have initially been selected. Drawing on an evolutionary analogy with the concept of generalization, we identify the conditions necessary for this to happen. This allows us to understand the peculiar distribution of reciprocal cooperation in the wild, virtually absent in most species—or limited to situations where individuals have partially overlapping interests, but pervasive in the human species.

The emergence of cooperation by evolutionary generalization

In principle, any cooperative behaviour can be evolutionarily stable as long as it is incentivized by a reward from the beneficiary, a mechanism that has been called reciprocal cooperation. However, what makes this mechanism so powerful also has an evolutionary downside. Reciprocal cooperation faces a chicken-and-egg problem of the same kind as communication: it requires two functions to evolve at the same time –cooperation and response to cooperation. As a result, it can only emerge if one side first evolves for another reason, and is then recycled into a reciprocal function. Developping an evolutionary model in which we make use of machine learning techniques, we show that this occurs if the fact to cooperate and reward others’ cooperation become general abilities that extend beyond the set of contexts for which they have initially been selected. Drawing on an evolutionary analogy with the concept of generalization, we identify the conditions necessary for this to happen. This allows us to understand the peculiar distribution of reciprocal cooperation in the wild, virtually absent in most species –or limited to situations where individuals have partially overlapping interests, but pervasive in the human species

The Impact of New Media on Diplomatic Practice: An Evolutionary Model of Change

Summary Based on a range of interviews with foreign diplomats in London, this article explains the considerable variation in the way that communication technologies both affect diplomatic practices and are appropriated by diplomats to pursue the respective countries’ information-gathering and public outreach objectives. The study shows that London, as an information environment, is experienced differently by each of the diplomats and embassy actors. The analysis elaborates a model of the ‘communication behaviour’ of foreign diplomats, based on an evolutionary analogy: foreign diplomats in the context of the British capital, within their respective embassy organizations, can each be compared to the members of a species that is attempting to survive in a natural environment. The nuances highlighted by the explanatory model challenge the largely homogeneous and generalized nature of current debates about media and diplomacy, as well as public diplomacy.

Survival of the Ideas that Fit: An Evolutionary Analogy for the Use of Evidence in Policy

This paper explores bias in the use of evidence in policy. It argues that existing models of the evidence–policy relationship neglect the tendency for attention to be paid only to that evidence helpful to the interests of powerful social groups. An evolutionary analogy is used to explain how this bias arises, without the need for irrationality or conspiracy on the part of policy makers. Examples are given in the fields of drug, asylum and other policies, and the possible responses by researchers to the biased use of research evidence are discussed.

A single-process learning theory

Many analogies exist between the process of evolution by natural selection and of learning by reinforcement and punishment. A full extension of the evolutionary analogy to learning to include analogues of the fitness, genotype, development, environmental influences, and phenotype concepts makes possible a single theory of the learning process able to encompass all of the elementary procedures known to yield learning.