Modality, Semantics, and Consciousness

Here I present an overall assessment of how Chalmers and I differ on the argumentative route to any form of anti-Materialism. I reframe my objection to the semantic framework he appeals to in his argument and also present reasons for thinking that no choice to adopt one semantic framework over another can yield the metaphysical conclusions he wishes to draw. One basic problem I present is that, using a semantic argument to establish that some realm of phenomena is fundamental, seems to unjustifiably assume a link between the semantically fundamental and the metaphysically fundamental. I also criticize his appeal to modal rationalism as a basis for disallowing so-called “strong necessity.”

Modal Realism, Modal Rationalism, Modal Naturalism

This chapter summarizes the accounts of modal realism, modal rationalism, and modal naturalism. It details the author's attempt to develop a framework that is compatible with the denial of actualist accounts of modality. It also alludes to some ways that the contrast between modal naturalism and modal rationalism connects with many of the issues that have been the focus of attention in recent philosophical discussions about reference, intentionality, and knowledge: Frege puzzles about singular reference, the phenomenon of a posteriori necessities, the interpretation and application of two-dimensional modal semantics, contextualism about knowledge. This book has not been about those problems, but the development of the framework of modal semantics is motivated in large part by its relevance to them.