Brain Transplant and Personal Identity

Should Christians support the view that one’s psychological continuity is the main criterion of personal identity? Is the continuity of one’s brain or memory states necessary and sufficient for the identicalness of the person? This paper investigates the plausibility of the psychological continuity theory of personal identity, which holds that the criterion of personal identity is certain psychological continuity between persons existing at different times. I argue that the psychological continuity theory in its various forms suffers from interminable problems. Then, I introduce an alternate account of personal identity, according to which personal identity is not further analyzable in terms of qualitative properties (“suchnesses”) of persons. Rather, persons are individuated by their primitive thisnesses (haecceities), which are nonqualitative properties of immaterial substances (or souls). This alternate conception of personal identity would be of particular relevance to those who believe in the immortality of the soul and are looking for a nonphysicalist account of personal identity.

Personal identity and the psychological continuity theory

According to the psychological continuity theory - which is one of the most popular philosophical approaches to the problem of personal identity -some sort of psychological relation represents the necessary (although, perhaps not the sufficient) criterion of a person?s persistence through time. The main aim of this paper is to provide a detailed critical analysis of two well-known arguments against the psychological continuity theory, both of which heavily rely on the animalist view on personal identity; that is to say, on the view according to which the essential property of persons is that they are biological organisms. The first argument purports to refute the psychological continuity theory by appealing to the fact that all persons are numerically identical to fetuses and that it is utterly implausible to attribute psychological properties or capacities to fetuses. The second argument attempts to show that every person is numerically identical to the biological organism that remains after its death and which does not have any psychological properties and capabilities. Hopefully, the final result of the analysis in this paper will show that the two arguments do not represent a satisfactory alternative to the psychological continuity theory.

Understanding tourist behaviour of senior citizens: lifecycle theory, continuity theory and a generational approach

ABSTRACTGlobal demographic changes and the increasing participation of senior citizens in leisure tourism activities have prompted governments and tourism providers in many developed regions to identify seniors as a priority market. Yet the lack of theory related to senior tourism poses a major hurdle to continued research in this field, especially with regard to the application of evolving age theories. Few studies analyse the relevance or motivations of senior tourists. Therefore, this study investigates the tourism behaviour of Spanish senior travellers, including both their motivations and their tendency to travel. To develop a theoretical framework, this article relies on three theories to explicate the travel behaviour of senior citizens: lifecycle theory, continuity theory and generational theory.