A short argument from modal rationalism to fundamental scrutability

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-139
Author(s):  
Gabriel Oak Rabin
Keyword(s):  
2007 ◽  
Vol 107 (1pt3) ◽  
pp. 433-456 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Hossack
Keyword(s):  

Erkenntnis ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anand Vaidya
Keyword(s):  

dialectica ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Leech
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Robert Stalnaker

This chapter summarizes the accounts of modal realism, modal rationalism, and modal naturalism. It details the author's attempt to develop a framework that is compatible with the denial of actualist accounts of modality. It also alludes to some ways that the contrast between modal naturalism and modal rationalism connects with many of the issues that have been the focus of attention in recent philosophical discussions about reference, intentionality, and knowledge: Frege puzzles about singular reference, the phenomenon of a posteriori necessities, the interpretation and application of two-dimensional modal semantics, contextualism about knowledge. This book has not been about those problems, but the development of the framework of modal semantics is motivated in large part by its relevance to them.


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